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1. Human capital, productivity, and earnings: a survey of the microeconometric literature
a. Estimating the individual return to schooling: methodological issues
Schooling costs time, effort and money, but at the same time it augments an individual’s
earnings capacity. Hence, expenditure on schooling can be considered an investment and the
extra income earned due to the completion of an additional year of schooling as part of its
return.
Most recent studies of education and wage determination are embedded in Mincer’s
framework discussed in Box 1 in the main text and a large amount of research has estimated
the Mincerian earnings equation for different countries and time periods. The common
estimation method is ordinary least squares (OLS). Estimating returns to schooling by OLS is
an easy task but has the drawback that the estimated return may be biased, i.e. the OLS
return may not reflect the "true" reward the labour market places on an additional year of
schooling. In what follows we first discuss why OLS estimates on returns to education may be
biased and then discuss possible remedies.
When estimating returns to education by OLS, the econometrician encounters basically
three problems. The first problem is that schooling attainment is not randomly determined,
but is rather the result of an optimising decision influenced by individual characteristics such
as ability, taste for schooling or access to funds. For example, if more able individuals spend
more time in school and receive higher earnings, then differences in earnings of individuals
who have different levels of education overestimate the true causal effect of schooling on
earnings or put differently, the returns to education will be upward biased. The most
straightforward approach to tackle the issue of unobserved ability is to include measures
that proxy for unobserved ability in the earnings equation, such as IQ or other test scores
(Griliches (1977)). But schooling itself determines this kind of ability measure leading to a
downward bias in the estimated returns to schooling. Another method, which attempts to
directly control for unobservable factors, adds information on family background variables
such as education or earnings of the parents to the Mincerian earnings equation. Controlling
for family background in the OLS estimates may reduce the upward bias in the OLS
estimates, but may be unable to eliminate it completely unless the family background
variables absorb all unobservable components. The second problem is that returns to education
may be heterogeneous, i.e. may vary across individuals, which will usually lead to biased
estimates. The third problem are measurement errors in the schooling variable, which is
likely to bias the OLS estimator of the returns to schooling downward.
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One approach taken to resolve these econometric problems is the use of twin studies. These
studies exploit the fact that members of the same family such as siblings or twins are more
alike then randomly selected individuals. Twins (or siblings) are less likely to face
differences in home environment or financial support and for identical twins even genetic
variation in ability may be ruled out. Differences in schooling and earnings of siblings and
twins can thus be used to estimate returns to schooling. But even this setting only yields
unbiased estimates of returns to schooling if twins face no heterogeneity in any factor that
may be correlated with the schooling variable and if the distributions of abilities among
twins equals the distribution of abilities in the population as a whole. If these requirements
are not satisfied the standard cross-sectional, then the OLS estimator may have a smaller
upward bias then the within-twin estimator. Another problem of twin studies is that is that
they are likely to exacerbate measurement errors in the schooling variable.
The instrumental variable (IV) approach is a further strategy to solve the bias in the OLS
estimates on returns to education. Generally, an IV approach requires an exogenous instrument
that is the existence of an observable variable that affects the variable of interest, i.e. years
of schooling, but is not correlated with the earnings residual. The IV approach proceeds in
two stages: First, the researcher obtains an estimate of the effect of the instrument variables
on schooling and then on earnings. Dividing the effect of the instrumental variable on
earnings by the effect of the instrumental variables on schooling will yield an unbiased
estimator of the returns to schooling if the exogenous instrument only affects earnings through
schooling.
Researchers obtained instrumental variables from natural experiments or family
background. The identification of natural experiments provides the researcher with
variables that are likely to influence the level of schooling but are independent of unobserved
individual characteristics. Natural experiments exploit natural variation in the data such
as institutional changes, which affect for example, the minimum school leaving age or tuition
costs for higher education or factors. Alternatively variables such as geographic proximity to
colleges or quarter of birth have been used (Card (1995), Angrist and Krueger (1991)). The
instrumental variable estimator has the advantage that if the instrumental variable is not
correlated with the measurement error, then measurement errors do not introduce a bias in the
IV estimator. However, if returns to education are heterogeneous the existence of an exogenous
instrument is not sufficient to guarantee that the IV approach yields unbiased estimates of
the average return to schooling. Consider for example a natural experiment that affects
mostly a certain subgroup of the sample. Card (1999) shows that in this case the IV estimate
may reflect the return of this subgroup and not the average return in the population.
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b.  Review of the estimates
We will now present a selective review of the evidence on the return to education with a
special focus on Europe. We start by providing evidence on instrumental variables based on
natural experiments. These findings are presented in Table A1.1 (which is enclosed at the end
of the Appendix, along with Table A1.3). Next, we summarize estimates obtained from twin
studies and then turn to returns to education whose estimation use information on family
background.
Using college proximity as instrumental variable, Card (1999) obtains estimates of returns
to schooling for the US, which are nearly twice as large as the corresponding OLS estimates
on returns to schooling. He further finds that college proximity affects children of less-
educated parents more and therefore interacts college proximity with family background as
instrumental variable, adding college proximity as a direct control variable to the earnings
equation. Returns to education using this IV procedure are 0.097, which compares to OLS
estimates of 0.073. Similarly, Connelly and Uusitalo (1997) find for Finland that IV
estimates of the returns to schooling based on college-proximity instrumental variables are 20
to 30% higher than the corresponding OLS estimates.
In Britain the minimum school leaving age was raised from 14 to 15 years in 1947 and from
15 to 16 years in 1973. Harmon and Walker (1995) use these institutional changes as
instruments and obtain IV estimates, which are about 2.5 times higher than the
corresponding OLS estimates. However, as Card (1999) points out, their IV estimates may be
upward biased due to the fact that the effect of the 1947 law change cannot be separated from
the changes in educational attainment induced by World War II. Changes in compulsory
education are also used as an instrumental variable by Viera (1999) to estimate the return to
schooling in Portugal. Again, IV estimates exceed standard OLS estimates. For Italy,
Brunello and Miniaci (1999) exploit the fact that in 1969 the possibility to enrol in a college
was no longer determined by the curriculum chosen in secondary school. Using family
background variables on the parental education level and actual occupation as additional
instruments, they obtain IV estimates that exceed OLS estimates by nearly 20%.
Angrist and Krueger (1991) propose individual’s quarter of birth as an instrument. They
find that individuals who are born earlier in the year reach the minimum school-leaving age
at a lower grade than people born later in the year. Hence, individuals who are born earlier
in the year and want to drop out legally leave school with less education. Levin and Plug
(1999) however find that Dutch individuals born later in the year have significantly lower
schooling. They explain this with the fact that within classes older students are likely to
receive higher marks, which encourages further schooling. Hence, the net-effect of quarter of
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birth on schooling attainment is ex ante not clear. An alternative explanation is that in the
Netherlands, students are obliged to finish the schooling year they have started, even if
they reach the minimum leaving age in the course of this year. Levin and Plug find that
returns to education increase by about 10% relative to standard OLS estimates when season of
birth is used as an instrument.
Recently, there has been a large increase in estimates of the return to schooling based on
twin studies because of the availability of new, relatively large data sets. The data set used
by Ashenfelter and Rouse (1998), for example, consists of 340 pairs of identical (monozygotic)
twins. It provides the response of each twin about their own and their sibling’s schooling
level. Hence, the difference in schooling between twins according to one twin can be used as an
instrument for the response on the difference in schooling for the other one. As can be seen in
Table A1.2, Ashenfelter and Rouse find that within-twins estimates of the returns to
education are about 30% lower than the corresponding OLS estimates. Once they control for
measurement errors, within-twins estimates increase by about 25%, remaining still below the
cross-sectional OLS estimates.
Table A1.2: Estimates based on twin-studies
Author Controls D a t a Specification Cross-
section
OLS
             Differences
  OLS                     IV
Isacsson
(1999)
Sweden
Gender,
marital
status,
quadratic in
age and
residence in a
large city.
Swedish
Twin
Registry.
Administrati
ve and
survey
measures of
schooling
identical
twins
fraternal
twins
Subsample
identical
twins
fraternal
twins
0.046
(0.001)
0.047
(0.002)
0.049
(0.002)
0.051
 (0.002)
0.022
(0.002)
0.039
 (0.002)
0.023
(0.004)
0.040
 (0.003)
0.027/0.060
(0.003/0.007)
0.044/0.060
(0.002/0.003)
0.027
(0.008)
0.054
 (0.006)
Ashen-
felter
 Rouse
(1998)
US
Gender, race,
quadratic in
age.
Additional
controls
tenure,
marital and
union status.
Princeton
Twin Survey,
1991-1993.
Identical
male and
female
twins.
Without
additional
controls.
W i t h
additional
controls.
0.110
 (0.010)
0.113
0.010)
0.070
 (0.019)
0.078
 (0.018)
0.088
(0.025)
0.100
 (0.023)
Isacsson (1999) uses a data set, taken from the population of twins born in Sweden between
1926 and 1958, which consists of 2492 pairs of identical (monozygotic) and 3368 pairs of
fraternal (dizygotic) twins. Furthermore information on two measures of schooling
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(administrative and self-reported level of education) is available for a sub-sample of the
data and allows him to correct for measurement error. Isacsson finds that for the sub-sample
with both education measures, the within-twins estimate is about 50% (20%) lower than the
OLS estimate for identical twins for (fraternal twins). For fraternal twins, the measurement
corrected within-twins estimate exceeds the OLS estimate by 35%.
This review suggests that estimates of returns to education obtained from instrumental
variable approach or twin studies usually exceed OLS estimates and confirms the results of
Ashenfelter, Harmon, Oosterbeek (1999). Analysing estimations from 1974 to 1995 in the US
and seven non-US countries (Finland, Honduras, Indonesia, Ireland, Netherlands, Portugal
and the United Kingdom), they find that IV estimates and twin studies estimates differ from
OLS estimates by 3.1 and 1.6 percentage points.
c.  The return to schooling over time and across countries
Many developed countries witnessed major changes in their wage distribution during the
last decades. In the US, returns to education decreased during the 1970s and rose sharply
during the 1980s. Average returns to education in Europe followed a similar pattern. When
looking at European countries one by one, different trends in returns to education can be
observed. In this section, we will provide evidence on the evolution of changes in returns to
education during the last decades for the US, Europe and selected European countries. We
will try to identify the driving forces behind these changes in returns to education and
explain why these patterns of change were so different across European countries. Finally, we
provide evidence on returns to education for various European countries and discuss the
country-specific determinants of these returns.
Returns to education are usually estimated from cross-sectional data and consequently
correspond to the wage differential among different skill groups. In a competitive labour
market, wages are determined by supply and demand. The supply of skilled workers is
determined by the educational attainment of the work force. Demand for skilled workers
may change, for example, due to technological change or trade.
It is a well-documented fact that returns to education in the US decreased during the 1970s
and increased during the 1980s generating a U-shaped time pattern of educational wage
differentials. There seems to be some consensus that these changes in the returns to education
may be interpreted as outcomes of shifts in the supply and demand for human capital. The
basic idea is that increases in the supply of skilled workers dominated during the 1970s,
while demand growth was the driving force in the 1980s. Katz and Murphy (1992), for
example, argue that the deceleration in the growth of highly educated labour supply in the
United States during the 1980s relative to the 1970s may explain the rise in returns to
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education during this decade. Katz and Murphy’s hypothesis is based on the assumption that
the relative demand for skilled workers increased. The prime candidate for explaining the
increase in the demand for skilled workers is skill-biased technological change. New
technologies have been introduced during the last decades, such as computers or robots, and
organizational changes took place within firms that often replaced labour intensive tasks
and increased the demand for skilled labour.
 For Europe, Harmon, Walker and Westergaard (2001) find that estimates of returns to
education where higher in the 1960s as compared to the 1970s. During the 1980s returns
dropped even further, but started to rise again in the 1990s. This describes a U-shaped
pattern, similar for what we have observed for the US. Performing a meta-analysis of the
data, Denny, Harmon and Lydon (2001) confirm these results. A meta-analysis is basically a
regression that takes as dependent variables the estimates of different studies that focus on
the same topic and similar methodology. The explanatory variables of this regression
describe the characteristics of the estimation such as equation specification, sample size and
years of estimation. A meta-analysis, thus, controls for the effect of study-specific features on
the estimated returns to education. Comparing the change in the US returns to education with
Europe, Denny, Harmon and Lydon (2001) show that rates of returns to education in Europe
exceeded US returns in the early 1960’s. In the course of the 1960s and 1970s, returns to
education in Europe and in the US fell at a similar rate. US returns to education reached their
minimum at the end of the 1970s, while European returns continued to decline until the mid
1980s. The subsequent increase in returns to education was much more pronounced in the United
States. By 1997 returns to schooling in the US were about 3-percentage point higher than in
Europe.
Although the pattern of change in the returns to education was strikingly similar in
Europe as a whole and the United States, behaviour across European countries differed
widely. Returns to schooling in Austria, Switzerland and Sweden decreased, but increased in
Denmark, Portugal and Finland. Other countries faced no trend at all or different behaviour
of male and female returns to education (Harmon, Walker and Westergaard (2001)). In what
follows, we provide some evidence on the evolution of returns to education for selected
European countries and try to identify the underlying forces. We start with Great Britain,
whose behaviour largely mirrors that of the United States and then turn to Spain and
Portugal, which also faced increases in the returns to education during the 1980s. Next, we
discuss why wage inequality in France, Germany and Italy remained rather stable. We
conclude with Austria, whose returns to education seem to have declined.
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Great Britain largely shares the pattern of change in wage inequality with the United
States. Similar to the United States, supply of university-educated workers in Great Britain
grew rapidly during the 1970s and differentials across skill groups narrowed. During the
1980s, wage inequality and university wage premia increased substantially. Katz, Loveman
and Blanchflower (1993) explain with the deceleration in the pace of growth of the relative
supply of high-educated workers during the 1980s and the decline in employment in mining,
manufacturing, construction and utilities which affected particularly male, manual, low-
skilled workers.
 Spain underwent profound changes in the 1980s. It joined the European Union and
consolidated its democratic institutions. The share of workers in heavy and manufacturing
industries declined substantially, whereas the share of employment in commerce, finance and
service industries rose. During the 1980s the average educational attainment of the workforce
increased remarkably in Spain. In 1981, 74,2% of the employed population had a primary
education or less and only 7,6% had completed higher education. By 1991, the population
with primary education or less had fallen to 48,5%. The percentage of employed with
secondary school degree had more than doubled and 12,5% held a higher education degree.
Generation of employment lagged behind the rapid increase of the Spanish labour force.
Unemployment was and is still high, affecting particularly younger and less educated
people, as well as women. Vila and Mora (1998) find that from 1981 to 1991 Spanish skill
wage differentials increased. Returns to lower secondary and primary education decreased,
whereas returns to higher education either increased or remained stable.
Portugal faced a severe economic crisis in the first half of the 1980s and major economic
changes during the second half. According to Hartog, Pereira and Vieira (2001) returns to
education in Portugal remained largely unchanged between 1982 and 1986. Between 1986 and
1992 they increased substantially for both men and women. In contrast to Spain, the increase
in returns to education in Portugal was not driven by a reallocation of employment towards
skill-intensive sectors. Employment in Portugal rather shifted after 1986 towards sectors
that traditionally employ low-educated workers, such as restaurants and hotels,
construction, textiles and services. So why did returns to education in Portugal increase?
According to Hartog, Pereira and Vieira an increase in demand for high-skilled workers
within industries may well explain this finding. Portugal joined the European Union in 1986.
It hence embarked in a process of modernising its productive structure, particularly through
the introduction of new production technologies. This was made possible thanks to structural
funds from the EU and specific financial aids. Furthermore, the liberalisation of trade with
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more developed countries, may have enhanced the importation of technologies that require
skilled labour.
In France, wage inequality did not increase substantially during the 1980s. It declined
until 1984 and increased slightly from 1984 to 1987 (Katz, Loveman and Blanchflower (1993)).
The fact that significant relative demand shifts did not result in increases in wage
differentials through the mid-1980s may be due to French labour market institutions, in
particularly the negotiated and the legislated minimum wage. Collective bargaining in
France takes mainly place at the industry level and these industry-level arrangements
determine minimum wages for each job category. These negotiated minima apply to all firms
of all sizes throughout the industry and are binding in case they exceed the legislated
minimum wage. The legislated minimum wage applies to all sectors.
Similar to France, former West Germany did not face any increase in wage inequality
during the 1980s (Abraham and Houseman (1985), Winkelmann (1994)). One possible
explanation is that in contrast to the United States, the growth of the high-educated work
force did not decelerate in Germany. Furthermore, as Abraham and Houseman (1985) point
out, the high quality of the German apprenticeship system may have prevented returns of
education from increasing. They argue that the high level of education for relatively low-
skilled workers facilitates the substitutability of workers with different levels of education
and experience. Moreover, German solidaristic wage policies, pursued by German trade unions
and sought to narrow the gap between highly paid and less highly paid workers, may have
tended to depress earnings differentials.
Italy experienced a compression of wage differentials during the 1970s, which according to
Ichino and Erikson (1992) came to a halt around 1982-83. The break in the evolution of the
wage differentials in 1982-83 coincides with the slow-down in inflation, industrial
restructuring, the introduction of an escalator clause in Italian union contracts and the loss of
support for unions and their egalitarian pay policies.
 In Austria, returns to an additional year of schoolings dropped remarkably from 1981 to
1997. The rapid increase in the labour supply of workers with secondary and tertiary
education may explain this fall in Austrian returns to education. Fersterer and Winter-Ebmer
(1999) provide evidence for this hypothesis. They find that workers, who belonged to
education, age and gender groups with the highest increase in supply, faced the lowest
growth of wages. In particular, the drop in returns to education was largest for university
students, while returns to a vocational school degree or apprenticeship training remained
fairly constant.
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Returns to education do not vary only over time, but also across countries. Using a common
specification across European countries, Harmon, Walker and Westergaard (2001) find that
the Scandinavian countries (Norway, Sweden and Denmark) have the lowest returns to an
additional year of schooling. Returns are highest in Ireland and the UK, followed by
Germany, Portugal and Switzerland. A meta-analysis reveals an average return to an
additional year of schooling of around 6.5% in Europe. It confirms that Scandinavian
countries have the lowest returns to schooling, followed by Italy, Greece and the
Netherlands, while returns to schooling in UK and Ireland are indeed higher on average.
Similar evidence is provided by, Denny, Harmon and Lydon (2001). They estimate returns
to education by OLS using the International Social Survey Program Data 1995. This data set
is designed to be consistent across countries. As can be seen in Figure A1.1, they find a large
difference in returns to education for men across countries ranging from 2.29% in Norway to
17.66% in North Ireland. Austria, Germany, Netherlands and Norway have relatively low
returns to schooling for men, while male returns to schooling are highest in Portugal, Ireland
and Great Britain. Returns to education for women exceed male returns in the majority of
countries. Female returns to education are lowest in the Netherlands (1.81%), Norway and
New Zealand and highest in Great Britain, the Republic of Ireland and North Ireland
(16.81%).
Figure A1.1: Returns to schooling in selected EU countries.
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d. The role of schooling for male-female wage differentials
In most industrialised countries the gender wage decreased dramatically during the last
decade. For a long time a large part of the gender wage had been attributed to differences in
schooling between men and women. But differences in average years of schooling among male
and female full-time workers have largely disappeared, contributing to a significant
decrease in the gender wage, (Blau and Kahn (1997) for the US and Harkness (1996) for the
UK). Not only schooling of women, but also female labour force participation and
consequently women’s accumulated labour force experience has increased. These changes in
experience seem to have been even more important in closing the gender wage gap than the
increase in years of education (see for example Blau and Kahn (1997) for the US). Relative
changes in schooling and work experience altogether, seem to have narrowed the gender wage
gap in the US by one-third to one-half between the mid 1970s and late 1980s (O’Neill and
Polacheck (1993)). But despite dramatic reductions in the male-female wage gap during the
last decades, differences in the earnings of men and women continue to persist.
Differences in the earnings of men and woman can arise for a variety of reason. Differences
in schooling, labour force participation rates, work experience, hours worked, job tenure and
turnover rates are only the most obvious. Even among equally qualified men and women a
substantial gender wage differential remains. Differences in social roles, parental
preferences concerning the level of education or job, financial attractiveness of home versus
market work, occupational preferences, tastes for jobs or labour market discrimination have
been proposed in order to explain these facts. In what follows, we will discuss the different
factors that are likely to determine the gender wage gap with a special focus on the role of
schooling and "careers".
 Differences in schooling between full-time working men and women have largely
disappeared in many industrialised countries. Today it is not the amount of schooling, but
rather differences in what men and women study, as well as differences in aptitudes and
achievement scores across subjects through which schooling affects gender wage gap. The
Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) 2000 of the OECD (OECD 2001a)
finds that while males are likely to under-perform in reading, women seem to have a
measurable disadvantage in mathematics. Similarly, Brown and Corcoran (1997) conclude for
the US that twelfth grade boys score higher on math achievement tests and lower on reading
and vocabulary tests. There exists some evidence for the US that these differences in
aptitudes may translate into earnings differentials. Altonji (1995) and Brown and Corcoran
(1997), for example, find that differences in high school courses play only a modest role in
the gender gap among high school students. But differences in the type of college major (e.g.
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engineering, physical science, business or law) account for a substantial share of the
differential among male and female wages.
A large part of the gender wage gap is generally attributed to the fact that women
accumulate a lower amount of experience than men do. Women often interrupt their careers,
work fewer hours and have a higher propensity to work part-time than men. As a consequence
they may spend a smaller proportion of their working-age time actually working. But it is
not only the total amount of experience, which matters. Differences in the timing of and the
returns to experience account for a sizeable fraction of the gender wage gap. Light and Ureta
(1995) show that about 12 percent of the raw differential in male/female earnings is due to
differences in the timing (i.e. differences in the frequency duration and placement of non-work
spells) of work experience, while 30% of the gap is due to differences in returns to experience.
They further find that career interruptions play a smaller role for women than for men and
that women recover more quickly from interrupting their career. This suggests that women
may tend to work in occupations that allow them to restore their skills faster, while men
may have career interruptions for reasons that are more negatively related to productivity.
Fewer working hours and fewer years in the labour market lead according to the standard
human capital theory to less investment in general human capital. Furthermore, women have
traditionally higher turnover than men. Expected separation from the current job may
discourage investment in employer specific human capital from the part of the women and
the employer. A woman may decide not to invest in employer specific human capital, as she
knows that she is going to interrupt her career soon. The same holds true for employers. Under
imperfect information, the employer may discriminate against the women in terms of
training opportunities, if he assumes that the women is likely to interrupt her career in the
near future, for example because she is in child-bearing age.
But women do not only have higher turnover rates. It also seems that the reasons
underlying the decision to quit a job vary systematically among men and women. Findings by
Sicherman (1996) suggest that women take short-run considerations into account when
changing jobs, while men place more importance on long run that is career considerations.
Sicherman (1996), for example, finds for the US that 12% of women and 4% of men left their
job due to a change in residence, which is consistent with the idea that women put more
weight on having a job close to their home. Not only proximity to home, but also working
hours seem to be a job attribute which is relatively more important to women. Empirical
evidence suggests that it is rather hours than wages that play a role in the job choice of
women and that job mobility of women is strongly linked to changes in hours (Altonji and
Paxson (1991))
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Differences in job characteristics such as occupation, industry, unionisation and job-related
amenities further contribute sizeably to the male female wage gap. Blau and Kahn (1997)
show that the unexplained part of male/female wage regressions reduces from 22% to 13% in
1988 once industry, occupation and collective bargaining variables were included.
Going beyond occupations, there has been a growing amount of research on the impact of
part-time and temporary work on wages. Women are heavily over-represented in part-time
and temporary jobs. These jobs pay typically less than full-time, permanent jobs. Whether a
greater relative fraction of women actually prefers part-time or temporary jobs or whether
this behaviour is due to labour market constraints is far from clear. There exists some
evidence that a part of the negative effect of part-time work on female wages may be due to
selection. Blank (1990) for example finds that controlling for women’s selection significantly
reduces the negative effect of part-time on women’s wages. This is also consistent with the
findings of Harkness (1996), who shows that while the wage gap has been closing for full-
time working women over the last decades, the relative earnings position of women working
part-time has changed little. But while the qualification gap among male and female full-
time workers disappeared completely for younger workers, part-time working women
continue to be less qualified than full-time working men and women.
Men and women do not earn the same. Differences in the subjects they study and the
occupation they choose, as well as differences in work experience play an important role in
explaining the gender wage gap. Lifetime work expectations and career considerations are
likely to affect female wages considerably. But even among equally qualified men and women
the gender differentials persist. Discrimination has been often proposed as a candidate for
explaining the unexplained part of the gender wage differential. An alternative explanation
is that women have different preferences, which translates into different career choices. The
question of how much of the gender wage differential is due to differential choices by women
and how much can be ascribed to discriminatory barriers in the labour market is difficult to
address. It is even not clear in the first place, if the two theories are not likely to interact
rather than to be separated, as past labour market discrimination may have induced women
to develop a certain set of preferences, which reflects itself in present choices. The distinction
between choice and constraint as determinants of the gender wage gap, thus, remain difficult
and controversial.
e. Technological change
An econometrician, who wants to estimate the effect of technological change on human
capital and employment, encounters several econometric problems. The first problem is how
to measure technology. Often researchers try to address this problem by repeating their
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estimation with different measures of technologies. This allows them to check that their
results are not susceptible to a specific technology measure. The simplest approach of
measuring technology is the use of time trends. Unfortunately, time trends are likely to
capture much more then solely technological change, such as changes in demand conditions or
prices. As a consequence, evidence on the effects of technological change based on this measure
should be treated with care.
A prime candidate for the measurement of technology is R&D expenditures. This
information is available at the firm level for many countries and different periods.
Furthermore, it has the advantage that it is rather comparable across countries and time.
The major disadvantage of using R&D is that the data usually refers to the industry in
which the innovation originates, not where it is actually used. Moreover, in most European
countries, firms are not obliged to disclose the amount of R&D expenditure in their company
accounts. While R&D measures the input to knowledge, patents measure its output. Using
patents as a measure of technology involves the complication that many of them are of very
low value. Taking this into account by weighting the different patents according to their
value is not straightforward. Furthermore, the likelihood of an innovation being patented
has differed historically across industries. The advantage of patent data is that it measures
the direct use of innovations. During the 1980s, the use of computers (and computer-based)
resources at the workplace has grown enormously. As a consequence, computers maybe the
most concrete example of technological change during 1980s and a good proxy for the rate of
technological change at the work place. The advantage of using a technology measure based
on investment in computers lies in the fact that it captures the use and not the production of an
innovation.
The past decades witnessed major changes in technologies, such as the rapid spread of
computers at our workplaces, the expansion of computer-assisted production techniques and
robots and the more intensive use of the Internet. How do these changes affect the relative
demand for skilled workers? There exist basically two hypotheses, which try to explain the
relation between the relative demand for skilled workers and technological change. The first
hypothesis relates technological change and demand of skilled workers. If highly educated
workers have a relative advantage in adjusting to and implementing of new technologies,
then the spread of these new technologies is likely to increase the demand for skilled
workers relative to unskilled workers. This means that in a period of technological change,
the productivity of highly educated workers increases relative to less educated workers, due
to the fact the highly educated workers are more able to adjust to a changing environment.
Hence, times of rapid technological change should also be associated with an increased
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demand for skill and may lead to higher returns to education. Furthermore, industries
characterized by high rates of innovations should have a higher demand for highly
educated workers. Bartel and Lichtenberg (1987) shed some light on this issue. They find
that the relative demand for educated workers declines as the age of the plant and
particularly of equipment increases. This is especially the case in R&D intensive industries.
The second hypothesis claims the technological change is skill biased. New technologies
mainly replace labour intensive tasks and are likely to complement skilled workers. Thus,
the transition from an old to a new technology results in permanent changes in the equilibrium
share of skilled labour, holding output and relative prices constant. If the demand for skilled
workers outstrips its supply then returns to education increase. There exists clear evidence at
the industry level that almost all industries started to employ educated workers during the
1970s and 1980s and that industries that were more computerized increased their demand for
college-educated workers at a faster rate (e.g. Berman, Bound and Griliches (1994), Autor,
Katz and Krueger (1996), and Machin and Van Reenen (1998)). Machin and Van Reenen (1998)
use data of the manufacturing sector in Denmark, France, Germany, Japan, Sweden and the
UK. Using R&D intensity as a measure of technology, they provide evidence for skill bias
across all these countries. Berman, Bound and Griliches (1994) and Autor, Katz and Krueger
(1996) model changes in workforce skill as a function of changes in industry capital intensity
and industry-level investment in computer equipment. Their findings reveal a strong positive
correlation between the level of computer investment and changes in the skill of workers in
the industry.
A positive correlation between the level of computer investment and demand for skilled
workers does not necessarily mean that computer investment causes an increase in the demand
for skills, since industries that are highly computerized may demand more skilled workers
for other reasons as well. Using plant-level data, Doms, Dunne and Troske (1997) also come to
the conclusion that a higher proportion of college-educated workers are employed in
technologically advanced plants, when using cross-sectional data. The longitudinal analysis
however reveals that plants that adopt new factory automation technologies have a higher
proportion of skilled workers before and after the adoption of the new technologies. They
conclude that the correlation between skill upgrading and the adoption of new technologies is
largely due to the fact that plants with a high wage workforce are more likely to adopt new
technologies. The authors however emphasise that the type of technology they use is
directly used in the production of manufactured goods, whereas computer investment is a main
tool for white-collar workers. When they use computer investment as an alternative measure
of technology, they find a positive correlation with the growth of skilled worker even in the
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longitudinal data. This leads them to conclude that the effect of new technologies on the
structure of the work force depends critically on which type of technology is adopted.
Industry level studies may be subject to serious aggregation bias. Hence, the fact that even
firm-level studies seem to support the existence of skill-biased technological chance
considerably strengthens the evidence. Using a data set on British plant, Haskel and Heden
(1997) find evidence, that computers positively affect the growth of skill intensity. Dueguet
and Greenan (1997) use an innovation survey for a panel of French manufacturing firms from
1986 to 1991 and come to a similar conclusion. They argue that skill bias arises mainly from
the introduction of new products. For Spain, Aguirrebriria and Alonso-Borrega (1997) find
that the introduction of technological capital, defined as "successful innovations generated
externally to the firm" has a strong negative effect on blue-collar workers. However, they
find no robust effect of R&D.
While there exists evidence, that technological change affects the relative demand for
skilled workers, only a few studies try to understand the mechanisms through which
technological change operates. Unobserved factors play a large role in the analysis of
technological change and demand for skills. Some conjecture (Dunne, Haltiwanger and
Troske, 1996 and Machin and van Reenen (1998)) that organizational change might well be
one of them. In most industrialized countries, there has been a trend towards less hierarchy
and more flexible organizational forms. More autonomy and responsibility is given to the
workers and often they are performing a wider range of tasks. Caroli and van Reenen (1999)
go even further and claim that lack of necessary organizational structures that facilitated
the introduction of new technologies, may to some extend explain the so-called "productivity
paradox." This states that huge investments in computers often fail to result in significant
increases in productivity. Caroli and van Reenen (1999) use a panel of British and French
establishments in order to investigate whether organizational changes such as the
decentralization of authority, delayering of managerial functions and increased multi-
tasking affects the skill composition of firms. They find that organizational changes tend to
reduce the demand for unskilled workers and lead to greater increases in productivity in
establishments with larger initial skill endowments. They conclude that the widespread
introduction of new organizational forms may be important in explaining the declining
demand for less skilled workers.
In contrast to the studies on technology and demand for skilled workers, most of the studies
that try to analyse the relation between technological change and wages use individual
data. The rise in wage inequality in the US and the widespread notion that technological
change may be the driving force behind it triggered a large amount of studies on this subject.
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Mincer (1993), using data from 1963 to 1987, shows that relative earnings of college graduates
increased with R&D intensity. Similarly, Allen (1998) provides evidence that changes in
innovative activities as measured by R&D intensity and the usage of high-tech capital play
an important role in explaining changes in the wage structure. He finds that increases in the
return to schooling between 1979 and 1989 were most pronounced in industries with a greater
R&D intensity and more high-tech capital. Krueger (1993) argues that computers change the
structure of wages and shows that workers that use computers are paid more. The effect of
computer use on wages is greater for educated workers.
A positive relation between returns to education and computer use (or other technologies)
does not necessarily mean that it is technology that drives wages of skilled workers up.
There exists a large body evidence demonstrating that workers with the highest ability and
hence the highest wages are given the best technologies to use. This means that it is rather
selection and not the increase in productivity that explains the computer wage premium.
DiNardo and Pischke (1997), for example, find a positive correlation between wages and
computer use in German data, which is similar to the finding of Krueger (1993). However,
they show that the correlation between wages and pencil use is equally robust, which is a
point in favour of the selection hypothesis. Likewise, Entorf and Kramarz (1997) emphasise
that in France the cross-sectional association between wages and computer use disappears
once they control for unobserved individual characteristics. One should thus be careful in
interpreting the computer-wage correlation as the causal effect of technical change on wages.
Several studies that use firm level data find a strong positive relation between technology
and inter-industry wages. It is not clear, however, whether this effect arises because of
sorting. Bartel and Sicherman (1999) address this issue by using individual-level data in
order to explain differences in inter-industry wages. They conclude that sorting is the
dominant explanation for higher wages in industries that are subject to faster technological
change. Similarly, Doms, Dunne and Troske (1997) find that the positive effect on wages
disappears once they account for individual fixed effects. Chennels and Van Reenen (1997)
show that the effect of technology on wages disappears once they use industry level measures
of technological opportunity as an instrument for the adoption of new micro electronic
technologies at the plant level.
To understand the effect of technological change on employment, assume that a firm
decides to implement a computer-assisted production process. The implementation of this new
process allows the firm to save on labour, which means that it can produce the same amount
of output as before with a lower level of employment. This initial drop in employment is
accompanied by a cost reduction, which may reflect itself in a decrease in prices. The latter
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may translate into an increase in the output of the firm, inducing employment to increase.
Whether employment is higher before or after the adoption of the new technology depends
on a variety of factors. The positive employment effect is smaller if the firm has some degree
of market power and passes only part of the cost reduction on in form of lower prices.
Economies of scale may magnify the positive employment effect. If consumers react strongly to
changes in prices then the positive employment effect is likely to be large. And product
innovations as opposed to process innovation have generally a stronger output expansion
effect and hence are more likely to affect employment positively. Summarising, the effect of
technological change on the level of employment is a priori far from clear.
Cross-industry studies on the relationship between employment and technology have been
relatively scarce. Analysing the OECD STAN/ANBERD database on manufacturing,
Blechinger, Kleinknecht, Licht and Pfeiffer (1998) show that industries with higher R&D
intensity expanded more quickly. Firm level studies provide a wide variety of results from
different countries. It appears that product innovation has a positive effect on employment
growth (e.g. Entorf and Pohlmeier (1990) for German firms.) Evidence concerning process
innovations is rather mixed. Some studies find positive effects (e.g. Blanchflower and
Burgess (1998) for the UK and Australia and Blechinger et al (1998) for Dutch firms). Greenan
and Guellac (2000) conclude for France that process innovations have a strong positive effect
at the firm level, but that this effect disappears at the industry level. They find the
opposite for product innovations. Note, however, that firms may introduce new technology
when they expect demand conditions to improve, which may lead to an upward bias in the
coefficient on the measure of technology. Finally, Entorf, Gollac and Kramarz (1999) show
that computer users are protected from job losses in the short run, that is, as long as bad
business conditions do not last too long. But also here the question arises whether it is not
rather selection, which determines not only wage gains but also job losses.
This review of recent studies on technology, demand for education, wages and employment
reveals a strong positive correlation between technology and the relative demand for skilled
workers for different time periods and across countries. This finding seems to be robust and
suggests that technology is on average skill biased. There also exists some evidence of a
positive correlation between wages and large technological innovations. However, measures
based on the diffusion of technology, such as computer use provide no evidence on the
existence of a causal effect of technology on wages. Similarly, the positive relation between
inter-industry wages and technology seems to be largely due to sorting. Evidence on total
employment is mixed. Product (process) innovation seems to be positively (negatively)
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associated with employment. Hence, the only definite conclusion we are able to draw is that
the recent technological change was on average skill-biased.
2. Cross-country data on human capital1
Most governments gather information on a number of educational indicators through
population censuses, labour force surveys and specialized surveys. Various international
organizations collect these data and compile comparative statistics that provide easily
accessible and (supposedly) homogeneous information for a large number of countries. Perhaps
the most comprehensive regular source of international educational statistics is UNESCO's
Statistical Yearbook. This publication provides reasonably complete yearly time series on
school enrollment rates by level of education for most countries in the world and contains some
data on the educational attainment of the adult population, government expenditures on
education, teacher/pupil ratios and other variables of interest. Other UNESCO publications
contain additional information on educational stocks and flows and some convenient
compilations. Other useful sources include the UN's Demographic Yearbook, which also
reports educational attainment levels by age group and the IMF's Government Finance
Statistics, which provides data on public expenditures on education. Finally, the OECD also
compiles educational statistics both for its member states (e.g. OECD (2000)) and occasionally
for larger groups of countries.
a. Data on schooling
The UNESCO enrollment series have been used in a large number of empirical studies of
the link between education and productivity. In many cases this choice reflects the easy
availability and broad coverage of these data rather than their theoretical suitability for
the purpose of the study. Enrollment rates can probably be considered an acceptable, although
imperfect, proxy for the flow of educational investment. On the other hand, these variables
are not necessarily good indicators of the existing stock of human capital since average
educational attainment (which is often the more interesting variable from a theoretical point
of view) responds to investment flows only gradually and with a very considerable lag.
In an attempt to remedy these shortcomings, a number of researchers have constructed data
sets that attempt to measure directly the educational stock embodied in the population or
labour force of large samples of countries. One of the earliest attempts in this direction is due
to Psacharopoulos and Arriagada (P&A, 1986) who, drawing on earlier work by Kaneko
(1986), report data on the educational composition of the labour force in 99 countries and
1
 This section is partly based on de la Fuente and Doménech (2000).
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provide estimates of the average years of schooling. In most cases, however, P&A provide
only one observation per country.
More recently, there have been various attempts to construct more complete data sets on
educational attainment that provide broader temporal coverage and can therefore be used in
growth accounting and other empirical exercises. The existing data sets on educational
attainment have been constructed by combining the available data on attainment levels with
the UNESCO enrollment figures to obtain series of average years of schooling and the
educational composition of the population or labour force. Enrollment data are transformed
into attainment figures through a perpetual inventory method or some short-cut procedure
that attempts to approximate it.
Most of the studies in the macroeconomic literature we review in this report rely on one of
the following data bases:
• Kyriacou (1991) provides estimates of the average years of schooling of the labour force
(YS) for a sample of 111 countries. His data cover the period 1965-1985 at five-year intervals.
He uses UNESCO data and P&A's attainment figures to estimate an equation linking YS to
lagged enrollment rates. This equation is then used to construct an estimate of YS for other
years and countries.
• Lau, Jamison and Louat (1991) and Lau, Bhalla and Louat (1991). These studies use a
perpetual inventory method and annual data on enrollment rates to construct estimates of
attainment levels for the working-age population. Their perpetual inventory method uses
age-specific survival rates constructed for representative countries in each region but does not
seem to correct enrollment rates for dropouts or repeaters. "Early" school enrollment rates are
estimates constructed through backward extrapolation of post-1960 figures. They do not use or
benchmark against available census figures.
• Barro and Lee (B&L 1993) construct education indicators combining census data and
enrollment rates. To estimate attainment levels in years for which census data are not
available, they use a combination of interpolation between available census observations
(where possible) and a perpetual  inventory method that can be used to estimate changes from
nearby (either forward or backward) benchmark observations. Their version of the perpetual
inventory method makes use of data on gross enrollments2 and the age composition of the
2
 The gross enrollment rate is defined as the ratio between the total number of students enrolled in a given
educational level and the size of the population which, according to its age, "should" be enrolled in the
course. The net enrollment rate is defined in an analogous manner but counting only those students who
belong to the relevant age group. Hence, older students (typically repeaters) are excluded in this second
case.
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population (to estimate survival rates). The data set contains observations for 129 countries
and covers the period 1960-85 at five-year intervals. Besides the average years of education
of the population over 25, Barro and Lee report information on the fraction of the (male and
female) population that has reached and completed each educational level. In a more recent
paper (B&L, 1996), the same authors present an update of their previous work. The revised
database, which is constructed following the same procedure as the previous one (except for
the use of net rather than gross enrollment rates), extends the attainment series up to 1990,
provides data for the population over 15 years of age and incorporates some new information
on quality indicators such as the pupil/teacher ratio, public educational expenditures per
student and the length of the school year. Some further extensions, refinements and updates of
this data base have been made available by the authors in recent years and are discussed in
Barro and Lee (2000) and Lee and Barro (2001).
• Nehru, Swanson and Dubey (NSD 1995) follow roughly the same procedure as Lau, Jamison
and Louat (1991) but introduce several improvements. The first one is that Nehru et al collect
a fair amount of enrollment data prior to 1960 and do not therefore need to rely as much on the
backward extrapolation of enrollment rates. Secondly, they make some adjustment for grade
repetition and drop-outs using the limited information available on these variables.
We can divide these studies into two groups according to whether they make use of both
census attainment data and enrollment series or only the latter. The first set of papers
(Kyriacou and Barro and Lee) relies on census figures where available and then uses
enrollment data to fill in the missing values. Kyriacou uses a simple regression of educational
stocks on lagged flows to estimate the unavailable levels of schooling. This procedure is valid
only when the relationship between these two variables is stable over time and across
countries, which seems unlikely although it may not be a bad rough approximation,
particularly within groups of countries with similar population age structures. In principle,
Barro and Lee's procedure should be superior to Kyriacou's because it makes use of more
information and does not rely on such strong implicit assumptions. In addition, these authors
also choose their method for filling in missing observations on the basis of an accuracy test
based on a sample of 30 countries for which relatively complete census data are available.
The second group of papers (Louat et al and Nehru et al) uses only enrollment data to
construct time series of educational attainment. The version of the perpetual inventory
method used in these studies is a bit more sophisticated than the one in the first version of
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Barro and Lee, particularly in the case of Nehru et al.3 On the other hand, these studies
completely ignore census data on attainment levels. To justify this decision, Nehru et al
observe that census publications typically do not report the actual years of schooling of
individuals (only whether or not they have completed a certain level of education and/or
whether they have started it) and often provide information only for the population aged 25
and over. As a result, there will be some arbitrariness in estimates of average years of
schooling based on this data and the omission of the younger segments of the population may
bias the results, particularly in LDCs, where this age group is typically very large and much
more educated than older cohorts. While this is certainly true and may call for some
adjustment of the census figures on the basis of other sources, in our opinion it hardly justifies
discarding the only direct information available on the variables of interest.
Methodological differences across different studies would be of relatively little concern if
they all gave us a consistent and reasonable picture of educational attainment levels across
countries and of their evolution over time. Unfortunately, this is not the case. Different
sources show very significant discrepancies in terms of the relative positions of many countries
and practically all of them display implausible estimates or time profiles for at least some
countries. Although the various studies generally coincide when comparisons are made across
broad regions (e.g. the OECD vs. LDCs in various geographical areas), the discrepancies are
very important when we focus on the group of industrialized countries. Another cause for
concern is that existing estimates often display extremely large changes in attainment levels
over periods as short as five years (particularly at the secondary and tertiary levels).
To a large extent, these problems have their origin in the deficiencies of the underlying
primary data. As Behraman and Rosenzweig (1994) have noted, there are good reasons to
worry about the accuracy and consistency of UNESCO's data on both attainment levels and
enrollment rates. De la Fuente and Doménech (2000), after reviewing the available data for
OECD countries, argue that the problems noted above can be traced back to shortcomings of the
primary statistics, which do not seem to be consistent, across countries or over time, in their
treatment of vocational and technical training and other courses of study,4 and reflect at times
3
 Differences across these studies have to do with the correction of enrollment rates for dropouts and
repeaters and with the estimation of survival probabilities. Latter versions of Barro and Lee have
improved the treatment of these issues.
4
 Steedman (1996) documents the existence of important inconsistencies in the way educational data are
collected in different countries and argues that this problem can significantly distort the measurement of
educational levels. She notes, for example, that countries differ in the extent to which they report
qualifications not issued directly (or at least recognized) by the state and that practices differ as to the
classification of courses which may be considered borderline between different ISCED levels. The
stringency of the requirements for the granting of various completion degrees also seems to vary
significantly across countries.
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the number of people who have started a certain level of education and, at others, those who
have completed it. They conclude that --despite the fact that the contributions they review
represent a significant advance in this area-- the available data on human capital stocks are
still of dubious quality.
Concerns about poor data quality and its implications for empirical estimates of the
growth effects of human capital have motivated some recent studies that attempt to improve
the signal to noise ratio in the schooling series by exploiting additional sources of information
and introducing various corrections. De la Fuente and Doménech (D&D 2000) restrict their
work to a sample of 21 OECD countries for which they construct new educational attainment
series covering the period 1960-90 at quinquennial intervals. They focus on cleaning up the
available census and survey data rather than on perfecting the fill-in procedure. After
collecting all the information they could find on educational attainment in OECD countries,
both from international publications and from national sources, they use a heuristic approach
to try to reconstruct a plausible time profile of attainment in each country, eliminating sharp
breaks in the series that can only arise from changes in data collection criteria. Their
approach involves using judgment to choose among alternative census or survey estimates
when several are available and, at times, requires reinterpreting some of the data from
international compilations as referring to somewhat broader or narrower schooling categories
than the reported one. Missing data points lying between available census observations are
filled in by simple linear interpolation. Missing observations prior to the first census
observation are estimated, whenever possible, by backward extrapolations that make use of
census information on attainment levels by age group. A revised version of this data set (D&D
2001) also incorporates information provided by national statistical offices in response to a
request for assistance channeled through the OECD.
Cohen and Soto (2001) follow a roughly similar approach to construct a schooling data set
for a much larger sample of 95 countries at 10 year intervals covering the period 1960-2000.
They collect census and survey data from UNESCO, the OECD's in-house educational data
base, and the websites of national statistical agencies, and exploit to the extent possible the
available information on attainment levels by age group to fill in missing cells through
forward and backward extrapolations. Remaining gaps in the data are filled using enrollment
rates from UNESCO and other sources.
Estimates of reliability ratios for different data sets
Tables A2.1 and A2.2 report estimates of reliability ratios for some of the data sets we
have discussed in the previous section. Following the methodology proposed by Krueger and
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Lindhal (2001) and briefly reviewed in section 3b.iii of the main report, we estimate the
reliability ratio rk of a given series of average years of schooling (say YSk) by using YSk to try
to explain alternative estimates of the same variable (YSj with j ≠ k). Hence, the figure
reported in the tables below for data set k is the average value of the slope coefficient in a
series of regressions of the form
YSj = c + rkjYSk
where j denotes the "reference" data set and varies over the last available version of all data
sets different from k. The reliability ratio of Barro and Lee's (2000) data set, for instance, is
estimated by including these authors' estimate of average years of schooling as explanatory
variable in a set of regressions where the reference (dependent) variables are the average
years of schooling estimated by Kyriacou (1991), NSD (1995) and Cohen and Soto (2001).
Other versions of the Barro and Lee data set, however, are not used as a reference, because the
correlation of measurement errors across the same family of estimates is almost certainly very
high and this would artificially inflate the estimated reliability ratio.
The exercise we have just described is repeated for several transformations of average
years of schooling and for two different samples (OECD and all available countries, including
OECD). In particular, we estimate reliability ratios for years of schooling measured in levels
(YSit) and in logs (ysit), for average annual changes in both levels and logs measured across
successive (quinquennial or decennial) observations (∆YSit and ∆ysit), for log years of
schooling measured in deviations from their country means (ysit - ysi) and for average annual
log changes computed over the period 1965-855 (∆ysi). Notice that ∆ysit corresponds to annual
growth rates and ysit - ysi is the "within" transformation often used to remove fixed effects.
The last row of each table shows average values of the reliability ratio for each type of data
transformation (taken across different data sets), and the last column displays the average
reliability ratio of each data set (taken over different data transformations). In each table
the different data sets are arranged  by decreasing average realiability ratios.
A comparison of Tables A2.1 and A2.2 shows that the estimated reliability ratios are
lower for the OECD than for the full sample (of up to 110 countries). This is likely to be
misleading.  The number of available primary sources that can be drawn upon to construct
estimates of educational attainment is probably higher in developed than in underdeveloped
countries. As a result, the variation across data sets is likely to be smaller in LDCs, and this
will tend to raise the estimated reliability ratio. To a large extent, however, the larger
ratios obtained for the full sample will simply reflect a higher correlation of errors across
data sets (i.e. an upward bias in the estimated reliability ratio). Hence, the results in Table
5
 This is the longest period over which all the available schooling series overlap.
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A2.1 are probably a better measure of the amount of measurement error in existing schooling
data sets.
Table A2.1: Average reliability ratios, OECD 21 subsample
______________________________________________________________________
YSit ysit ∆YSit ∆ysit ysit-ysi ∆ysi average
D&D (2001) 0.623 0.716 0.376 0.736 0.894 0.898 0.707
C&S (2001) 0.619 0.709 0.203 0.595 0.776 0.796 0.616
D&D (2000) 0.638 0.727 0.058 0.457 0.873 0.642 0.566
B&L (2000) 0.646 0.595 0.027 0.08 0.679 0.502 0.421
Kyr. (1991) 0.743 0.831 0.020 0.066 0.446 0.243 0.391
NSD (1995) 0.301 0.528 0.059 0.224 0.858 0.277 0.375
B&L (1996) 0.558 0.488 0.026 0.052 0.628 0.357 0.351
B&L (1993) 0.530 0.428 0.018 0.014 0.403 0.318 0.285
average 0.582 0.628 0.098 0.278 0.695 0.504 0.464
______________________________________________________________________
- Note: This subsample is comprised of the 21 OECD countries for which de la Fuente and Doménech have
compiled data.
Table A2.2: Average reliability ratios, all available countries
______________________________________________________________________
YSit ysit ∆YSit ∆ysit ysit-ysi ∆ysi average
C&S (2001) 0.788 0.919 0.396 0.848 0.958 0.950 0.810
NSD (1995) 0.877 0.920 0.296 0.634 0.834 0.668 0.705
Kyr. (1991) 0.981 1.000 0.092 0.436 0.754 0.693 0.659
B&L (2000) 0.910 0.781 0.145 0.299 0.823 0.752 0.618
B&L (1996) 0.900 0.777 0.117 0.259 0.812 0.709 0.596
B&L (1993) 0.897 0.788 0.129 0.256 0.704 0.563 0.556
average 0.892 0.864 0.196 0.455 0.814 0.723 0.657
______________________________________________________________________
Notes:
- The regressions used to estimate the reliability ratios are estimated using all the common observations for
each pair of data sets over a sample of 110 countries for which at least two independent estimates are
available.
- Data are reported at five-year intervals except by Cohen and Soto who do it at 10-year intervals. To
compute reliability ratios for  ∆YSit and ∆yit in the case of Cohen and Soto, we attribute the observed
annualized change or growth rate in H over the entire decade to both of its quinquenni.a.
- While the true reliability ratio must lie between zero and one, a few of the coefficients of the pairwise
regressions are either negative or greater than one. To compute the averages reported in the table, I ignore
these values, i.e. assign a value of zero to negative estimates and a value of one to estimates greater than this
number.
- The version we use of Barro and Lee (1993) is actually taken from Barro and Lee (1994b). We do not
know if the two data sets are identical or if there are minor differences between them.
The overall average value of the reliability ratio in the OECD subsample is 0.464. This
suggests that the estimated coefficient of schooling in growth equations is likely to suffer
from a substantial downward bias, even without taking into account the further loss of signal
that arises when additional regressors are included in these equations. The bias will tend to
be smaller for estimates obtained using the data in levels or logs, even when fixed effects are
included, but is likely to be extremely large in specifications that use data differenced over
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relatively short periods. The average reliability ratio is only 0.278 for the data in
quinquennial log differences, and 0.098 for level differences taken at the same frequency.
Our results also indicate that the importance of measurement error varies significantly
across data sets, although their precise ranking depends on the data transformation that is
chosen. Two of the datasets most widely used in cross-country empirical work, those by
Kyriacou (1991) and Barro and Lee (various years), perform relatively well when the data is
used in levels, but contain very little signal when the data is differenced. Recent efforts to
increase the signal to noise ratio by de la Fuente and Doménech (2001) and Cohen and Soto
(2001) seem to have been at least partially successful, but even in these cases the potential
estimation bias remains large.
b. Direct measures of skills and achievement
It is clear that average years of schooling can be at best an imperfect proxy for the average
stock of human capital of the population. The level of skill will vary across countries with
similar levels of school attainment if there are differences among them in the quality of
their educational systems or in the extent to which skills are built up or maintained through
other channels, such as various types of post-school training and on-the-job learning.
Table A2.3: International achievement  and literacy tests
_____________________________________________________________
years of data
collection
conducted
b y subjects
no. of
countries
population
tested
1964 IEA mathematics 13 13, final sec.
1970-72 IEA science 19 10, 14, final sec.
reading 15 10, 14, final sec.
1982-83 IEA mathematics 20 13, final sec.
1984 IEA science 24 10, 14, final sec.
1988 IAEP mathematics 6 13
science 6 13
1991 IEA reading 31 9, 14
1990-91 IAEP mathematics 20 9, 13
science 20 9, 13
1993-98 IEA math 41 9, 13, final sec.
(TIMSS) science 41 9, 13, final sec.
1994-1998 OECD
(IALS)
reading and
 quantitative literacy
23 16-65
2000 OECD
(PISA)
reading, mathematical
and scientific literacy
32 15
_____________________________________________________________
- Source: updated from Lee and Barro (2001)
- Key: IEA = International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement; IAEP =
International Assessment of Educational Progress; PISA = Programme for International Student Assessment;
final sec. = final year of secondary schooling.
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While the available information is much scarcer than for formal school attainment,
student scores in standardized international achivement tests and some recent literacy studies
provide some data on the quality of educational outputs and on the skill level of the
population that can be a useful complement to the schooling data reviewed above. Table A2.3
summarizes the standardized tests in mathematics, science and reading that have been
administered by different international organizations at various times, as well as two recent
literacy studies sponsored by the OECD (known as PISA and IALS). This last group of studies
is of particular interest because they specifically attempt to measure the extent to which
respondents have developed basic skills that will be essential both at work and in everyday
life rather than their mastery of a standard curriculum. These skills include the ability to
understand and use information and apply simple mathematical techniques and basic
scientific knowledge to the solution of practical problems.
Figure A2.1: Literacy skills vs. average schooling
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- Note: Log IALS average score vs. log average years of schooling in 2000 from Cohen and Soto (2001).
The IALS (International Adult Literacy Survey) study is the only available one that
focuses on the entire population of working age rather than on young subjects currently
enrolled in school. Hence, it probably provides the best available data for testing the
hypothesis, implicit in most of the empirical work we will survey below, that educational
attainment can be used as a proxy for the stock of human capital because many of the skills
that are relevant in production are probably acquired in school. Figure A2.1 shows the
relationship between average national literacy scores (after averaging over the three types
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of skills measured in the study) and average years of schooling in 2000 (taken from Cohen and
Soto (2001)), with both variables measured in logs. When we use average schooling to try to
explain literacy scores in a simple regression, the estimated slope coefficient is 0.423, with a t
ratio of 3.83, and the R2 of the regression is 0.494. Hence, educational attainment alone
explains half of the observed variation in literacy scores, suggesting that average schooling
is indeed a useful proxy for skills, but a far from perfect one. If we interpret the coefficient of
this regression as a reliability ratio (with schooling as a noisy measure of skill levels), its
estimated value reinforces the standard concern in the literature that measurement error will
lead to the underestimation of the impact of human capital on productivity. Or, to put it
differently, it seems likely that we can learn something useful by examining the correlation
between school attainment and growth, but it is almost certain that in order to get a better
picture of the importance of human capital we need to find ways to control also for the
quality of education and for other ways in which skills can be acquired.
3. Results of macroeconomic studies on human capital and growth
This section reviews the main empirical studies that have attempted to measure the
contribution of human capital accumulation to economic growth.6 We will organize the
discussion of the bulk of the literature around groups of studies defined in terms of their
econometric specification, distinguishing between papers that estimate production function-
based specifications and those based on convergence equations and, within the latter group,
betwen those based on ad-hoc specifications and those that have estimated structural
equations along the lines of Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992). We will consider in a separate
section some recent studies that have focused on data quality and measurement error. As noted
in the text, practically all of these studies use some schooling indicator (either enrollment
rates or average years of schooling) as a proxy for human capital. There are also a small
number of studies that explore the growth effects of more direct measures of educational or
labour force quality based on internationally comparable achievement tests. These will be
discussed separately.
For easy reference, Box A3.1 summarizes the notation used in the numerous tables that
appear below. Wherever possible, we report the estimated values of structural parameters
(i.e. the coefficients of the production and technical progress functions) which are denoted by
the same symbols as in Box 2 in the text. Otherwise, the tables show the relevant regressor.
Standard explanatory variables include the rates of investment in physical and human
capital (sk and sh), initial income per capita or per worker (Q) and years of schooling (YS). In
6
 This section is based on de la Fuente (2002).
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the last two cases, lower-case letters are used to denote logarithms and the symbol ∆ to
denote annual changes.
Box A3.1:  Notation used in the Tables
______________________________________________________________________
As noted in the text, most structural analyses of the determinants of economic growth are
based on a Cobb-Douglas aggregate production function of the form
(1) Yit = Ait Kit
αkHit
αhLit
α l
where Yit denotes the aggregate output of country i at time t, Lit is the level of employment,
Kit the stock of physical capital, Hit the average stock of human capital per worker, and Ait
an index of technical efficiency or total factor productivity (TFP). In most applications, H is
typically replaced by years of schooling (YS) or by an exponential function of it, H = exp
(θYS).
The tables shown below respect this notation for the different inputs of the production
function and for the relevant output elasticities, αi (with i = k, h, l or ys). On occasion, the
production function also includes as an argument the stock of R&D capital, whose elasticity
will be denoted by αR&D. The symbol ρ will denote the coefficient of YS measured in levels in
an otherwise standard Cobb-Douglas production function (this is the Mincerian specification
discussed in Box 2 in the text), or the result of dividing αYS by average YS in the sample when
a standard Cobb-Douglas is estimated with YS in logs. In both cases, this parameter measures
the % increase in output that would follow from a unit increase in YS and αYS the elasticity of
output with respect to years of schooling.
As in Box 2, lower case letters will be used for factor stocks measured in logarithms, and
the symbol ∆ will indicate the average annual change in the relevant variable. Hence, YS is
years of schooling in levels, ys the same variable in logarithms, ∆YS the average annual
increase in years of schooling over the relevant period, and ∆ys the average annual increase
in the logarithm of the same variable, which is approximately  equal to the annual
percentage change in the original variable measured in levels. Similarly, ∆a will stand for
the rate of technical progress.
We will use Q = Y/L to stand for output per capita or per worker. The symbol si will denote
the fraction of GDP invested in type-i capital or, in the case for human capital, some proxy
for this variable typically based on school enrollments. The symbol γj will be used for the
coefficients of the technical progress function, except for the rate of technological diffusion,
which will be denoted by λ, as in
(2) ∆ait = γio +  λbit + γYS YSit +γbh YSitbit  + γr R&Dit
where b stands for the gap with the world technological frontier. The parameter β will be
interpreted as the rate of convergence and is typically the coefficient of initial income per
capita in a convergence equation.
______________________________________________________________________
a. Ad-hoc growth equations
A simple way to explore the connection between human capital and growth is to introduce
some indicator of human capital in a convergence equation in which the growth rate of real
output over a given period is explained in terms of the initial level of income per capita and
other variables motivated by informal theoretical considerations. This approach has been
followed with generally encouraging results in a large number of papers in the literature using
(mostly cross-section) data for the post-WWII period.
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The results of some of the earlier studies in the literature are summarized in Table A3.1.
The explanatory variables used in the regressions include the initial level of per capita
income (Qo), different indices of human capital at the beginning of the period (Ho), and the
rates of investment  (sk) and population (or labour force) growth (n). Landau (1983 and 1986),
Baumol et al (1989) and Barro (1991) find that the coefficient of initial human capital is
positive and highly significant. Baumol et al observe that the inclusion of a proxy for
education is enough to "set things right" in a convergence equation in which, when the only
explanatory variable is initial income, the neoclassical prediction that poorer countries tend
to grow faster than rich ones seems to fail.
Barro (1991) estimates two different versions of the convergence equation in a first attempt
to identify the channels through which education affects growth. In the first one he does not
control for fertility or the investment rate, while in the second equation he includes both of
these variables. As can be seen in the table, the human capital indicators lose part of their
significance and have smaller coefficients in the second equation. This suggests that an
important part of the effect of education on growth is channeled through a reduction in the
fertility rate (education increases the opportunity cost of female time) and an increase in the
investment coefficient (human and physical capital are complementary inputs). The results
of two auxiliary regressions in which fertility and the investment rate are the dependent
variables tend to confirm these results, for they show that high school enrollments are
associated with high investment shares and low fertility rates.7
In the papers cited so far the introduction of human capital variables is justified mainly
by their possible impact on the rate of innovation and technology adoption. In principle, the
best variable to capture such effects would be some indicator of the average educational
attainment of the labour force. However, the lack of comparable data for a sufficient number
of countries forces the three authors to use flow variables (enrollment rates) as proxies for the
relevant stock variables.8 Although all of them take the precaution of using lagged
enrollment rates, these could be highly correlated with investment in human capital over the
sample period. Hence, the results of these studies do not allow us to discriminate clearly
between level and rate effects. The work of Kyriacou (1991), however, provides more direct
evidence of the importance of the second type of effects. Using a procedure described in
 
7
 Barro and Lee (1994a) provide a more detailed analysis of the relationship between education and
fertility. Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) also find that education has a positive effect on investment.
 
8
 Landau (1983 and 1986) uses a weighted average of the primary, secondary and university enrollment
rates. Baumol et al (1989) reestimate the same equation with each of these variables and find that
secondary schooling yields the best results. They argue that this is the preferable variable from a
theoretical point of view, since it should be the best proxy for the technological absorption capacity of a
broad segment of the population. Barro (1991) includes the primary and secondary enrollment rates as
separate explanatory variables.
90
Section 2a of this Appendix, this author constructs an estimate of the average stock of human
capital (the average years of schooling of the labour force, YS) which he then includes in
convergence regressions with results qualitatively similar to those we have just discussed.9
Table A3.1: Human capital in ad-hoc convergence equations
______________________________________________________________________
Source: Qo Ho sk n other variables: sample:
[1] Landau -0.0021 0.026 N = 96 GCONS (-). POP (0). 1961-76
(1983) (6.18) (7.64) R2 = 0.82 CLIM (Y) 96 countries
[2] Landau -0.311 0.032 0.059 -0.262 N = 151 POP (0). GCONS (-). 1960-80
(1986) (4.80) (4.87) (1.37) (1.35) R2  = 0.714 GINV (0). GED (0). T (0). 65 countries
INF (-). OIL (+). DP (-)
[3] Baumol 0.622 N = 103 1960-81
et al (1989) (1.72) R2  = 0.029 103 countries
-1.47 1.615* N = 103
(2.47) (5.00) R2 = 0.227
[4] Barro -0.0075 0.0305* N = 98 GCONS (-). DISTOR (-). 1960-85
(1991) (6.25) (3.86) R2 = 0.56  REV (-). ASSAS (-) 98 countries
0.025**
(4.46)
-0.0077 0.01* 0.064 -0.004 N = 98 GCONS (-). DISTOR (-).
(8.56) (1.15) (2.00) (3.07) R2 = 0.62  REV (-). ASSAS (-)
0.0118**
(2.07)
[5] Kyriacou -0.009 0.0062 N = 89 1970-85
(1991) (2.43) (4.09) R2 = 0.17 89 countries
______________________________________________________________________
- Notes:
- t statistics are shown in parentheses below each coefficient.
- N is the number of observations in the sample.
- The dependent variable is the average growth rate of real per capita income during the sample period.
- Definition of Ho: (*) =  secondary enrollment rate, (**) = primary enrollment rate. Landau uses a weighted
average of three enrollment rates (primary, secondary and university), and Kyriacou an estimate of the
average number of years of schooling of the population.
- Other variables: GCONS = public consumption/GDP; POP = total population; CLIM = climate zone
dummy; T = trend; GINV = public investment/PIB; GED = public expenditure in education/GDP; INF =
inflation rate; OIL = dummy for oil producers; DP = distance to the closest harbour; DISTOR = Barro's
index of distortions affecting the price of capital goods; REV = no. of coups and revolutions; ASSAS =
number of political assasinations.
- (+) and (-) indicate a significative coefficient  of the corresponding sign; (Y) denotes significance, and (0)
lack of it.
- Landau (1986) uses pooled data with 4-year subintervals; the rest of the regressions use cross-section
data by countries.
 
9
 Actually, the interpretation problem does not disappear completely since Kyriacou's estimate of YS is a
weighted sum of enrollment rates in the relatively recent past.
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Table A3.2 shows some of the results of several more recent studies by Barro and various
coauthors using a pooled data set with two or three observations per country based (mostly) on
decade-long averages for a large sample of countries. The data comes from various versions of
Summers and Heston's Penn World Table and Barro and Lee's (1993) schooling data set and
from miscellaneous other sources. The methodology is similar in all the cases: a separate
cross-section convergence equation is estimated for each period, imposing the equality of the
coefficients across equations and instrumenting some of the regressors with their lagged
values in order to mitigate possible endogeneity biases.
The results of the different studies are largely consistent with each other and generally
supportive of the view that human capital has a positive effect on growth.  The log of life
expectancy, which can be expected to be a good proxy for the health component of human
capital, appears with a positive and highly significant coefficient in all the equations
shown in the table.10 The pattern of results for the schooling indicators is, as we will see, more
complex but is generally consistent with the existence of some sort of positive growth effect
and suggests also that an increase in educational attainment helps to speed up convergence,
possibly by facilitating the adoption of foreign technologies.
Barro and Lee (B&L, 1994) find that the average number of years of male secondary
schooling (male YSsec) enter the equation with a positive and significant coefficient
(equation [1]). This variable, moreover, behaves better than the corresponding flow variable
as can be seen in equation [2], where the secondary enrollment rate (SEC.ENR) is not
significant. The number of years of university education (YShigh), which is added as a
regressor in equation [3], is also not significant. Finally, equation [4], which includes both the
stock variable and its first difference (male ∆YSsec), suggests that male secondary schooling
has both level and rate effects. Most of these findings are replicated by Barro and Sala i
Martin (B&S 1995) (see equation [5]). In this study, however, the change in the years of male
secondary schooling is not significant. On the other hand, B&S find indications that
educational expenditure matters and that human capital contributes to fast convergence. This
can be seen in equation [5], where public expenditure in education measured as a fraction of
GDP (GED) and the interaction term between log initial income per capita and average
human capital11 (H*qo)  are significant and display the expected sign. Finally, Barro (1997)
confirms the significance of a broader indicator of male schooling (the average years of
10 Sachs and Warner (1997) also find that this variable enters significantly in a growth regression. In a
more recent paper that uses essentially the same methodology and a slightly longer sample, Barro (2000)
finds that health-related variables generally display the expected signs but are often not significant. Except
for this, the results of this study are very similar of those of previous ones by the same author.
11 See the notes to the table for the definition of H.
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Table A3.2: Results of Barro and various coauthors
________________________________________________________________
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Life expectancy 0.0801 0.0829 0.0806 0.0903 0.076 0.0418
(5.76) (5.28) (5.80) (6.10) (5.07) (3.01)
male YSsec 0.0138 0.0133 0.0136 0.0199 0.0164
(3.29) (3.09) (3.16) (4.15) (2.83)
male YSsec+high 0.0098
(3.92)
male YShigh 0.000 0.053
(0.00) (1.77)
H* qo -0.209 -0.0052
(2.16) (3.06)
male ∆YSsec 0.289 0.0066
(2.39) (1.02)
SEC .ENR male 0.0072
(0.62)
GED 0.205
(1.90)
female YSsec -0.0092 -0.008 -0.0061 -0.0162 -0.0102
(1.96) (1.60) (1.22) (3.00) (1.44)
female YShigh -0.021 -0.071
(0.88) (1.97)
female ∆YSsec -0.453 -0.0128
(2.35) (1.54)
SEC .ENR female -0.0119
(0.73)
R2 (N) 0.56 (85) 0.56 (85) 0.56 (85) 0.58 (85) 0.64 (87) 0.60 (80)
0.56 (95) 0.56 (93) 0.57 (95) 0.57 (95) 0.53 (96) 0.52 (87)
0.47 (84)
Source: B&L (94) B&L (94) B&L (94) B&L (94) B&S (95) B (97)
________________________________________________________________
    Notes:
- t statistics in parentheses  below each coefficient.
- Additional control variables: All the equations control for the log of initial GDP per capita (-) and for the
following variables (see the notes to the previous table): GCONS (-), REV (-) and BMP (-), where the last
variable is the black market premium on foreign exchange and government consumption is measured net of
education and defense expenditure. All equations except [6] control for the investment ratio, which is
always positive and significant in all cases except for equation [5]. Equations [5] and [6] include also the
change in the terms of trade (+). Equation [5] includes as regressors the change in male and female higher
schooling, which are not significant. Equation [6] also controls for the log of the fertility rate (-), and index
of democracy (+) and its square (-), the inflation rate (-) and dummies for Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin
America and East Asia, which have the expected signs but are not significant.
- In equations [1]-[5], two separate regressions are estimated for 1965-75 and 1975-85 (hence the two
values of R2 and sample size reported in the table). In equation [6] the procedure is similar but there is a
new observation for 1985-90. The equality of the coefficients across equations is (presumably) imposed.
Some regressors are instrumented by their own lagged values.
- The human capital indicator H that is used to construct the interaction term with initial GDP per capita
(H*qo) is different in equation [5] and in equation [6]. In the first case, H is the average of five human capital
indicators: life expectancy and four schooling variables (male and female average years of secondary and
higher schooling), all measured in deviations from sample means. In the second, H is the years of male
secondary and higher schooling.
- Human capital data from Barro and Lee (1993) and from subsequent revisions of this data set in Barro
(1997).
- Sources: B&L = Barro and Lee (1994); B&S = Barro and Sala i Martin (1995); B = Barro (1997).
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 secondary and higher education, male Ysec+high) and of the interaction effect between
schooling and initial income (see equation [6]).
One difficulty with these results is that it is difficult to establish whether the positive
schooling coefficients should be interpreted as evidence of level or rate effects.12 In part, the
problem arises because Barro and his coauthors do not use a structural specification that can
be used to distinguish sharply between these two effects. A second problematic aspect of
Barro et al's studies has to do with their puzzling results about the growth effects of female
schooling. The coefficient of female educational variables is often negative and sometimes
significant in B&L (1994) (equations [1]-[4]) and in B&S  (equation [5]) and not significantly
different from zero with the revised schooling data used in Barro (1997).
In a comment to B&L's (1994a) paper, Stokey (1994) provides a possible explanation for
these results on the basis of a combination of measurement error and the existence of a handful
of influential and atypical observations (in particular, those corresponding to the so-called
East-Asian tigers, which are characterized by very high growth rates and display large
educational differences across sexes). She suggests dropping the female schooling variable
and conjectures that, given its high correlation with male schooling, the coefficient of the
latter will fall, casting some doubt on its statistical significance. Lorgelly and Owen (1999)
take up Stokey's suggestion and, using the same data, explore the sensitivity of Barro and
Lee's results to the omission of the Asian tigers (Hong Kong, Singapure, Taiwan and Korea)
and of female schooling. Their results confirm that omitting the East-Asian economies renders
both male and female secondary schooling insignificant and that omitting female schooling
in the full sample considerably reduces the coefficient of male secondary attainment. When
the two schooling variables are combined into a single measure of average years of schooling
of the entire population, this variable is only borderline significant. The authors interpret
their findings as an indication of the statistical fragility of Barro and Lee's results -- an issue
which is also raised in a more general context by Levine and Renelt (1992).
Barro (1997) illustrates and discusses a problem to which we will return repeatedly below.
He notes, in particular, that some of his key results (and in particular those pointing to
positive growth effects of human capital) tend to break down when the estimation is done in
first differences in order to eliminate country-specific effects. This is illustrated in Table
A3.3, where the original pooled-data results (using a slightly different specification from
12 Barro and his coathors tend to interpret the positive coefficient on schooling in terms of the contribution
of education to the absorption of technology and the effects of imbalances between the stocks of human and
physical capital. For a given initial income, countries with high schooling will tend to grow faster because
their stock of physical capital will be low, relative to their stock of human capital, and physical capital
can be accumulated more rapidly.
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the one shown in Table A3.2) are compared with those obtained with two alternative
specifications, a single cross-section in levels with all variables averaged across subperiods,
and an equation in first differences. It is interesting to note that, while the results of the
cross-section and pooled data specifications are rather close, at least qualitatively, the use of
first differences leads to the loss of significance of the educational variables and actually
reverses the sign of their coefficients. Barro argues that the first difference specification has
several important drawbacks. The main one is that it wastes all the cross-sectional
information in the data (which accounts for most of the variation in the regressors) and
therefore gives less precise estimates. In addition, he stresses that estimates obtained with
first-differenced data are more likely to suffer from measurement error bias and less robust
than other estimates to the likely misspecificationi of the timing of the impact of the
explanatory variables on growth. While admitting concern about the problem raised by the
sensitivity of the results to the specification, he argues that implausible "panel" results such
as those given inequation [3] should be heavily discounted.
Table A3.3: Alternative specifications in Barro (1997)
_______________________________________________
[1] [2] [3]
Life expectancy 0.0388 0.0172 -0.0820
(3.13) (0.93) (2.15)
YSsec+high 0.0123 0.0141 -0.0032
(5.35) (4.70) (0.71)
H* qo -0.0070 -0.0077 0.0052
(4.67) (4.05) (1.49)
specification: pooled cross-
section
first
differences
_______________________________________________
- Note: - t statistics in parentheses  below each coefficient. All equations control for the same additional
variables as equation [6] in Table A3.2 except for the regional dummies. Equations [1] and [3] are estimated
using a SUR technique without instrumenting some of the regressors and equation [2] is estimated by OLS.
b. Results from structural convergence equations
Many recent studies of growth and convergence have made use of the structural convergence
equations derived by Mankiw, Romer and Weil  (MRW 1992) from a log-linear approximation
to an extended Solow model. In this section we will review the results of a number of these
studies, starting with MRW's very influential paper. As we will see, the pattern of results on
human capital is very similar to the one we found in the previous section. Cross-section and
pooled estimates generally yield positive results that are consistent with the existence of
sizable level effects. On the other hand, fixed effects and first-difference specifications that
rely on the time series variation in the data often produce insignificant or even negative
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estimates of the coefficient of human capital in the aggregate production function. As will be
emphasized in a later section, a possible explanation for these negative findings is related to
the weak signal content of differenced schooling data.
Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) use cross-section data for the period 1960-85 to estimate a
structural convergence equation of the form13
(A3.1)  qiT - qio  =  Γ +  (1-e-βT) 
 

 
αk
1-αk-αh
 ln 
ski
δ+g+ni
  +  
αh
1-αk-αh
 ln 
shi
δ+g+ni
  -  qio  
where qiT is log output per capita (using as denominator the working-age population) in
country i at time T, sk and sh the the average rates of investment in physical and human
capital over the relevant period, δ the rate of depreciation, which is assumed to be the same
for both types of capital, g and n the rates of technical progress and (working-age) population
growth. The parameters αk and αh and are the coefficients of physical and human capital in
a Cobb-Douglas aggregate production function, and β the convergence parameter that
measures the speed at which the economy approaches the steady state or long-run
equilibrium determined by the observed investment rates.  MRW assume g = 0.02 and δ = 0.03
and use as their proxy for the rate of investment in human capital (sh) the fraction of the
working-age population enrolled in secondary schooling. Implicitly, they also assume a
common level of technical efficiency for all countries or, at least, that cross-country
differences in TFP can be safely thrown into the error term. Hence, they treat the term Γ  in
equation (A3.1) as a constant even though the underlying theoretical model suggests that it
should vary across countries with differences in initial levels in TFP .
Columns [1] and [2] of Table A3.4 show MRW's results, including the implied values of the
coefficients of the production function and the rate of convergence, for two different samples:
one formed by 75 countries, and a second one comprising the 22 OECD countries with
population above 1 million. The estimated production function coefficients are in general
significant and have the expected sign. Their values, moreover, seem quite reasonable when
judged from the a priori expectation that they should reflect the shares of the different
factors in national income. According to the estimated model, capital's share in national
income would be around 40%. Of the remainder, which is labour's share, almost half would be
the return on human capital, whose estimated elasticity (αh) is 0.23.
MRW's paper was extremely influential beacuse its appealing results seemed to indicate
that a simple extension of the standard neoclassical model provided a satisfactory
description of the process of growth and of the evolution of the regional (or national) income
distribution.14 The only change required, relative to the more traditional models, was the
13 See Box 2 in Section 3b.ii of the main report.
14 See also Mankiw (1995).
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broadening of the relevant concept of capital in order to include the accumulated investment
in education.
Because of its popularity, MRW's paper provided the starting point for a large number of
empirical studies that attempted to extend the original model in various directions, to test
the robustness of its results or to improve the quality of the estimation through the use of
better data or more adequate econometric techniques. Columns [3] to [8] of Table A3.4
summarize the results of a group of such studies that, making use of cross-section or pooled
data, largely corroborated MRW's results and established their robustness to reasonable
extensions of the underlying model. Lichtenberg (1992) and Nonneman and Vanhoudt (N&V
1996) consider a further augmentation of the Solow model in which R&D capital is treated in
Table A3.4: Cross-section and pooled data specifications of the MRW model
______________________________________________________________________
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
β 0.0186 0.0206 0.024 0.017 0.021 0.029 0.033 0.034
(9.79) (10.30) (17.99) (4.20) (5.25)
αk 0.44 0.38 0.474 0.354 0.35 0.301
(6.29) (2.92) (10.09) (4.12) (5.07)
αh 0.23 0.23 0.236 0.259 0.148 0.204
(3.83) (2.09) (4.21) (3.65) (3.74)
αR&D 0.066 0.084 0.060
[(2.54) (2.22)
ln sk 0.506 0.396 0.550 0.413 0.491
(5.33) (2.61) (2.90) (2.65) (3.61)
ln sh 0.266 0.236 0.621 0.175 0.558
(3.33) (1.67) (3.37) (1.55) (3.60)
ln sR&D 0.098 0.099
(1.78) (2.25)
specification cr.sect.
1960-85
cr.sect.
1960-85
cr sect
1960-85
cr.sect.
1960-85
cr.sect.
1960-85
cr.sect.
1960-85
cr.sect.
1960-85
pooled
1965-95
sample 75 ctries. 22 OECD 22 OECD 53 ctries. 53 ctries. 22 OECD 22 OECD 19 OECD
source MRW MRW V&C Licht. Licht. N & V V&C dF
______________________________________________________________________
Notes:
- t statistics in parentheses below each coefficient. For ease of comparison, I have calculated some of them
using the originally reported standard errors. These calculations may not be entirely accurate due to
rounding error.
- Source: MRW = Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992); V&C = Vasudeva and Chien (1997); Licht. =
Lichtenberg (1992); N&V = Nonneman and Vanhoudt (1996); dF = de la Fuente (1998).
- Some authors estimate the coefficients of the production function directly, others infer them from the
coefficients of the ln si terms and others report only the latter.
- dF controls also for the share of government spending in GDP and changes in the unemployment and
labour force participation rates and includes a dummy for technological laggards and the interaction of this
variable with a trend. In this paper, the convergence equation is estimated using pooled data with averages
over five-year periods and the proxy for sh is total secondary enrollment as a fraction of the labour force,
averaged over the current and previous five-year subperiods.
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the same way as physical and human capital. De la Fuente (1998) further controls for
government spending, labour-market indicators and technological diffusion, and considers a
broader measure of human capital investment that takes into account university as well as
secondary schooling. In the same line Vasudeva and Chien (1997) replicate MRW's and
N&V's estimates using as a proxy for educational investment a weighted average of the
primary, secondary and university enrollment rates (with weights of 0.2, 0.3 and 0.5
respectively). As can be seen in the Table, the results are generally quite satisfactory. Human
capital only fails to be significant at conventional levels in N&V (column [6]) and (if we
consider the coefficient of ln sh rather than the corresponding parameter of the production
function) in MRW's OECD subsample (column [2]). Using essentially the same data and the
exact same sample, N&V show, however,  that results improve considerably when a broader
measure of educational investment is used.
Table A3.5: Various specifications of MRW model
______________________________________________________________________
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
β 0.0186 0.014 0.0206 0.015 0.0142 0.014 0.047
(9.79) (10.30) (7.45)
αk 0.44 0.38 0.48 0.468
(6.29) (2.92) (6.86) (5.57)
αh 0.23 0.23 0.23 -0.121
(3.83) (2.09) (4.60) (1.53)
ln sk 0.506 0.66 0.396 0.13 0.500 0.59
(5.33) (5.50) (2.61) (0.65) (9.62) (6.56)
ln sh 0.266 0.00 0.236 0.13 0.238 -0.01 0.00
(3.33) (0.00) (1.67) (0.76) (3.97) (0.17) (0.08)
specification cr.sect.
1960-85
cr sect
1960-85
cr.sect.
1960-85
cr.sect.
1960-85
cr.sect.
1960-85
cr.sect.
1960-85
diff. cr.sect.
1960-85
sample 75 ctries. 69 ctries. 22 OECD 21 OECD 98 ctries. 92 ctries 98 ctries. 58 LDCs
source MRW Temple
(1998a)
MRW Temple
(1998a)
MRW Temple
(1998a)
H&M
(1998)
Temple
(1998b)
______________________________________________________________________
    Notes:
- t statistics in parentheses below each coefficient (calculated using the originally reported standard
errors).
- Equations [2] and [6] from Temple (1998a) include dummies for Africa (-, -), Latin America (0, 0), East
Asia (0, +) and the industrial countries (0, 0).
- The countries considered atypical by Temple (1998a) and excluded from the original samples of MRW are
Japan in the OECD sample (equation [4]); Argentina, Cameroon, Chile, Hong-Kong, India and Zambia in the
intermediate sample (equation [2]) and Chad, Chile, Hong-Kong, Mauritania, Somalia and Zambia in the
broader sample (equation [6]).
- Equation [8] controls for investment in equipment (+) and structures (+) and includes dummies for Latin
America (0), Africa (-) and East Asia (+). The schooling variable is also non-significant in other samples,
especially when regional dummies are included.
On the other hand, a second set of studies stemming from MRW's paper have shown that
these authors' results are not robust along a number of dimensions. Temple (1998a) shows that
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MRW's results are largely driven by a few influential observations. To identify outliers,
Temple first estimates the model by a robust estimation technique (least trimmed squares, due
to Rousseeuw (1984)) that fits the model to the half of the sample that provides the best fit,
uses the results to identify as outliers those countries with the greatest residuals, and then
reestimates the model by OLS after excluding outliers. His results for the three samples
considered by MRW are shown in Table A3.5 (equations [2], [4] and [6]) next to MRW's original
results (equations [1], [3] and [5]) that are reproduced here for convenience. In all cases, he
finds that the exclusion of a few outliers (listed in the notes to the table) renders the
coefficient of human capital insignificant. The same author (Temple 1998b) also finds that
schooling is not significant in a variety of samples in an extension of MRW's model in which
investment in physical capital is disaggregated into its equipment and structures components
following De Long and Summers (1991) (see equation [8] in Table 7).
Hamilton and Monteagudo (1998) find that MRW's schooling indicator also loses its
significance when their model is used to try to explain changes in growth performance across
decades. They essentially reestimate MRW's model in first differences (calculated as the
difference between average values for 1960-70 and 1975-85) with the results shown in
equation [7] in Table A3.5: while the coefficient of investment in physical capital is very
similar to the original estimate (equation [5]), the point estimate of the schooling variable is
actually negative.
Table A3.6: Jones (1996)
_____________________________________________________________
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
ln sk 0.425 0.437 0.394 0.506 0.377 0.353
(2.85) (2.60) (4.15) (3.95) (2.73) (3.72)
ys 1.032 0.500 -0.050
(5.61) (3.65) (0.39)
YS 0.191 0.189 0.159
(6.16) (6.10) (2.48)
implied αk 0.298 0.304 0.282 0.336 0.274 0.261
(4.08) (3.75) (5.76) (6.00) (3.75) (5.02)
implied αY S 0.724 0.348 -0.036
implied ρ 0.127 0.137 0.118
R2 0.668 0.522 0.141 0.678 0.571 0.205
specification levels levels differences levels levels differences
y e a r 1960 1990 1990-60 1960 1990 1990-60
_____________________________________________________________
    Notes:
- Summers-Heston data for 78 countries. Years of schooling are from Barro and Lee (1993).
- t statistics in parentheses below each coefficient.
- The rates of investment rate (sk) and population growth (n) are averages over relatively short periods
around the year whose output level is taken.
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A study by Jones (1996) reaches rather more optimistic conclusions regarding the
contribution of schooling to productivity using a mincerian specification. Starting from a
different theoretical model (that emphasizes the role of ideas and technological diffusion),
this author derives a steady-state equation that is identical to the one implied by MRW's
model when the stock of human capital H is an exponential function of the average years of
schooling, YS. Assuming that countries have reached their steady states, Jones derives an
expression that relates (the log) of per capita income, qit, to the rate of investment in
physical capital (skit), average years of schooling (YS) and log TFP (a). When we interpret it
as coming from MRW's model, this equation can be written as follows
(A3.2)  qit = co + ait + 
αk
1-αk
  ln 
skit
δ+g+nit
  + 
ρ
1-αk
  YSit
Jones estimates this equation and its standard (non-mincerian) MRW counterpart (with  
αh
1-αk
ysit replacing the last term in (A3.2)) using data in levels for 1960 and 1990 (without
controling for possible differences in TFP levels, ait), and with the variables measured in
differences across these two years. As can be seen in Table A3.6, the results vary dramatically
depending on the specification chosen for the schooling variable. When years of schooling
enter the equation in logs (equations [1]-[3]), the results are similar to those obtained by
Hamilton and Monteagudo (1998): the coefficient of the human capital variable (which is
positive and significant in the cross-section) becomes negative in the differenced
specification. When YS is entered in levels, by contrast, the human capital coefficient is
always positive and significant, and the estimated value of the returns to schooling
parameter (ρ ) is slightly above 10%, which is above the average of the available
microeconometric estimates when these are properly adjusted.15
Panel data specifications
The doubts about the growth effects of educational investment that were first motivated
by the apparent statistical fragility of some earlier results have been reinforced in recent
years by a set of papers which have approached the empirical analysis of convergence from a
panel data perspective. Knight, Loayza and Villanueva (KLV, 1993), Islam (1995) and
Caselli, Esquivel and Lefort (CEL, 1996) reestimate the MRW model introducing various
fixed effects specifications to pick up possible cross-country differences in levels of TFP. In
addition, CEL use an instrumental variables technique to allow for the likely endogeneity of
some of the regressors. The results of all three papers indicate that panel estimates of the
15 Psacharopoulos (1994) reports an average microeconometric estimate of the return to schooling of 10.1%
for a large sample of countries. The adjustment required to make this figure comparable to macroeconometric
estimates brings it down to 6.7%.
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MRW model which rely heavily on the time series variation of the data generally yield
insignificant or negative coefficients for human capital.
Table A3.7: Panel estimates of the MRW model
______________________________________________________________________
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
β 0.0069 0.0375 0.0162 0.0913 0.0107 0.0679
(2.76) (4.03) (2.95) (5.71) (3.96) (3.30)
αk 0.8013 0.5224 0.6016 0.2074 0.496 0.491
(15.01) (8.14) (5.93) (1.97) (6.44) (4.31)
αh 0.0544 -0.199 0.0174 -0.045 0.18 -0.259
(0.53) (1.81) (0.10) (0.31) (3.33) (2.09)
ln sk 0.105 0.023
(10.16) (1.61)
ln sh -0.111 -0.065
(13.26) (5.09)
specification: fixed
effects
fixed
effects
pooled
ols
fixed
effects
pooled
ols
fixed
effects
pooled
ols
fixed eff.
& I V
sample: 75 LDCs 96 ctries. 79 ctries. 79 ctries. 22 OECD 22 OECD 97 ctries. 97 ctries.
source: KLV KLV Islam Islam Islam Islam CEL CEL
______________________________________________________________________
- Note: Panel data from Summers and Heston's PWT for 1960-85 with 5-year subperiods. t statistics in
parentheses below each coefficient (in the case of CEL and Islam, they are calculated using the originally
reported standard errors).
This finding is illustrated in Table A3.7, which summarizes some of the key results of
these studies. Islam uses a variant of the MRW model in which the growth rate of output per
worker appears as a function of the log of the stock of human capital, which is proxied by
current average years of schooling from Barro and Lee (1993), rather than as a function of
school enrollments. CEL, on the other hand, deviate in this respect from MRW only in that
they use the secondary enrollment ratio as a proxy for the investment rate in human capital,
and KLV use the same schooling variable as MRW. In spite of these differences in the choice
of regressors, and additional differences in the way the fixed effects model is implemented,
the results are broadly similar. The estimated coefficient of human capital in the production
function is positive and sometimes significant in either cross-section or pooled data
specifications, but becomes negative and often significant when fixed country effects are
added to the equation. KLV also report that the coefficient of schooling is positive and
highly significant when only its average value for each country is used in the regression.
It is interesting to note that the reaction of the authors to their findings regarding human
capital is quite different. KLV argue that, because of the long time lags involved, it makes
little sense to use quinquennial enrollment rates as a proxy for the relevant investment in
human capital, and advocate disregarding the time-series variation in this variable in the
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estimation (which, as we noted above, yields positive schooling coefficients). Islam (1995)
tries to rescue human capital as a determinant of the level of technological development
(which is presumably what is being captured by the country dummies) by observing that the
fixed effects are highly correlated with standard measures of educational achievement. The
argument, however, merely sidesteps the problem: we know that human capital variables
work well with cross-section data, but if they really had an effect on the level of technical
efficiency they should be significant when entered into the panel equation. Finally, Caselli
et al (1996) seem quite willing to take their negative findings at  face value.
c. Production function estimates and related specifications
A third group of papers has examined the growth effects of human capital through the
estimation of aggregate production functions and related specifications. As far as we know,
the earliest studies in this branch of the literature are due to Kyriacou (1991) and Benhabib
and Spiegel (B&S 1992, 1994), who estimate a Cobb-Doulgas production function using a single
cross-section of growth rates computed over a long period and Kyriacou's (1991) schooling
data set. Pritchett (1999) undertakes a similar exercise after constructing a "mincerian" stock
of human capital using microeconometric estimate of the returns to schooling parameter and
data from both Barro and Lee (1993) and Nehru et al (1995). Finally, Temple (1999 and 2001)
uses B&S's and Pritchett's data to examine the robustness of their results to outliers and to
some changes in the specification.
The key results of these studies are summarized in Table A3.8. The coefficient of the
human capital variable (αh  or α YS) is either non-significant or negative in the basic
specifications used in the earlier three studies (equations [1] to [4]). The authors also show
that this result is robust to a number of changes in the specification, such as the inclusion of
regional dummies or initial income per capita to control for a technological catch-up effect.
Kyriacou (1991) also tests for threshold effects and various non-linearities with generally
negative results. Pritchett (1999) argues that the results do not seem to be due to measurement
error in human capital, as they remain essentially unchanged when the estimation is
repeated using the Nehru et al schooling data to construct an instrument for his (Barro and
Lee based) human capital stock (equation [5]). On a somewhat more positive note, Temple
(1999 and 2001) finds that the elimination of outliers does generate a positive and significant
human capital coefficient16 (equation [6], but notice that this requires the elimination of 14
out of 78 countries), and that the mincerian (log-level rather than log-log) specification
16
 Temple (1999) follows essentially the same procedure as a previous paper of the same author we have
already commented upon (Temple, 1998a). He uses large residuals from LTS estimates to identify influential
observations and deletes them before reestimating the equation by OLS.
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produces better results than the Cobb-Douglas when the Barro and Lee (1993) data are used
(but not with Kyriacou's data, see equations [7] and [8]). Even in this case, however, the
schooling variable becomes only borderline significant when regional dummies are added to
the equation (equation [9]).
Table A3.8:  Aggregate production functions with human capital
______________________________________________________________________
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]
αk 0.449 0.457 0.524 0.501 0.460 0.553 0.432 0.490 0.462
(5.05) (5.38) (12.8) (15.4) (10.18) (13.16) (5.08) (8.18) (5.97)
α l 0.261 0.209 0.241 0.266
(0.90) (1.01) (2.15) (1.38)
αh/αYS -0.152 0.063 -0.049 -0.104 -0.120 0.165
(1.68) (0.80) (1.07) (2.07) (1.42) (4.00)
ρ 0.015 0.080 0.062
(0.52) (2.56) (1.76)
notes: I V reg dum
N 87 78 91 79 70 64. 78 91 91
period 1970-85 1965-85 1960-87 1960-87 1960-87 1960-85 1960-85 1960-87 1960-87
H data Kyr. Kyr. B&L NSD B&L, N Kyr. Kyr. B&L B&L
Source: Kyr. B & S Prit. 99 Prit 99 Prit 99 T99 T01 T01 T01
______________________________________________________________________
Notes:
- t statistics in parentheses below each coefficient (some of them are computed using the originally reported
standard errors). N is the number of observations (countries) in the sample.
- ρ is the coefficient obtained from a Mincerian specification, where the regressor is the change in the years
of schooling rather than the change in their logarithm. In the case of Pritchett, a Mincerian estimate of the
stock of human capital (based on an exponential function of the years of schooling and an outside estimate
of the relevant coefficient) is inserted into a standard Cobb-Douglas production function and αh is the
elasticity of this function. Constant returns to scale are imposed when the coefficient of labour (αl) is not
shown.
- Cross section data and estimation in long differences or average growth rates by OLS except in equation
[5] where instrumental variables are used. Equation [9] includes regional dummies (presumably for Africa,
Latin America, East Asia and developed countries, although the author does not say it explicitly).
- For Kyriacou and Benhabib and Spiegel, the dependent variable is the log change in total output during
the sample period; in Pritchett, it is the growth rate of output per worker. Pritchett uses least-squares
logarithmic growth rates of output and factor stocks.
- Capital stocks are obtained by accumulating investment flows.
- Sources: Kyr = Kyriacou (1991); B&S = Benhabib and Spiegel (1994); Prit = Pritchett (1999); T99 = Temple
(1999) and T01 = Temple (2001).
- Sources of human capital data: Kyr = Kyriacou (1991); B&L = Barro and Lee (1993) and N = Nehru,
Swanson and Dubey (1995).
Rate effects and interaction with technological diffusion
The results of the production function studies we have just reviewed are largely consistent
with the hypothesis that the stock of human capital does not enter the production function as
a productive input (i.e. that there are no level effects). Some of these papers, however, do
find rather clear indications that the level of education is an important determinant of the
103
rate of technological progress. This positive rate effect, moreover, seems to work at least in
part through the role of education in facilitating the absorption of foreign technologies.
Following the work of Nelson and Phelps (1966) and Romer (1989), Kyriacou (1991) argues
that the level of education (rather than its first difference) should be included in a growth
equation as a determinant of the rate of technological progress. This hypothesis leads to
equations [1] and [2] in Table A3.9, where he introduces the log of average years of schooling
(ys) or the level of the same variable (YS) and its square to try to capture rate effects with
encouraging results, particularly in the second case.
Table A3.9:  Rate effects in aggregate production functions with human capital
__________________________________________________________________
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
αk 0.435 0.417 0.479 0.4723 0.5005 0.5076 0.5517 0.5233
(4.88) (6.24) (5.10) (6.59) (6.49) (5.38) (4.50) (3.66)
α l 0.176 0.387 0.391 0.188 0.2045 0.1720 0.5389 0.2901
(0.58) (1.49) (2.01) (1.15) (1.31) (0.74) (1.39) (0.57)
αYS 0.018 0.0359
(0.12) (0.34)
qo -0.235
(5.11)
YS 0.0101 -0.00136 0.0021 0.0439 -0.0003 -0.0736
(3.25) (0.09) (0.14) (1.96) (0.01) (1.26)
YS2 -0.001
(3.07)
ys 0.0068 0.167
(1.79) (3.09)
YS*(Ql/Q) 0.0011 0.0007 0.0003 -0.0001 0.0012
(5.50) (2.33) (0.33) (0.11) (4.00)
Ql/ Q 0.0014
(1.40)
notes: rich middle poor
N 87 87 78 78 78 26 26 26
Source: Kyr. Kyr. B & S B & S B & S B & S B & S B & S
__________________________________________________________________
Notes:
- The human capital variable used in all the equations is the average number of years of schooling from
Kyriacou (1991). The sample period is 1970-85 in Kyriacou and 1965-85 in Benhabib and Spiegel.
- Equation [3] include continent dummies for Latin America and Africa; equation [2] includes dummies for
oil producers, mixed economies and Latin America, as well as an index of political instability.
Benhabib and Spiegel (B&S 1994) follow a similar route and extend the model to allow for
technological diffusion and rate effects from human capital. In equation [3] they add the log
of the stock of human capital (ys) to capture rate effects and the log of initial income per
capita income (qo), interpreted as a proxy for the inital level of technical efficiency, to
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control for a technological catch-up effect. Both variables are significant and have the
expected signs.
Starting from this last specification, B&S try to characterize more precisely the channels
through which human capital contributes to technological progress. For this purpose they
estimate a "more structural" model in which they include as regressors, in addition to the
average years of schooling, YS, (which should capture human capital's contribution to
domestic innovation), the ratio (Ql/Q) between output per worker in the leading country and
that in each member of the sample (as a proxy for technological backwardness), and the
product of these two variables to capture interaction effects. The results for the complete
sample (equations [4] and [5] in Table A3.9) suggest that human capital's effect on growth
works mostly through its contribution to technological diffusion and absorption as signaled by
the fact that only the interaction term is significant. The results, however, change with the
level of development. When the same equation is reestimated separately for each of three
subsamples, the catch-up effect dominates in the poorest countries (equation [8]), while the
contribution to domestic innovation is more important in the richer group (equation [6]).
Neither of these variables is significant in the case of the middle-income subsample
(equation [5]).
Table A3.10: Engelbrecht (1997)
__________________________________________________
[1] [2] [3] [4]
∆ ln Rd 0.072 0.098 0.098 0.105
(5.29) (6.83) (6.70) (7.15)
∆ G7*ln Rd 0.17 0.175 0.163 0.166
(5.54) (5.01) (4.77) (4.86)
∆ m ln Rf 0.198 0.303 0.249 0.249
(3.93) (5.75) (4.56) (4.72)
∆ys 0.136
(3.89)
ys(*) -0.007 0.141 0.128
(0.42) (2.93) (2.71)
ys* ln Qi/Qus 0.127 0.107
(3.34) (2.82)
ln Qi/Qus -0.260
(4.51)
__________________________________________________
    Notes:
- Annual panel data for the period 1970-85. Annual data on years of schooling are constructed by
interpolating between quinquenial observations from Barro and Lee (1993). t statistics in parentheses
below each coefficient.
- G7 = dummy variable, = 1 for the G7 countries; m is the share of imports in GDP.
- Equations [2]-[4] include both period and country dummies.
- (*) Notice that the coefficient of ys is not really an estimate of γh as we have defined it. To recover the
latter parameter (which measures the contribution of YS to TFP growth (rather than that of its logarithm),
we have to divide the relevant coefficient in the table by the value of YS).
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A more recent study that also finds evidence of rate effects in a more complete model is due
to Engelbrecht (1997). This paper investigates the connection between education and technical
progress using an extension of the model estimated by Coe and Helpman (1995). These authors
examine the relationship between (estimated) total factor productivity (TFP) and domestic
and foreign R&D investment. For each country in a sample of 21 developed economies, an
estimate of the domestic stock of technological capital (Rd) is constructed by accumulating
past R&D expenditures. To allow for cross country spillovers, the level of domestic TFP is also
allowed to be a function of the stock of foreign R&D capital (Rf), defined as an average of the
domestic stocks of a country's trading partners weighted by the share of each country in total
domestic imports.
Drawing on Benhabib and Spiegel (1994), Engelbrecht (1997) extends Coe and Helpman's
model to allow the rate of TFP growth to be a function of the log of average schooling or its
growth rate and of the technological gap with the leading country, proxied by the ratio of
each country's real per capita GDP to that of the US (Qi/Qus). The resulting model is
estimated using Coe and Helpman's data together with Barro and Lee's (1993) series on
average years of schooling.
The results of the exercise are summarized in Table A3.10. Since the dependent variable is
the growth rate of total factor productivity, the explanatory variables enter in log
differences when we are looking for a level effect and in logs when it is expected that they
will have a direct effect on the rate of technical progress. The coefficients on the domestic
and foreign stocks of R&D, and the interaction between home R&D and size (proxied by a
dummy variable for the G7 economies) confirm Coe and Helpman's results about the impact of
research expenditures, the importance of trade as a vehicle for technological diffusion and
the existence of scale effects in innovation. The coefficients of the human capital indicators
are consistent with the existence of both level (equation [1]) and rate effects, although the
two hypotheses are not tested simultaneously (presumably because a high correlation
between ys and its first difference that would generate multicollinearity problems). It is
interesting to note, however, that rate effects (a significant positive coefficient for ys)
appear only when we introduce a catch-up term and its interaction with the schooling
indicator.17
17
 It is interesting to note that the sign of the interaction term between human capital and the relative
productivity variable used as a proxy for technological backwardness is the opposite one than in
Benhabib and Spiegel (B&S, 1994). Notice that the latter variable is constructed in different ways in the
two studies, with own productivity in the numerator in one case and in the denominator in the other. Hence,
B&S's results (equation [5] in Table A3.9) imply that rate effects from human capital are higher in
technologically backward countries, whereas Englebrecht (equation [5] in Table A3.10) finds that they
will be larger in more advanced countries. Notice, however, that the samples are different. Engelbrecht's
sample is presumably a subset of Benhabib and Spiegel's rich country subsample, where the interaction term
is not significant.
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d. Data quality and measurement error
A number of recent papers argue that the negative results found in the earlier literature
can be attributed to low data quality and the resulting measurement error bias (see the main
text for a discussion). Krueger and Lindhal (K&L 2001) argue that Benhabib and Spiegel's
(B&S 1994) widely cited failure to find significant level effects can be attributed to the
almost complete lack of signal in the schooling variable they use. According to K&L's
estimates, the simple reliability ratio for the relevant regressor (which is the aveage
growth rate of Kyriacou's years of schooling over the entire sample period) is only 0.195.
Since the R2 of a regression of this variable on the remaining explanatory variables of B&S's
model is about the same size, the expected value of the human capital coefficient in the
absence of a correction for measurement error is zero regardless of its true value. A similar
argument, combined with available estimates of reliability ratios for the data sets used in
the prior literature (see section 2a of this Appendix) suggests that many previous estimates of
the coefficients of interest may be similarly flawed.
De la Fuente and Doménech (D&D 2000, 2001a), Cohen and Soto (C&S 2001) and Bassanini
and Scarpetta (2001) find clear evidence of sizable and significant level effects using newly
constructed data sets which appear to have higher signal to noise ratios than those used in
the earlier literature (see Section 2a of this Appendix). De la Fuente and Doménech estimate
several production function specifications that allow for level effects using pooled data at
quinquennial intervals for a sample of OECD countries. They examine the sensitivity of the
results to the quality of the human capital data by reestimating several specifications with
three different data sets: their own, and the ones constructed by Barro and Lee (1996) and
Nehru et al (1995). Table A3.11 shows the results obtained with their preferred
specification, which incorporates a technical progress function allowing for technological
diffusion and for permanent TFP differences across countries. The pattern of results that
emerges for the different human capital data sets is consistent with the authors' hypothesis
about the importance of educational data quality for growth estimates. The human capital
variable is significant and displays a reasonable coefficient with their data (D&D 2000,
equation [3]), but not with the Nehru et al (NSD) or Barro and Lee (B&L) series (equations [1]
and [2]), which actually produce negative human capital coefficients. Moreover, the
coefficients of the stocks of physical and human capital estimated with the D&D data are
quite plausible, with αk only slightly above capital's share in national income (which is 0.35
in their sample) and αYS close to one third. Equation [4] is taken from an update of de la
Fuente and Doménech (2000) that uses the revised data set described in de la Fuente and
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Doménech (2001b). This further revision of the data increases the coefficient of the schooling
variable by over one third.
Table A3.11: Results of D&D with different human capital data sets
___________________________________________________
[1] [2] [3] [4]
schooling data: NSD B & L D&D 2000 D&D 2001
αk 0.510 0.409 0.373 0.345
(8.30) (6.12) (7.15) (6.83)
αYS -0.148 -0.057 0.271 0.394
(2.62) (0.88) (2.53) (4.57)
λ 0.100 0.063 0.068 0.074
(6.98) (8.27) (6.34) (7.07)
adj. R2 0.840 0.811 0.809 0.828
___________________________________________________
- Notes: White's heteroscedasticity-consistent t ratios in parentheses. Only significant country dummies are
left in the reported equation. The parameter λ is the coefficient of the technological gap with the US and
measures the speed of technological diffusion. Aside from the schooling variable, the data used to estimate
equation [4] is slightly different from the data used in the previous equations because it incorporates the
latest revision of the OECD's national accounts series. The sample period is 1960-90, except for the NSD
data, which only extend to 1985.
In a background study for the OECD growth project (OECD 2001b), Bassanini and
Scarpetta (2001) use D&D's (2001) updated schooling series and in-house OECD data to
extend the sample period (from 1971) until 1998 and interpolate the schooling series to obtain
annual observations for a sample of OECD countries. These authors estimate a convergence
equation à la MRW (written in terms of the stock of human capital rather than the
investment rate) which includes fixed effects and is embedded into an error-correction model
that allows for short-term deviations from the equilibrium path described by the underlying
growth model. Their specification permits short-run coefficients and the convergence
parameter to differ across countries but imposes (as is usually done in the literature) a common
value of the coefficients of the production function. The estimated level effects are highly
significant and much larger than those found by D&D (2000). The parameter values obtained
in the preferred specification are αk = 0.13 and αYS = 0.82, whereas removing Finland from the
sample yields αk = 0.19 and αYS = 0.41. The authors settle for an intermediate "best-guess"
estimate of around 0.60 for αYS, which (since the average years of schooling in the sample is a
bit over 10), implies a gross mincerian return to schooling of about 6%.
Cohen and Soto (2001) construct a new data set for a sample of 95 countries which they use
to estimate two alternative "mincerian" specifications, finding evidence of sizable level
effects. The first one (equations [1] and [2] in Table A3.12) is an MRW-style steady state
equation linking income per capita to the rate of investment in physical capital (sk) and
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school attainment in levels, YS. The (lagged) urbanization rate and continental dummies are
used to proxy for differences in TFP levels in this equation. The second specification
(equations [3] to [5]) relates the growth rate of income per capita to the average annual
change in average years of schooling, ∆YS. The equation includes an LDC dummy and controls
for the urbanization rate but not for investment in physical capital. The coefficient of years of
schooling in the steady-state equation (which will be an estimate of ρ/(1-αk)) is 0.085 when
the equation is estimated by OLS and rises to 0.100 when schooling is instrumented to
mitigate any potential endogeneity problems. These estimates imply that the gross return to
schooling lies between 5.7% and 6.7%. The estimated coefficient of ∆YS in the growth
equation is also consistent with this range of values18 when Cohen and Soto's own data set is
used (see equation [3]), but drop sharply when the estimation is repeated with Barro and
Lee's (2000) data set (equation [4]).
Table A3.12:  Cohen and Soto (2001)
_____________________________________________________
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
ln sk 0.46 0.41
(5.7) (2.00)
YS 0.085 0.100 0.00078
(4.0) (2.06) (0.76)
∆YS 0.0845 0.028 0.0864
(2.51) (1.45) (2.56)
urban 0.011 0.010 -0.00019 -0.00015 -0.00024
(5.3) (2.55) (2.3) (1.6) (2.3)
poor -0.0104 -0.0090 -0.0080
(2.80) (2.31) (1.60)
R2 0.83 0.83 0.20 0.21 0.21
schooling data C&S C&S C&S B&L 00 C&S
notes OLS I V OLS OLS OLS
levels levels growth
rates
growth
rates
growth
rates
_____________________________________________________
The one discouraging feature of the studies reviewed in this section is that they generally
do not find clear evidence of rate effects. The coefficient of years of schooling in Cohen and
Soto's growth equation, which would be an estimate of γh, is positive but extremely small and
18 The structural interpretation of the coefficient of ∆YS in the growth equations is made difficult by the
failure to control for the accumulation of physical capital (K). If there is perfect capital mobility across
countries, so that K adjusts instantaneously and optimally to changes in YS, as we have assumed at the
individual level to derive the correction factor for microeconometric estimates, the  coefficient  of  ∆YS  in
equations [3]-[5] will also be an estimate of ρ/(1-αk)) and can therefore be directly compared to the
coefficient of YS in the steady state equations.
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not significantly different from zero (see equation [5] in Table A3.12). Similarly, the
introduction of ys in D&D's growth equation yields a positive but small and insignificant
coefficient and sharply reduces the precision of the estimate of the level effect (αYS) -- a
pattern which suggests that the simultaneous introduction of the level and the growth rate of
schooling in the same equation can give rise to serious collinearity problems that make it
difficult to untangle level and rate effects. Krueger and Lindhal (K&L 2001), finally, also
report some adverse results in this respect. They find that rate effects tend to be positive and
significant in standard specifications that constrain the relevant parameter to be equal across
countries, but that relaxing this assumption generates insignificant coefficients except for
countries with very low levels of education.
e. Educational quality and test scores
All the studies we have reviewed until now use enrollment rates or years of schooling as
proxies for investment in human capital or for the stock of this factor. An obvious limitation
of these indicators is that they measure only the quantity of schooling. But since workers
with the same number of years of schooling may have very different skills across countries
depending, among other things, on the quality of national educational systems, one would
ideally like to complement the standard schooling indicators with some measure of quality.
In this section we review some studies that have tried to do this by using data on educational
expenditures and other possible determinants of school quality and/or direct measures of
skills such as scores in standardized international achievement tests. Some of these papers
also analyze, with conflicting results, the impact of educational expenditures on student
achievement.
Dessus (1999) argues that the impact on productivity of an additional year of schooling
should vary across countries depending on the quality of the educational system. He uses
quinquennial data covering the period 1960-90 for a sample of 83 countries to estimate a
variant of the MRW model (written in terms of the stock of human capital) with fixed
country effects and a varying parameter specification that makes the coefficient of human
capital (αYS) a function of some indicator (QSi) of the average quality of schooling,
αYSi = αYSo + ηQSi.
While the results of the study are not very sharp, they are generally supportive of the
view that human capital elasticities do indeed differ across countries and are responsive to
expediture variables. As can be seen in Table A3.13, the share of educational expenditure in
GDP (SEDU) and the average number of students per teacher in primary school (PT1) are
significant and have the expected sign when included alone in the varying-parameter
specification, but the secondary pupil/teacher ratio (PT2) has the wrong sign and is not
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significant. Dessus also finds that the human capital coefficient increases with average
schooling measured at the beginning of the sample period (YSo). This result may be
interpreted as an indication of the importance of intergenerational externalities (children
benefit from having educated parents through learning at home and greater motivation) and
may generate threshold effects as argued by Azariadis and Drazen (1990).
Table  A3.13: Dessus (1999)
________________________________________________
[1] [2] [3] [4]
qo -0.444 -0.439 -0.457 -0.459
(5.45) (5.26) (5.31) (5.53)
ln sk 0.214 0.209 0.211 0.220
(4.62) (4.43) (3.84) (4.49)
h. capital param:
αYSo -0.175 0.714 -0.133 -0.351
(1.57) (3.05) (0.45) (0.05)
YSo 0.080
(2.96)
PT1 -0,018
(2.76)
PT2 0.013
(0.86)
SEDU 0.111
(2.08)
________________________________________________
- Notes: t statistics below each coefficient. The varying parameter model is estimated using the specification
proposed by Amemya (1978). Average years of schooling are taken from Barro and Lee (1993) and the other
educational indicators from UNESCO. Notice that there is no temporal variation in the quality indicators,
which are defined as averages over the sample period.
Some studies have examined the correlation between growth performance and
standardized achievement measures. A paper by Lee and Lee (1995) obtains some suggestive
results with data on average national scores in tests administered by the International
Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA) in the early seventies.
Using science scores as their proxy for initial human capital, these authors estimate a series
of simple cross-section convergence regressions for a sample of 17 (developed and
underdeveloped) countries with the results shown in Table A3.14. As usual, the dependent
variable is the growth rate of GDP per worker (between 1970 and 1985) and the conditioning
variables include the initial level (not log) of GDP per worker (Qo) and one or several
schooling indicators. It is interesting to note that the partial correlation between test scores
(SCORE) and growth is positive and significant even when we control for alternative human
capital indicators such as the primary or secondary enrollment rates (PR.ENROL  or
SEC.ENROL) or the average years of schooling of the adult population (YS) and that all
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these variables tend to lose their significance when SCORE is included as a regressor. Barro
(1998, 2000) confirms Lee and Lee's findings on the significance of test scores but finds that, in
some but not all specifications, years of schooling continue to be significant when both
variables are entered simultaneously in the growth equation.
Table A3.14: Results of Lee and Lee (1995)
_______________________________________________
[1] [2] [3]
Qo -0.0016 -0.0019 -0.0009
(4.00) (2.11) (0.64)
SCORE 0.0018 0.0016 0.0027
(4.50) (2.29) (4.50)
PR.ENROL 0.0008
(0.03)
SEC.ENROL 0.0128
(0.40)
YS -0.0042
(1.91)
R2 0.572 0.507 0.640
_______________________________________________
- Note: t statistics s below each coefficient. YS seems to be taken from some version of the Barro and Lee
data set, but the authors do not say it explicitly.
A more thorough attempt along similar lines is due to Hanushek and Kimko (H&K 2000).
These authors construct an indicator of labour force quality for a sample of 31 countries using
their scores in a number of international achievement tests in mathematics and science.19 This
indicator is then included as a regressor in a growth equation with results that are
qualitatively similar to those of Lee and Lee (1995). H&K, moreover, conduct extensive
robustness checks and provide fairly convincing evidence that the observed correlation
between test scores and growth reflects, at least in part, a causal relationship.
To approximate the average quality of the stock of workers (rather than that of current
students), H&K combine all the test scores available for each country into a single cross-
section indicator that is constructed as a weighted average of the standardized values of such
scores. They use two alternative standardization procedures to produce two different (but
highly correlated) measures of labour force quality that they denote by QL1 and QL2. In the
first case (QL1), the average world score in each year (measured by the percentage of correct
19 The authors use the results of six such tests that were conducted between 1965 and 1991 (four by IEA
and two by IAEP (International Assessment of Educational Progress)). The countries for which direct score
data are available are: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Finland, France, West Germany,
Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan  South Korea, Luxembourg,
Mozambique, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Singapore,
Japan, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, UK, US and the USSR. Some of these are
excluded from the sample used in the growth equations due to lack of other relevant variables.
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answers) is normalized to 50. This procedure implicitly asumes that average performance
does not vary over time. In the second case, they allow average peformance to drift over time
reflecting average US scores in a different but comparable set of national tests. Finally, H&K
enlarge their original sample (to around 80 countries) by estimating the values of their
quality measures in a number of other countries using an auxiliary equation that is estimated
with the original sample. This equation links their quality indicators to the primary
enrollment rate, the average years of schooling of the adult population, the share of
educational expenditures in GDP, the rate of population growth and regional dummies for
Asia, Latin America and Africa.20
Table A3.15:  Hanushek and Kimko (2000)
______________________________________________________________________
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
Qo -0.609 -0.472 -0.460 -0.270 -0.382 -0.370 -0.393 -0.368
(3.27) (4.92) (4.47) (3.14) (4.72) (4.40) (4.14) (3.87)
YS 0.548 0.103 0.100 0.085 0.127 0.120 0.070 0.065
(2.62) (0.82) (0.68) (0.75) (1.43) (1.25) (0.67) (0.56)
QL1 0.134 0.091 0.108 0.112
(5.83) (3.96) (5.14) (5.60)
QL2 0.104 0.094 0.100
(6.93) (5.88) (6.67)
PT1 0.001 0.006
(0.04) (0.25)
PT2 -0.038 -0.038
(0.86) (0.84)
SEDU 7.388 3.968
(0.46) (0.26)
R2 0.33 0.73 0.68 0.40 0.41 0.41 0.42 0.42
N 31 31 31 25 78 80 76 78
______________________________________________________________________
    Notes:
- t statistics below each coefficient. N is the number of observations (countries).
- The dependent variable is the average annual growth rate of real per capita GDP between 1960 and 1990.
Initial income is in levels, not in logs. YS is average years of schooling from Barro and Lee (using a 1994
update of their 1993 paper); this variable enters the equation as the average of the quinquennial
observations for each country between 1960 and 1985.
- Equation [4] excludes Hong-Kong, Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, Japan and Thailand.
- PT1 and PT2 are the pupil to teacher ratios in primary and secondary education and SEDU the share of
educational expenditure in GDP.
Labour force quality indicators are then entered in cross-section growth regressions that
control for initial real income per capita, Qo , (measured in levels, not in logs) and by Barro
and Lee's (1993) measure of average years of schooling of the adult population (YS). As can be
20
 The estimated contribution of these variables to labour force quality is positive and significant in the
cases of primary enrollments and average schooling, negative and significant for the rate of population
growth, and positive but not significant for educational expenditures.
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seen in Table A3.15, the quality variables display the expected positive sign, are highly
significant, and tend to drive out other educational indicators, including average years of
schooling, which is only significant when the quality variable is omitted. This result holds
for both quality indicators in the original and in the enlarged samples (equations [2] and [3]
versus [5] and [6]), and are robust to the omission of East-Asian countries (equation [4]), which
might conceivably generate a spurious correlation between growth and test scores because of
their excellent performance on both accounts. H&K's indicators, moreover, seem to be better
measures of schooling quality than pupil to teacher ratios in primary and secondary schooling
(PT1  and PT2) or the share of educational expenditure in GDP (SEDU) . In fact, these
variables are not significant in the growth equation even without controlling for test scores.
Finally, the authors also report that their findings are not sensitive, qualitatively or
quantitatively, to the inclusion of additional variables such as the share of government
consumption in GDP, the investment ratio, a measure of openness to international trade and
indices of political instability.
Hanushek and Kimko provide fairly convincing evidence that their results are not, at
least in qualitative terms, driven by reverse causation or by omitted variables bias and can
therefore be interpreted as evidence of a causal relationship running from the quality of
education to growth. They base this conclusion on two separate pieces of evidence. The first
one is their finding (discussed further below) that various measures of resource input into the
school system do not seem to be positively correlated with test scores. It is conceivable, they
argue, that growth may feed back into higher educational quality through increased school
funding, thereby generating an upward bias in the coefficient of quality in growth regressions.
But since funding seems to have no measureable effect on quality, a crucial link in the chain is
broken and it is unlikely that the results are driven by reverse causation.
The second piece of evidence is obtained through the estimation of a mincerian wage
equation for a sample of immigrants into the US. H&K find that the quality of schooling in
the country of origin enters the equation with a positive and significant coefficient (after
controlling in the usual way for years of schooling and experience) but only in the case of those
workers who migrated after completing their education abroad, and not for those who
completed their schooling in the US. The authors interpret this finding as an indication that
their quality variables are not simply proxies for relevant country characteristics that are
omitted in the growth equation, or even for cultural or family factors that may persist after
migration. They note, however, that the microeconometric estimates obtained with
immigrant data seem to imply much smaller productivity effects than their
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macroeconometric growth equation results, and that this suggests that the latter set of
estimates may be picking up something more than direct productivity effects.
Can quality be purchased?
The results we have reviewed in this section suggest that educational quality may be just
as important as quantity as a determinant of productivity, if not more. This raises the obvious
policy question of what may be done to improve the quality of educational systems. In
addition to teaching techniques and curriculum design, a plausible hyptohesis is that quality
will tend to rise with educational expenditure, as more resources are likely to translate into
more and better teachers and into improved facilities.
The evidence on this issue, which comes mostly from microeconomic studies, is conflictive
(see for instance Hanushek (1986) and Card and Krueger (1996)). At the macroeconomic level,
we are aware only of two studies that have dealt with the subject and they too reach
conflicting results. As noted above, Hanushek and Kimko (H&K 2000) conclude that standard
measures of school resources  do not have a perceptible effect on the quality of schooling as
measured by achievement tests. Lee and Barro (2001), on the other hand, find a positive
correlation between test results and some expenditure variables.
The results of both studies are summarized in Table A3.16. Both sets of authors find that
the average attainment of the adult population (YS) has a positive impact on school
performance. This result, which is consistent with Dessus' (1999) findings, is suggestive of a
strong family influence on school outcomes. In the same line, Lee and Barro (2001) also find
that income per capita (q), which they interpret as a proxy for parents' income has a strong
positive effect on test scores, and H&K report that test scores tend to be lower in countries
with greater rates of population growth (GPOP) , as suggested by theoretical models
emphasizing the tradeoff between the quantity and quality of children.
Turning to measures of school inputs, H&K (2000) find that the primary school pupil to
teacher ratio (PT1) and two measures of educational expenditure (total expenditure in
education as a fraction of GDP, SEDU, and a measure of expenditure per student exp/pupil)
display the "wrong" sign in the test score regression. Lee and Barro (2001), by contrast,
conclude that smaller class sizes tend to be associated with better performance (i.e. obtain a
significant negative coefficient for PT1) and detect some indications of a positive effect of
primary school salaries (Wteacher) which presumably operates through the quality and
motivation of the teaching staff. It is interesting to note that expenditure levels per se
(exp/pupil) are only weakly positively correlated with performance (see equation [5]), and
that this corelation disappears when we control for class size and teacher salaries (equation
[6]). This suggests that expenditures that do not affect the quantity and quality of teachers
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are much less important for peformance than these two items. These results are generally
robust to the inclusion of an Asian dummy (which turns out to be positive and highly
significant, see equation [7]) and of fixed country effects (equation [8]).
Table A3.16:  Hanushek and Kimko (2000) vs. Lee and Barro (2001)
dependent variable = test scores
______________________________________________________________________
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
q 3.19 4.16 3.41 3.39 3.53
(3.00) (4.23) (3.20) (3.42) (0.42)
YS 2.04 1.62 1.54 1.33 1.33 1.35 1.17 5.02
(2.49) (2.13) (2.41) (4.93) (4.94) (4.90) (4.67) (1.96)
GPOP -4.65 -4.60 -2.64
(2.77) (3.38) (1.35)
PT1 0.066 -0.15 -0.22 -0.19 -0.76
(0.41) (2.44) (2.54) (3.20) (1.70)
SEDU -165.9
(1.83)
exp/pupi l -0.69 1.06 -1.34 5.86
(3.63) (1.46) (1.13) (0.86)
Wteacher 1.62 2.88 1.92 7.69
(1.81) (2.09) (2.28) (1.80)
school day 0.01 0.003 -0.02
(0.46) (0.14) (0.89)
Asia 3.67
(3.71)
N 69 67 70 214 214 214 214 197
source: H & K H & K H & K L&B L&B L&B L&B L&B
______________________________________________________________________
    Notes:
- t statistics below each coefficient. N is the number of observations.
- YS is average years of total schooling of the adult population in H&K and average years of primary
schooling in L&B; exp/pupil is current public expenditure per student and is measured in levels in H&K and
in logs in L&B;Wteacher is measured in logarithms and school day refers to its length in hours.
- Equation [8] includes country fixed effects.
f. A plausible range of parameter estimates
In this section we will try to extract from the preceding review of the literature a
plausible range for the values of the parameters that describe the relationship between
human capital and the level and growth rate of productivity. The coefficients of interest are
two alternative measures of level effects and one measure of rate effects. The level
parameters are the elasticity of output with respect to average schooling, αYS, and the
Mincerian "gross return" on schooling, ρ, that measures the percentage increase in output
resulting from a one-year increase in average attainment. As the reader will recall (see Box 2
in the main text), ρ can be obtained by dividing αYS by average attainment in years, and
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viceversa. The rate effects parameter is the coefficient of YS  in the technical progress
function, γYS, and measures the contribution of an additional year of schooling to the rate of
TFP growth holding other things (and in particular the gap with the world technological
frontier) constant.
The first block of Table A3.17 shows a number of selected coefficient estimates taken from
the empirical literature reviewed in previous sections. The first row of the table gives the
source of the estimate, the second shows the specific form in which years of schooling enters
the equation,21 the third and fourth rows display the estimated value of the "raw" regression
coefficient and the associated t statistic, and the fifth row lists the source of the schooling
data. To facilitate the comparability of the coefficients and their interpretation, we have
selected only estimates obtained using data on average years of schooling (rather than
enrollment rates). We have focused mostly on recent studies that make use of the latest
available data sets and use specifications that produce "respectable" signal to noise ratios for
the OECD data set. Implicitly, then, we are accepting Krueger and Lindhal's (2001) argument
that failure to find significant productivity effects is most likely due to poor data, and not
taking into account the negative findings of some of the studies we have reviewed.
The second block of the table shows the values of αYS and ρ implied by the original
coefficients when these are interpreted as capturing level effects only. In most cases, the
values of these parameters are not given directly by the estimated coefficients displayed in
the first block of the table but can be recovered from them using either the explicit structural
model that underlies the estimated equation, or a model that generates the same reduced
form specification. For instance, Jones (1996) interprets the coefficient of YS in the steady-
state equation he estimates as capturing rate effects in a world with technological diffusion.
We will do something like this below, but for now we interpret his coefficient within the
framework of a Mincerian MRW model (which yields exactly the same steady state
specification) as capturing a level effect. In the case of Barro (2000), the estimated
convergence equation is not explicitly derived from a structural model, but it can be
interpreted as such because the functional form is similar to the one that would be implied by
the same Mincerian MRW model when we allow for transitional dynamics.22 To recover the
21 The notation is the standard one in this report: YS denotes years of schooling, ys the log of this variable
and ∆ys its annual growth rate, computed as the average annual log change over the relevant period.
22 Within this model, the coefficient of years of schooling will provide an estimate of β ρ
1-αk
, where β  (the
rate of convergence) is the coefficient of log initial income per capita. Barro's equation includes both this
variable and its square, but the author reports that the average rate of convergence in the sample is 2.5%.
This is the value of β we use in our calculations and is shown in the last block of the table. Barro's
equation controls for investment in physical capital, but the investment ratio does not enter the equation in
a way that permits us to recover an estimate of αk. Hence, we assume a value of 1/3 for this parameter.
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values of αYS and ρ we typically need an estimate of αk. When possible, this is taken from the
original equation (as in Jones (1996) or in Bassanini and Scarpetta (2001)); otherwise, a value
of 0.333 is assumed for this parameter.
Table A3.17:  Selected estimates, corrections for measurement error bias and tentative
estimates of rate effects
_________________________________________________________________
1. original coefficient estimates:
source: D&D update C&S (2001) Bas&Scarp Barro (2000) Jones (1996)
regressor: ∆ys YS ys YS* YS
raw coefficient 0.394 0.085 0.95 0.0044 0.159
( t ) (4.57) (4.00) (3.96) (2.44) (2.48)
data from: D&D (2001) C&S (2001) D&D (2001) B&L (2000) B&L (1993)
2. implied values of the level parameters:
coefficient
interpreted as
αYS ρ
1-αk
αYS
1-αk
β ρ
1-αk
ρ
1-αk
implied ρ 3.70% 5.67% 7.76% 11.73% 11.75%
implied αY S 0.394 0.603 0.826 1.248 1.250
3. level parameters after correcting for measurement error:
reliab. ratio 0.736 0.788 0.716 0.910 0.897
corrected coeff. 0.535 0.108 1.327 0.005 0.177
implied ρ 5.03% 7.19% 10.84% 12.89% 13.10%
implied αY S 0.535 0.765 1.154 1.372 1.394
4. implied value of γh under the assumption that αYS = 0.535/ρ = 5.03%
corrected coeff.
interpreted as:
ρ
1-αk
    + 
γYS
λ
αYS
1-αk
     + 
γYS
λ
βρ
1-αk
     + 
βγYS
λ
ρ
1-αk
    + 
γYS
λ
implied γY S 0.00% 0.24% 0.49% 0.87% 0.81%
5. other parameter values used in the calculations:
avge. YS 10.64 10.64 10.64 10.64 10.64
λ 0.074 0.074 0.074 0.074 0.074
αk 0.333 0.130 0.333 0.261
β 0.025
_________________________________________________________________
(*) The regressor is some transformation of the average years of total schooling of the adult population,
except in Barro (2000), where it is the average years of secondary and higher schooling of the adult male
population.
The calculations we have just sketched will produce an estimate of αYS when the
underlying production function is Cobb-Douglas in years of schooling (i.e. when we assume
that H = YS), and an estimate of ρ = θαh when a Mincerian specification (with H = Exp
(θYS)) is adopted. To compute ρ given αYS, we will divide the latter parameter by 10.64,
which is the average years of schooling in 1990 in a sample of OECD countries using D&D's
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(2001b) data set.23 The reverse procedure will be used to compute αYS given the value of ρ. The
values of the auxiliary parameters used in these computations are shown in the last block of
the table.
The third block of the table shows the effects on parameter estimates of correcting for
measurement error using the appropriate reliability ratios taken from Tables A2.1 and A2.2
above. Notice that the correction is only a partial one because it ignores the increase in the
attenuation bias that will result from the introduction of additional regressors when these
are correlated with schooling (see Section 2b.iii of the main report). The corrected estimates
of the raw coefficients are obtained by dividing their original values (in the first block of the
table) by the reliability ratios shown in the first row of the third block. The implied values
of αYS and ρ are then recovered in the manner explained above, working with the corrected
raw coefficients.
The range of parameter values obtained in this manner is very broad. Estimates of the
Mincerian return to schooling in OECD countries (ρ) range from 3.7% (using D&D's uncorrected
estimates) to 13.1% (using Jones' estimates corrected for measurement error). The higher
values in this range appear extremely implausible when we interpret them as estimates of
direct level effects. After correcting for measurement error, three of the five studies imply
values of αYS greater than one, i.e. increasing returns to schooling alone.
We interpret these findings as an indication that, as may be expected from our previous
discussion about the difficulty of empirically separating level and rate effects, the
coefficient estimates shown in Table A3.17 are picking up both of them. To get some feeling for
the likely size of the rate effects, we will take as given the values of the level parameters
implied by D&D's estimates (corrected for measurement error) and solve for the value of the
rate effects coefficient, γYS, that is consistent with the raw coefficient of schooling. To do
this, we will reinterpret the reported raw coefficients within the framework of an enlarged
model with rate effects and technological diffusion. In this context, and under the further
assumption that countries are reasonably close to their "technological steady states" relative
to the world frontier, the coefficient of the schooling variables will reflect both the standard
level effect and an additional term of the form γYS/λ, where λ is the rate of technological
diffusion.24 The fourth block of the table shows the results of this calculation, which uses the
value of λ  estimated by de la Fuente and Doménech.
23 Hence, the values of ρ given in Table A3.17 refer to this sample and are therefore different from those used
in the rate of return calculations in the main report, which correspond to a subset of the OECD sample
comprised by 14 member states of the EU.
24 The details of the required calculations are as follows. Let x be the relevant "raw coefficient" corrected
for measurement error and assume for concreteness that we are interpreting this coefficient as
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4. Selected educational indicators for the EU and other countries of interest
Tables A4.1-A4.12 collect a number of human capital indicators for the EU and other
countries of interest. Each table is divided into four blocks. The first one gives values for EU
members (EU14), typically with the exception of Luxembourg for which data are often not
available; the second refers to a group of seven advanced OECD economies that serve as a
useful reference to gauge the EU's position relative to its most direct competitors; and the
third block gives the data available for countries that are currently candidates for accession
to the EU. The coverage for the last group varies across tables and is often restricted to
countries in this group that are also members of the OECD. The fourth block of each table,
finally, displays average values for different subsamples and other statistics of interest.
The values in the tables are always given in relative terms, taking as a reference the
average value of each variable taken over the available observations for the group of 21
OECD countries that are listed in the first two blocks. This average value, which is denoted
by avge. OECD21 or avge. 21 in the tables, is normalized to 100. The original variables can be
recovered by multiplying the average value for the reference group (which is listed under
avge. OECD in levels) by the relative values given in the table.
Tables A4.1-A4.4 contain various measures of the educational attainment of the adult
population (i.e. of the quantity of human capital) in selected years between 1960 and 2000. As
has been emphasized elsewhere in this report, there are significant discrepancies across
sources that introduce a considerable amount of uncertainty in cross-country comparisons.
Nonetheless, it seems clear that Southern European countries (Greece, Italy, Spain and
especially Portugal) have significantly lower attainment levels than the rest of the Union,
and that the Nordic countries and Germany occupy the first positions of the EU ranking by
x = 
ρ
1-αk
    + 
γYS
λ
Given the assumed values of λ, ρ and αk, we can solve for γYS as
γYS = λ
 

 

x - 
ρ
1-αk
    .
In the case of Basanini and Scarpetta (2001), an additional step is necessary. Since these authors use years
of schooling in logs rather than in levels (ie. ys = ln YS), the calculation just described will yield an estimate
of the change in the rate of technical progress (g) induced by a unit increase in log schooling, i.e. of ∂g
∂lnYS
rather than of γYS which is defined as 
∂g
∂YS
    . To recover the parameter of interest, notice that
∂g
∂YS
    = ∂g
∂lnYS
 dlnYSdYS     =  
∂g
∂lnYS
1
YS
so we have to divide the result of the first calculation by average years of schooling to recover γYS.
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Table A4.1: Average years of schooling  (YS) in 1960 and 1990
______________________________________________________________________
source: D&D01 C&S B&L00 average D&D01 C&S B&L00 average
year : 1960 1960 1960 1960 1990 1990 1990 1990
W. Germany 118.5 117.9 123.6 120.0 121.7 120.9 102.1 114.9
Denmark 129.0 112.5 133.6 125.0 110.2 105.6 114.2 110.0
Sweden 96.2 107.5 114.2 106.0 99.8 110.2 107.9 105.9
U K 102.5 112.9 114.5 110.0 98.9 112.4 98.5 103.2
Finland 91.5 84.9 80.2 85.5 103.1 98.2 106.8 102.7
Austria 107.7 102.6 100.2 103.5 106.3 100.1 92.6 99.7
Netherlands 97.0 103.3 78.7 93.0 102.9 98.1 97.0 99.3
Belgium 92.5 91.6 111.4 98.5 94.7 91.8 95.0 93.8
France 97.3 83.4 86.3 89.0 98.2 94.8 85.2 92.7
Ireland 88.0 89.8 96.3 91.4 88.4 87.2 95.8 90.5
Greece 66.5 73.6 69.3 69.8 74.3 79.7 86.3 80.1
I t a l y 64.7 72.1 68.1 68.3 75.6 83.3 69.4 76.1
Spain 59.5 71.7 54.3 61.8 66.7 77.2 68.6 70.9
Portugal 52.3 39.0 29.0 40.1 60.2 54.1 48.8 54.4
USA 126.3 126.1 129.3 127.2 119.1 115.5 135.2 123.3
Australia 117.7 121.7 140.8 126.7 121.1 116.8 114.1 117.3
Canada 124.1 112.9 125.0 120.6 119.7 113.1 118.3 117.1
Switzerland 124.8 135.8 109.0 123.2 114.9 118.6 111.8 115.1
N. Zealand 125.1 111.3 142.7 126.4 113.8 100.8 126.0 113.6
Norway 115.8 112.1 91.2 106.4 104.4 112.7 122.3 113.1
Japan 103.1 117.4 102.6 107.7 105.6 109.2 103.9 106.2
Poland 100.62 108.2
L a t v i a 107.52
Czech Rep. 105.83
Lithuania 104.81
Bulgaria 90.44 90.77 96.9 104.36
Romania 89.45 79.57 91.5 104.14
Estonia 103.35
S l o v a k i a 102.22
Hungary 93.78 99.27 99.46 98.16
Cyprus 68.51 64.04 81.16 94.78
Slovenia 78.22
Malta 84.2 76.3
Turkey 26.51 29.86 57.19 44.52
Czechosl. 107.34
E. Germany 131.37 114.62
avge. 21 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
    in years 8.36 8.07 6.70 10.64 10.93 8.87
avge EU 14 90.22 90.20 89.97 90.13 92.95 93.81 90.60 92.45
avge. cands. 73.74 81.96 85.24 94.80
______________________________________________________________________
    Notes:
- Sources: D&D01 = de la Fuente and Doménech (2001); C&S = Cohen and Soto (2001); and B&L00 = Barro
and Lee (2000).
- The data refer to the population 25 and over in D&D and B&L, and to the population between 15 and 64
in C&S.
- The average values given in the fourth and eigth columns of the Table are simple averages across sources
of the normalized values for each year.
- The average for the candidate countries (avge. cands.) does not include East Germany.
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Table A4.2: Average years of schooling  (YS) in 2000
and expected years of schooling based on current enrollment rates
_____________________________________________________
YS
(C&S 2001)
YS
 (B&L 2000)
YS expected
(OECD)
 YS expected
( W B )
Sweden 101.75 119.13 117.00 93.21
Finland 101.40 106.33 105.48 102.86
Denmark 105.92 105.81 102.02 96.43
Germany** 112.43 102.24 99.14 102.86
U K 113.90 98.05 108.93 106.07
Netherlands 98.45 96.89 98.56 102.86
Ireland 88.29 94.59 92.22 90.00
Austria 99.23 92.28 92.22 93.21
Belgium 94.11 91.55 106.63 109.29
Greece 85.95 89.24 89.91 90.00
France 93.15 87.77 95.10 99.64
Spain 82.48 76.03 99.71
I t a l y 89.68 73.40 91.07
Portugal 63.20 51.49 96.83 93.21
USA 109.65 128.46 99.14 102.86
Norway 108.35 124.37 103.17 99.64
N.  Zealand 104.96 120.80 99.14 106.07
Canada 113.47 119.86 95.10 109.29
Australia 113.64 110.84 114.70 109.29
Switzerland 110.52 108.95 93.95 93.21
Japan 109.48 101.93
Poland 103.82 92.22 83.57
Bulgaria 91.94 102.14 77.14
L a t v i a * 100.04 80.36
Romania 86.82 99.73 77.14
Czech Rep. 99.20 87.03 83.57
Lithuania* 97.52
S l o v a k i a 96.37
Estonia* 96.16 80.36
Hungary 94.37 92.38 92.22 83.57
Cyprus 77.01 91.97
Malta 79.38
Slovenia 77.07
Turkey 54.26 50.33 61.10 64.29
avge.  OECD21 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
   in levels 11.52 9.54 17.35 15.56
avge EU14 95.00 91.77 99.63 98.30
avge cands. 80.88 91.24 83.14 78.75
_____________________________________________________
    Notes:
- Average years of schooling of the adult population (YS) in 2000 from Barro and Lee (2000) and Cohen
and Soto (2001), and expected years of schooling in the future on the basis of currently observed enrollment
rates as calculated by the World Bank (WB) for the 2000/2001 World Development Report and by the
OECD in the 2001 edition of Education at a Glance. Both estimates of "school expectancy" are constructed
essentially by adding up across successive school grades (excluding pre-primary education) the enrollment
rates observed in the late 1990s.
(*) In the case of the Baltic countries the Barro and Lee data refers to 1990.
(**) In Cohen and Soto,  Germany is West Germany.
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school attainment. In terms of average years of schooling (YS) the average EU country was
around ten percentage points below the OECD average in 1960. This educational gap had been
reduced by only 2.5 percentage points by 1990 and perhaps by one additional point by 2000.
(See Tables A4.1 and A4.2). Projections based on current enrollment rates, however, suggest
that EU attainment will gradually converge to the OECD average in the future provided
current conditions remain unchanged (see the last two columns of Table A4.2).
Table A4.3: Standard deviation of normalized years of schooling in the EU14
________________________________________________________
D&D C&S B & L average W B OECD
1960 21.55 20.78 27.98 22.73
1990 17.00 16.42 17.17 16.16
2000 12.60 15.97
future 6.22 7.49
%∆ 1960-90 -21.1% -21.0% -38.6% -28.9%
%∆ 1990-00 -23.2% -7.0%
________________________________________________________
- Standard deviation of normalized years of schooling and expected future years of schooling from Tables
A4.1 and A4.2
The dispersion of relative national attainment levels within the EU has declined
significantly during the period we are considering and can be expected to continue to do so in
the foreseable future. This convergence process is illustrated in Table A4.3, which shows the
standard deviation of normalized years of schooling according to various sources in selected
years and the same dispersion indicator for the OECD and World Bank projections based on
current enrollment rates. Between 1960 and 1990, this indicator of educational inequality fell
by almost 30% (when we work with an average across the three available sources of data on
years of schooling). The decade of the 1990s saw a further reduction of this variable,
although the two available sources imply very different convergence rates, and existing
projections suggest that, under current conditions, the level of educational inequality within
the EU should fall to about half its current level within a generation.  Educational
convergence is also apparent in the data on upper secondary attainment by age group
contained in Table A4.4: the dispersion of the normalized values of this indicator is 50%
lower in the 25-34 age group than in the 55-64 age group.
The attainment data available for the countries that are currently candidates for
accession to the EU (henceforth the candidate countries) is limited and somewhat hard to
assess. Barro and Lee (2000) is the only data set that provides estimates of average years of
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Table A4.4: Upper secondary attainment by age group in 1999
_________________________________________________________________
Ages 25-64 Ages 25-34 Ages 35-44 Ages 45-54 Ages 55-64
Germany 124.19 112.30 121.62 132.84 147.43
Denmark 121.72 114.98 114.26 128.62 141.19
Sweden 117.10 114.74 116.56 120.24 123.86
Austria 112.89 109.65 111.78 113.15 118.53
Finland 109.32 112.83 117.26 108.80 93.87
France 94.59 100.68 93.48 92.23 84.98
U K 94.32 86.89 91.11 97.40 107.96
Belgium 87.71 96.23 87.52 81.58 72.32
Ireland 78.43 87.93 80.82 66.24 62.37
Greece 76.34 93.81 83.47 69.27 49.51
I t a l y 64.57 73.10 71.40 59.95 43.05
Spain 53.70 71.87 58.56 40.65 27.26
Portugal 32.48 40.18 30.45 25.10 22.79
Netherlands
US 132.87 115.67 126.32 144.14 164.28
Norway 129.32 123.81 127.73 128.65 138.47
Switzerland 124.93 117.01 120.27 129.07 145.40
Japan 123.72 122.67 132.21 128.12 120.44
Canada 121.52 114.89 119.15 127.66 125.97
N. Zealand 112.55 104.53 111.13 116.47 121.29
Australia 87.73 86.23 84.89 89.81 89.04
Czech Rep. 131.53 121.98 128.08 137.88 151.73
Hungary 103.01 105.00 109.33 114.36 73.83
Poland 82.54 81.73 84.65 86.48 74.89
Turkey 33.93 34.54 32.71 29.86 23.88
avge. OECD21 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
   in levels 65.42 75.86 69.70 61.29 49.41
avge. EU14 89.80 93.48 90.64 87.39 84.24
avge. cands. 73.16 73.76 75.57 76.90 57.53
SD  OECD21 27.10 20.45 25.79 32.66 41.08
SD EU14 26.95 21.05 25.62 32.48 40.37
_________________________________________________________________
     Notes:
- Definition: percentage of the population that has attained at least upper secondary education by age
group.
- SD is the standard deviation of attainment and is computed with the normalized data.
- The data refer to 1998 in the cases of Austria, Ireland, Norway and Poland.
- Source: Education at a Glance, 2001.
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schooling for all the countries in this group. According to these authors, average attainment
in the candidate countries (avge. cands. in Tables A4.1 and A4.2) was four percentage points
above the EU14 level in 1990 and approximately equal to the EU14 average in 2000, with all
candidate countries except Malta, Slovenia and Turkey above mean EU14 attainment in this
year. These figures, however, may significantly overestimate attainment levels in the
candidate countries. Cohen and Soto's estimates of schooling in 2000 are significantly lower
than Barro and Lee's for two out of the three formerly socialist countries for which these
authors supply data. A recent study for the European Commission (EIC, 2001) also suggests
that attainment statistics tend to overstate the human capital stocks of Eastern European
countries because a large share of secondary-level qualifications were obtained in vocational
schools that typically offered short courses with deficient curricula. The rapid decline in
attendace to these schools may be partly responsible for the apparent fall in (relative)
enrollment rates that these countries seem to have experienced over the recent period of
turmoil caused by the crisis and eventual demise of their communist regimes. This decline is
apparent in Table A4.4, where we see that secondary attainment rates in socialist countries
decline as we move to younger cohorts, following the opposite pattern than the rest of the
sample, and in Table A4.2, where projections based on current enrollment rates suggest that
the relative attainment levels of formerly socialist countries are likely to deteriorate
rapidly in the future.
Tables A4.5-A4.8 contain various indicators of educational expenditure and school resource
input in recent years. The source for Tables A4.5 and A4.6 is the 2001 edition of the OECD's
Education at a Glance, which provides information for our OECD sample and for four
candidate countries (Hungary, Poland, Turkey and the Czech Republic). Some additional
information for other candidate countries is provided in Tables A4.7 and A4.8, which are
taken respectively from the World Bank and from Barro and Lee's (2000) data set. As in the
case of attainment estimates, there are worrisome discrepancies across data sources that
make it necessary to interpret international comparisons with great caution.25 On the whole,
however, the OECD data (Tables A4.5 and A4.6) suggest that the EU is only slightly below
the OECD average in terms of most indicators of educational expenditure and slightly above
this average in terms of direct measures of school input (teachers per pupil and hours of
instruction per year). The exceptions to this rule occur at the tertiary level, where both
25 Many of these indicators are not strictly comparable across sources, but they should in principle capture
similar things. The coefficient of correlation among similar OECD and World Bank indicators, computed
over common observations and normalized by the OECD21 average, is as follows: public expenditure in
education as a percentage of some measure of national income (0.322), expenditure per student as a
percentage of income per capita (0.756 at the primary level, 0.457 at the secondary level and 0.452 at the
tertiary level) and pupil to teacher ratio at the primary level (0.888).
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Table A4.5: Indicators of expenditure in education in 1998 (OECD)
______________________________________________________________________
                                          GEDUps/GDPpc                        GEDUps/GDPpew                              GEDU/GDP       .
primary second. tertiary primary second. tertiary public pr ivate to ta l
Austria 130.13 130.90 112.71 142.86 144.24 121.80 115.84 62.88 112.34
Sweden 129.22 97.77 142.65 129.97 98.70 141.23 96.30 87.75
Denmark 132.76 106.43 88.07 150.41 121.02 98.22 131.93 59.17 126.62
Portugal 106.93 110.56 107.62 111.68 111.32 101.06
I t a l y 129.06 110.21 66.94 101.52 87.02 51.83 113.83 59.50 110.14
France 89.82 118.19 80.58 78.22 103.31 69.08 84.30 197.41 97.98
U K 79.93 93.86 108.46 82.45 97.18 110.14 66.65 217.58 84.04
Germany 78.01 102.51 97.55 79.89 105.38 98.34 83.39 66.66 83.16
Finland 107.82 88.74 79.27 103.63 85.61 75.00 93.30 31.86 88.47
Spain 97.08 102.75 69.72 72.87 77.41 51.51 86.90 19.45 81.31
Netherlands 77.81 81.28 102.71 73.31 76.86 95.26 117.10
Belgium 80.95 94.54 63.63 68.45 80.24 52.96 107.85 13.59 99.79
Greece 83.63 86.77 68.37 69.44 72.32 55.89 86.02 140.79 93.49
Ireland 61.18 65.54 88.46 56.19 60.42 79.98 127.57 30.05 119.53
N. Zealand 89.99 45.71 86.94
Canada 136.32 140.37 83.95 186.02 96.44
Switzerland 119.74 129.30 142.77 145.13 157.30 170.34 106.20 111.44 108.75
US 94.77 91.01 144.64 103.15 99.42 154.97 68.74 192.78 83.33
Norway 111.48 106.21 98.40 126.62 121.08 110.01 131.17 21.14 121.85
Japan 106.54 92.42 96.51 122.80 106.92 109.49 104.24 77.98 103.39
Australia 83.14 91.00 112.24 85.48 93.90 113.59 93.40 265.98 113.61
Hungary 98.69 77.31 124.17 78.87 98.20 82.41
Poland 92.52 66.46 122.74 86.32 96.62 89.04
Czech Rep. 64.31 93.00 101.71 103.56
Turkey 56.91 89.19 61.43
avge. 21 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
     in levels 19.76 26.44 42.44 8.83 11.77 19.26 5.16 0.61 5.66
avge. EU14 98.88 99.29 89.93 94.06 94.38 84.71 100.82 78.72 98.04
avge. cands. 85.17 78.92 116.21 81.41 94.67 77.63
max/min EU 2.17 2.00 2.24 2.68 2.39 2.74 1.98 16.01 1.56
______________________________________________________________________
    Definitions:
- GEDUps/GDPpc = expenditure per student relative to GDP per capita (expenditure on public and private
educational institutions per student, measured as full time equivalent)
- GEDUps/GDPpew = expenditure per student relative to GDP per employed worker. It is obtained by
multiplying the previous variable by the ratio of employment to the total population using data for 1998
from an updated version of Doménech and Boscá (1996).
- GEDU/GDP = direct and indirect expenditure on educational institutions from public and private sources
as a fraction of GDP.
Notes:
- Countries are ranked within each group by the average value of all the normalized indicators shown in
the Table.
- For expenditure per student as a fraction of GDP per capita or per employed worker, the data refer to
public institutions only in Austria, Hungary, Italy, Norway and Portugal; and to public and government-
dependent private institutions only in Belgium and Greece.
- For GEDU/GDP, public subsides to households are included in private rather than public expenditure in
Austria, Greece, Norway, New Zealand and Poland.
- Source: Education at a Glance, 2001.
126
Table A4.6: Other indicators of school resource input in 1999 (OECD)
______________________________________________________________________
                                                      pupil to teacher ratios                                    hours of instruction per year      .
primary second. tertiary average age 12 age 13 age 14 average
Denmark 63.23 90.67 76.95 93.62 94.43 96.76 94.94
Sweden 79.58 106.27 59.12 81.66 82.54 77.70 77.05 79.10
Austria 86.57 71.80 93.32 83.90 111.68 121.32 129.92 120.97
Belgium (Fl.) 83.34 64.48 113.09 86.97 100.73 99.88 100.30
Spain 92.52 94.28 102.56 96.45 88.49 91.28 90.52 90.10
I t a l y 67.89 75.15 154.55 99.20 123.15 115.94 114.97 118.02
Netherlands 99.67 129.69 74.81 101.39 118.88 111.92 110.98 113.93
Finland 104.36 99.28 101.82 76.23 89.71 88.95 84.97
Germany 126.02 111.37 76.60 104.66 96.29 96.63 95.82 96.25
France 117.54 93.87 105.17 105.53 93.73 102.72 101.86 99.44
Greece 81.08 78.03 162.25 107.12 115.46 108.70 107.79 110.65
Ireland 129.57 107.23 107.72 114.84 104.23 98.12 97.30 99.88
U K 134.47 107.71 115.22 119.13 108.11 101.77 100.92 103.60
Portugal 103.65 97.58 96.76 99.33
Norway 75.47 83.39 79.43 85.76 89.71 88.95 88.14
Switzerland 96.16 90.12 93.14
Australia 103.73 92.89 98.31 106.28 105.80 106.04
US 97.34 114.50 87.53 99.79 101.96 101.96
Japan 126.68 113.02 72.04 103.91 97.52 91.81 91.04 93.45
N. Zealand 122.92 117.87 92.62 111.14 100.63 103.66 102.79 102.36
Canada 111.85 141.77 126.81
Hungary 65.22 77.50 75.73 72.82 86.97 94.63 93.83 91.81
Slovak Rep. 117.20 99.90 64.06 93.72
Czech Rep. 140.22 107.77 92.92 113.64 88.92 86.81 92.23 89.32
Turkey 179.73 117.62 133.89 143.75 96.29 90.65 89.89 92.28
avge. 21 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
    in levels 16.70 13.65 16.03 897.25 953.09 961.16
avge. EU14 97.37 94.60 105.86 101.24 100.61 100.68
avge. cands. 125.59 100.70 91.65 90.73 90.70 91.99
max/min EU 2.13 2.01 2.74 1.55 1.62 1.56 1.69 1.53
______________________________________________________________________
    Definitions:
- Pupil to teacher ratio = ratio of students to teaching staff in public and private institutions, calculations
based on full-time equivalents.
hours of instruction per year  = total intended instruction time in hours per school year for students aged 12
to 14.
Notes:
- The data for Belgium refers to the Flanders region.
- In the case of hours of instruction per year, the value shown in the Table for the UK is estimated as the
(unweighted) average of the values for England and Scotland.
- Countries sorted by the average pupil to teacher ratio
- Source: Education at a Glance, 2001.
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Table A4.7: Indicators of educational expenditure and school input in 1997 (World Bank)
_______________________________________________________________
                                                           public                                       GEDUPps/GNIpc                           pupil/teacher
GEDU/GNP primary secondary tertiary primary
Denmark 141.99 136.09 148.14 141.23 67.09
I t a l y 85.89 114.52 122.37 60.36 73.80
Austria 94.66 111.44 106.06 100.51 80.51
Belgium 54.34 45.19 57.54 49.83 80.51
Portugal 101.67 99.12 92.32 69.76 80.51
Sweden 145.49 151.50 146.42 206.15 80.51
Greece 54.34 64.84 63.50 93.93
Netherlands 89.40 76.01 91.03 134.68 93.93
Spain 87.65 86.28 96.61 50.68 100.64
Germany 84.14 107.63 114.06
Finland 131.47 117.09 118.08 129.84 120.77
France 105.18 81.14 115.07 79.73 127.48
U K 92.90 91.41 88.02 115.89 127.48
Ireland 105.18 70.36 94.03 103.36 147.60
Norway 129.72 157.15 76.43 132.97 46.96
Switzerland 94.66 99.12 124.52 129.27 80.51
Canada 120.95 107.35
US 94.66 98.09 102.62 70.33 107.35
Australia 94.66 76.52 72.14 84.57 120.77
N. Zealand 127.96 91.93 102.19 130.13 120.77
Japan 63.11 97.06 81.58 39.58 127.48
Hungary 80.63 94.49 78.15 89.41 80.51
L a t v i a 110.43 219.41 93.39 87.22
Slovenia 99.92 103.22 32.20 106.78 93.93
Poland 131.47 90.39 73.42 77.45 100.64
Lithuania 94.66 119.37 119.87 107.35
Bulgaria 56.09 157.66 49.54 114.06
Estonia 126.21 194.94 109.34 114.06
Czech Rep. 89.40 84.22 92.32 99.37 120.77
Romania 63.11 104.25 37.79 90.55 134.19
Slovak Rep. 87.65 114.52 87.70 134.19
Turkey 38.56 46.22 39.50 145.50 161.02
avge. OECD21 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
    in levels 5.70 19.47 23.29 35.12 14.90
avge. EU14 98.16 98.35 103.12 100.94 99.20
avge. cands. 88.92 99.37 98.57 97.17 113.45
_______________________________________________________________
Notes:
- public GEDU/GNP = public educational expenditure as a percentage of GNP in 1997, from the World
Development Report 2000/2001.
- GEDUPps/GNIpc = public expenditure per student as a fraction of gross national income per capita.  This
variable and the primary school pupil to teacher ratio are taken from the World Bank's 2001 World
Development indicators.
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Table A4.8: Indicators of educational expenditure and school input in 1990
(Barro and Lee, 2000)
__________________________________________________________________
                                       pupil/teacher ratios                     GEDUPps/GDPpc          hours per year
primary secondary primary secondary primary
Sweden 39.02 72.53 241.58 92.65 123.29
Belgium 62.30 56.76 81.38 132.70
Austria 67.97 66.22 93.58 144.76 98.63
Denmark 72.37 84.36 168.35 114.36 106.85
I t a l y 72.37 68.59 78.83 106.16 83.84
France 76.78 98.55 61.03 100.37 99.86
Portugal 88.73 81.99 78.83 87.82 100.68
Finland 90.62 103.25 128.84 89.79
Netherlands 108.24 123.78 64.59 109.05 102.74
West Germany 112.02 109.59 61.03 88.30 78.08
Greece 123.34 120.62 47.81 70.93 92.47
U K 124.60 105.64 75.78 125.94 97.60
Spain 138.45 131.66 61.03 66.59 105.31
Ireland 168.03 121.41 62.05 97.95
Norway 38.39 70.17 180.04 89.27
Canada 96.28 110.37 114.43 119.19 100.17
Australia 103.84 97.76 100.19 57.90
New Zealand 113.28 135.60 83.92 69.97 102.74
US 116.42 112.74 76.80 111.47 117.95
Japan 130.27 131.66 82.90 83.00
Switzerland 156.70 182.59 102.78
Hungary 78.66 94.61 106.81 127.87
Bulgaria 96.91 112.74 195.81 88.15
Poland 102.58 143.49 97.60
U.S.S.R. 106.98
Romania 107.61 221.54 76.85
Czechoslovakia 120.83 78.84 84.76
Cyprus 129.01 93.82 65.61 9.65 86.30
Malta 130.27 95.39 112.19
Yugoslavia 142.85 130.87 69.35
Turkey 191.31 188.42 63.07 54.53 89.90
avge. OECD21 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
    in levels 15.89 12.68 19.66 20.72 973.33
avge. EU14 96.06 95.52 91.37 104.74 98.26
avge. cand. 120.70 128.86 78.49 96.97 88.14
__________________________________________________________________
- GEDUPps/GDPpc = public expenditure per student as a fraction of GDP per capita.
129
normalized expenditure and the number of teachers per student (the inverse of the pupil to
techer ratio shown in Table A4.6) are significantly below the OECD average. The other
peculiarity of the EU is that private expenditure in education is generally lower than in the
rest of the OECD sample. A comparison of the OECD data with the World Bank's
expenditure indicators (which consider only public spending) suggests that the relatively low
level of EU spending per student at the tertiary level is due mostly to low private
expenditures (i.e. to low tuition fees at universities).
Within the EU, there are very significant differences across countries in terms of the
various resource indicators. The ratio between the highest and the lowest value of each
indicator within this sample (max/min EU), which is given in the last row of Tables A4.5
and A4.6, is always above 1.5 and often above 2.0. If we measure expenditure per student as a
fraction of output per employed worker (which is probably a better reference than GDP per
capita as a way to correct expenditure for differences in purchasing power), Austria, Sweden
and Denmark have the highest expenditure levels and Ireland the lowest. At the tertiary
level, expenditure so normalized is particularly low in Spain, Italy, Belgium and Greece.
Pupil to teacher ratios and hours of instruction vary considerably less than expenditures per
student, but even here the differences across countries are quite significant.
The available information suggests that the candidate countries as a whole spend less on
education than the EU, both as a fraction of national income and on a per student basis. There
are, however, large differences across countries in this group and discrepancies across sources
that make it difficult to be very precise concerning expenditure patterns in candidate
countries. On the whole, it seems clear that expenditure levels are particularly low in
Turkey, Romania and Bulgaria, whereas Hungary, the Baltic Republics, Slovenia, Poland
and the Czech Republic are not far from EU levels at least in terms of some resource
indicators.
Tables A4.9-A4.11 display various indicators of school achievement and labour force
quality based on international standardized tests or literacy surveys. Tables A4.9 and A4.10
summarize the results of two recent OECD studies (IALS and PISA) that have already been
discussed in Section 2.b of this Appendix. We construct summary measures of national
performance in each of these studies by averaging each country's results across the various
dimensions of literacy analyzed in these surveys. These two tables display the mean national
scores, the scores corresponding to the 5th and 95th percentile of each national distribution,
the range of scores (defined as the difference between the previous two values) and the
percentage of the adult population (in IALS) or the student population (in PISA) that falls
below the literacy level (level 3) that is considered necessary for coping with the demands of
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work and everyday life in advanced societies. Table A4.11 shows average scores by subject in
the PISA study and in another recent international study of achievement in math and science
(TIMSS). As usual, all variables are normalized by their average values in our primary
sample of 21 OECD countries.
Table A4.9: Average IALS results
______________________________________________________________
mean
score
5 t h
percentile
95th
percentile
range of
scores
% in levels
1 or 2
Sweden 109.88 127.81 107.56 89.63 59.31
Denmark 105.09 127.01 99.02 74.24 76.59
Finland 103.68 115.76 100.45 86.89 86.01
Germany 103.47 124.56 100.27 78.77 90.09
Netherlands 103.23 119.32 98.82 80.66 84.98
Belgium ** 100.44 95.84 100.37 104.38 95.03
U K 96.35 85.39 100.02 112.98 117.42
Ireland 95.05 88.52 98.51 107.35 123.79
Portugal 81.67 57.96 89.63 117.66 172.65
Norway 106.30 122.59 101.02 81.93 70.16
Canada 100.99 87.03 103.58 118.22 98.24
Australia 99.11 86.91 99.75 111.10 100.77
US 98.46 79.65 103.35 124.32 108.40
Switzerland* 98.40 88.96 97.47 105.00 104.65
New Zealand 97.89 92.68 100.20 106.86 111.91
Chzech Rep. 103.55 115.61 101.55 89.11 91.01
Hungary 92.97 93.79 95.10 96.26 142.28
Slovenia 85.40 63.93 91.95 116.74 160.88
Poland 83.24 58.51 91.51 120.71 167.43
average OECD21 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
     in levels 277.28 169.08 360.12 191.04 43.54
average EU14 99.87 104.69 99.40 94.73 100.65
average candidates 91.29 82.96 95.03 105.71 140.40
SD all 7.53 22.19 4.25
______________________________________________________________
    Notes:
- The figures shown in the Table are averages of the values corresponding to the three types of literacy
assessed in the study (prose, document and quantitative) with weights 0.25, 0.25 and 0.50 respectively.
- For each country we show the overall mean score and the scores at the 5th and 95th percentiles of the
national distribution. Range of scores is the difference between the 95th and 5th percentile scores, and % in
levels 1 or 2 refers to the fraction of the population which is classified below level 3, which is considered
the minimum required for satisfactory performance in everyday situations.
(*) For Switzerland, we report the unweighted average of the values for the German, French and Italian-
speaking populations.
(**) Belgian data refer only to the Flanders region.
- Source: OECD and Statistics Canada (2000).
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Table A4.10: Average PISA results
____________________________________________________________
mean
score
5 t h
percentile
95th
percentile
range of
scores
% in levels
1 or 2
Finland 106.83 115.42 103.03 89.64 57.22
U K 103.92 106.09 104.06 101.87 89.92
Ireland 102.10 105.65 100.32 94.56 79.02
Sweden 101.31 103.74 100.43 96.86 87.19
Austria 101.01 102.85 99.82 96.55 98.09
Belgium 100.12 90.36 100.97 112.43 98.09
France 99.98 101.46 99.56 97.50 100.82
Denmark 98.10 97.56 98.60 99.72 111.72
Spain 96.33 98.74 95.55 92.10 114.44
Germany 95.93 87.65 99.14 111.55 122.62
I t a l y 94.16 93.89 94.90 95.99 122.62
Greece 91.54 85.96 94.75 104.25 138.96
Portugal 91.39 89.19 93.11 97.34 141.69
Netherlands
Japan 106.09 112.04 102.11 91.39 76.29
Canada 105.06 111.08 103.03 94.32 73.57
New Zealand 104.71 102.49 105.24 108.22 84.47
Australia 104.41 106.97 103.94 100.67 84.47
Switzerland 99.28 96.76 100.74 105.04 111.72
Norway 99.09 96.83 99.67 102.74 100.82
US 98.64 95.29 101.04 107.26 106.27
Czech Republic 98.30 97.71 98.98 100.36 114.44
Hungary 95.88 95.14 97.65 100.36 130.79
Poland 94.25 90.36 96.66 103.45 130.79
L a t v i a 90.70 84.71 94.59 105.28 155.31
avge. OECD21 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
    in levels 506.88 340.29 655.16 314.88 36.70
avge. EU14 98.67 98.35 98.79 99.26 104.80
avge. candidates 94.78 91.98 96.97 102.36 132.83
SD all 4.62 8.20 3.23
____________________________________________________________
    Notes:
- See the notes to the previous table.
- The figures shown in the Table are averages of the values corresponding to the three types of literacy
assessed in the study (math, science and reading) with weights 0.25, 0.25 and 0.50 respectively.
- The % in levels 1 or 2 refers to the reading literacy scale, which is the only one for which this information
is supplied.
- Source: OECD (2001a).
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Table A4.11: PISA and TIMSS results by subject
______________________________________________________________________
PISA
reading
PISA
m a t h
PISA
science
PISA
avge.
TIMSS
m a t h
TIMSS
science
TIMSS
avge.
Finland 107.57 105.63 106.57 106.83
U K 103.03 104.25 105.38 103.92 96.68 101.64 99.17
Ireland 103.82 99.12 101.61 102.10 101.50 102.30 101.90
Sweden 101.65 100.50 101.42 101.31 99.95 101.73 100.85
Austria 99.88 101.49 102.80 101.01 103.81 106.10 104.96
Belgium 99.88 102.47 98.25 100.12 105.06 97.07 101.04
France 99.49 101.88 99.04 99.98 103.61 94.70 99.13
Denmark 97.91 101.29 95.28 98.10 96.68 90.89 93.77
Spain 97.12 93.80 97.26 96.33 93.79 98.31 96.06
Germany 95.35 96.56 96.46 95.93 98.03 100.97 99.51
I t a l y 95.94 90.06 94.68 94.16
Greece 93.38 88.09 91.31 91.54 93.21 94.51 93.86
Portugal 92.59 89.47 90.92 91.39 87.44 91.27 89.37
Netherlands 104.19 106.49 105.35
Japan 102.84 109.76 108.94 106.09 116.52 108.58 112.52
Canada 105.20 105.03 104.78 105.06 101.50 100.97 101.23
N. Zealand 104.22 105.82 104.59 104.71 97.84 99.83 98.84
Australia 104.02 105.03 104.59 104.41 102.07 103.63 102.86
Switzerland 97.32 104.25 98.25 99.28 104.96 99.26 102.09
Norway 99.49 98.33 99.04 99.09 96.87 100.21 98.55
US 99.29 97.15 98.84 98.64 96.30 101.54 98.93
Czech Rep. 96.93 98.14 101.22 98.30 108.62 109.15 108.89
Bulgaria 104.00 107.44 105.73
Slovenia 104.19 106.49 105.35
Hungary 94.56 96.17 98.25 95.88 103.42 105.34 104.39
S l o v a k i a 105.35 103.44 104.39
L a t v i a 90.23 91.24 91.12 90.70 94.95 92.22 93.58
Romania 92.83 92.41 92.62
Lithuania 91.87 90.51 91.18
Cyprus 91.29 88.04 89.65
Poland 94.37 92.62 95.67 94.25
avge. OECD21 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
    in levels 507.60 507.45 504.85 506.88 519.24 525.89 522.57
avge. EU14 99.05 98.05 98.54 98.67 98.66 98.83 98.75
avge. cands 94.02 94.54 96.56 94.78 99.61 99.45 99.53
______________________________________________________________________
   Notes
- TIMSS: scores are for 13-year olds. In the cases of the UK and Belgium, reported figures are based on the
unweighted average of mean regional scores (for England and Scotland and Flanders and Wallonia
respectively).
- Countries ranked by average PISA scores (with weights 0.5 for reading and 0.25 for mathematics and
science), except candidate countries, which are ranked by their average TIMSS score (with equal weights
for mathematics and science).
- Sources: OECD (2001a) and The Economist (1997).
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Table A4.12: Communications and technology indicators
__________________________________________________________________
te lephone
lines
mobile
phones
personal
computers
internet
hosts
R&D
personnel
Denmark 120.26 127.91 133.46 130.31 127.14
Sweden 122.81 163.05 127.80 138.36 149.26
Finland 100.95 201.00 123.49 251.31 109.19
Netherlands 108.05 74.85 112.31 106.64 86.57
Germany 103.31 59.74 107.75 42.82 110.44
Belgium 91.11 60.79 101.14 64.65 88.63
Ireland 79.26 90.31 96.08 32.83 90.47
U K 101.49 88.55 93.01 66.29 95.50
Austria 89.47 99.10 82.54 69.87 63.47
France 103.86 66.06 73.49 27.12 103.73
I t a l y 82.18 124.75 61.32 23.60 51.42
Spain 75.44 62.90 51.21 21.73 50.91
Portugal 75.25 108.58 28.75 18.70 46.11
Greece 95.11 68.17 18.35 15.23 30.16
US 120.44 89.96 162.18 400.13 143.40
Switzerland 122.99 82.58 149.16 88.49 117.27
Australia 93.29 100.50 145.56 117.01 130.96
Norway 120.26 166.57 132.05 185.52 142.94
Canada 115.52 61.85 116.70 111.41 106.07
N. Zealand 87.28 71.34 99.76 145.07 64.88
Japan 91.65 131.43 83.88 42.91 191.50
Slovenia 68.33 29.52 88.73 21.39 87.81
Czech Rep. 66.33 33.03 34.41 22.64 47.67
S l o v a k i a 52.11 30.57 23.02 9.89 72.79
Hungary 61.22 36.90 20.83 23.39 42.87
Lithuania 54.66 25.30 19.10 7.10 79.11
Poland 41.54 17.57 15.52 9.75 52.98
Estonia 62.50 59.74 12.17 42.66 78.69
Turkey 46.28 18.62 8.20 2.87 11.35
Romania 29.52 10.19 3.61 2.27 54.11
Bulgaria 59.95 5.27 2.99 68.15
L a t v i a 55.03 23.90 11.82 40.92
avge. OECD21 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
     in levels 548.81 284.57 282.78 484.83 2563.38
avge. EU14 96.33 99.70 86.48 72.10 85.93
avge. candidates 54.32 26.42 25.06 14.25 57.86
__________________________________________________________________
   Definitions:
- main telephone lines per 1.000 people in 1998
- number of mobile telephones per 1.000 people in 1998
- personal computers per 1000 people in 1998
- internet hosts per 10.000 people in 2000
- R&D personnel = scientists and engineers employed in R&D per million, most recent year available (ranges
between 1987 and 1997).
- Source: World Bank, 2000/01 World Development Report.
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According to most of these indicators, mean EU performance is sligthly below the OECD
average and significantly above that of the group of candidate countries (except for the
TIMSS study, where the last group does slightly better than the EU14 on average). A
particularly worrisome finding of IALS is that a large fraction of the population (43.54% for
the OECD21 and over 60% in the candidate countries) lacks basic literacy and quantitative
skills that are likely to be important both on the job and in everyday life. The corresponding
figures for the (reading literacy of the) student population are only somewhat better (36.70%
and 48.75% respectively) according to the PISA study. It is also interesting to note that the
cross-country variation in skill levels (as measured by the standard deviation of normalized
scores) is much higher at the bottom of the distribution (5th percentile score) than for mean or
top performance levels, and that there is essentially no correlation between mean national
performance and the range of scores in the PISA study. This suggests that the quality of the
educational system is particularly important for disadvantaged individuals, and that the
performance of this group can be improved without lowering average standards.
Finally, Table A4.12 collects various indicators of the penetration of ICT technologies and
of R&D effort. In terms of these indicators, most candidate countries are lagging well behind
the EU which is, in turn, far below US standards. Within the EU, there is a clear divide
between the north and the south, with the Scandinavian countries at one end of the scale and
Spain, Portugal and Greece at the other, in terms of indices of computer and internet use and
R&D investment.
5. Social capital: a survey of the theoretical and empirical literature
The attention paid by economists to social capital has been rapidly increasing in the last
decade. The term social capital was rendered popular by the contributions of Coleman (1988,
1990) and Putnam (1993, 1995) and by now the World Bank (2002) has an excellent internet
site with an entire electronic library on the subject. Coleman starts with the consideration
that social interaction brings about long lasting patterns of relations, which constitute a
resource available to individual actors. Such a resource may be accumulated or depleted over
time and is defined by its productive function: it allows actors to reach goals otherwise not
reachable or it diminishes the cost of reaching them. Thus, it may be thought of as a peculiar
form of capital, namely a ‘social capital’, whose specific characteristic consists in the fact
that it is not incorporated in physical goods or in single human beings, as physical and human
capital, but rather in social relations: it is an attribute of social structures. Examples of social
capital are the level of trust and the information potential incorporated in relations, the
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existence of civic norms with effective sanctions, and the presence of hierarchical and
horizontal relations and organizations.
A critical difference between social capital and other forms of capital, stressed by
Coleman, is that it presents a key aspect of public goods: ‘As an attribute of the social
structure in which a person is embedded, it is not the private property of any of the persons
who benefit from it’. This poses a problem of under-investment, since ‘there will be in society
an imbalance between the relative investment in organizations that produce private goods for
the market and in organizations (often voluntary associations) from which the benefits are
not captured – an imbalance in the sense that if the positive externalities created by such
social capital could be internalized, it would come to exist in greater quantity’. Thus, private
investment in social capital could fall short of the social optimum; on the other hand, if
social capital is accumulated through interaction among individuals, public provision cannot
be a solution either. One of the key contributions of social capital, according to Coleman, is to
the accumulation of human capital: it is much easier to develop individual skills in a
socially rich environment than in a socially poor one. Since human capital accumulation
constitutes an engine of growth in advanced economies, social capital appears in a way as a
deep root of growth processes.
Putnam (1993a) investigates the link between social capital and economic and political
performance in Italy and finds that a great part of the difference in development between
Southern and Northern Italian regions is ‘explained’ by the different presence of networks of
horizontal organizations, which is a historical heritage and constitutes a form social
capital. In particular, he shows that local governments are more efficient where civic
engagement is stronger, and argues that civic engagement is strictly related to the presence of
horizontal associational networks. In other works (1993b, 1995a, 1995b, 1996, 2000) he extends
the analysis of social capital. In particular, applying it to the U.S., he argues that the stock
of American social capital has been declining in the late Twentieth Century, mainly due to
the disappearance of the ‘civic generation’, come to age between the Great Depression and
World War II, and to television, that keeps individuals apart from one another.
Nevertheless, his last work also discusses some signs of revival.
Already in these contributions, the authors do not always refer the term social capital to
the same thing: Putnam’s definition is relatively narrow, whereas Coleman’s one is broader.
The World Bank now defines social capital at the broadest level as ‘the norms and networks
that enable collective action’. Different authors have proposed still different definitions, so
that by now ‘social capital’ denotes more a whole strand of research than a single concept.
Our first step is consequently to review the various theoretical definitions and to provide a
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conceptual clarification. Next, we consider the empirical problem of measuring social capital
and its effects. The subsequent step is to analyze the process of social capital accumulation.
Finally, we consider some policy implications, with particular attention to Europe.
a. What is social capital?
Let us start with a rather general definition of social capital – adapted from the World
Bank – as the norms and social relations embedded in the social structure of a group that
enable people to coordinate action to achieve desired goals. This definition deserves some
comments. First of all, the group considered might consist of only one individual, at one
extreme, as well as of the whole society, at the opposite extreme; correspondingly, we can
define social capital at the individual as well as at the aggregate level, and we can choose
between focusing on a specific group or on the society as a whole. Secondly, social capital
consists of norms and social relations, which are attributes of the social structure. They can be
reinforced or weakened over time, but at a given point in time they constitute a stock. Third,
this stock is ‘productive’, in the sense that it allows group members to reach their goals. Such
goals may concern standard output and income, but may also concern socially provided goods,
like status and friendship. Moreover, the goals pursued by one group may be in accordance or
contrary to those of other groups, so that social capital may display both positive and
negative externalities (for instance, it may serve cooperative as well as rent-extracting
purposes). Fourth, social capital is both accumulated and displays its effects through social
interaction: it is this way that norms and relations are reinforced or weakened and it is this
way that coordination among people is achieved. Such coordination may take place at two
levels: either within the group members (‘bonding social capital’), or with non-members
(‘bridging social capital’). There is an intrinsic difficulty in the aggregation of social capital,
because what is productive for a group may either hurt or benefit a different group: if we
collect together groups with a strong ‘bonding’ social capital, we do not necessarily end up
with a high aggregate level of social capital; ‘bridging’ links play a crucial role. For this
reason, it is useful to work both with an individual-level definition of social capital and
with a group-level one. In the literature both are present. Let us consider them in turn.
i. Individual social capital
Glaeser, Laibson and Sacerdote (2000) propose to define individual social capital as an
individual’s social skills, which are partly innate (‘e.g., being extroverted and
charismatic’), but partly cultivated (e.g., popularity), i.e., they are the result of an
investment. Social skills enable an individual to ‘to reap market and non-market returns from
interaction with others. As such, individual social capital might be seen as the social
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component of human capital’. Not all of the social skills which are beneficial to an
individual are also beneficial to the aggregate outcome of social interaction: for instance, the
ability to persuade others that you are trustworthy when you are not generates a negative
externality (think e.g. of some sellers of encyclopedias or of used cars), whereas the ability to
induce others to participate to a socially beneficial project generates a positive one.
Moreover, the same social skills may be used sometimes to increase aggregate outcome, but
sometimes only to increase the slice reaped by their owner, with a possible aggregate loss.
This problem makes it difficult to aggregate individual social capital over a whole economy
(or even over a group), since one should incorporate ‘all of the cross-person externalities
generated by the different types of individual social capital’. The consequence is that ‘the
determinants of social capital at the individual level may not always determine social
capital at the society-level’. On the other side, the big advantage of this framework is that
it allows studying individual decisions of investment in social capital with standard
investment models, which provide predictions that can be confronted with the data. Glaeser,
Laibson and Sacerdote perform such exercise and find that individuals invest in social skills
in the same way as they invest in human capital.
Two remarks are in order. On one side, Glaeser, Laibson and Sacerdote’s definition of social
capital does not really fit the definition we have given above, since they focus on individual
characteristics and not on traits of the social structure. As they recognize, what they are
analyzing is the social component of human capital, which, for the sake of clarity, should
perhaps be kept separated from the concept of social capital. On the other side, the amount
of social skills belonging to an individual is highly correlated with the amount of his or her
social connections, an aspect that is better compatible with our definition.
In this spirit, DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999) define individual social capital as an
individual’s connections to others and argue that it matters much for private provision of
local amenities and of local public goods. They also investigate empirically whether
homeownership increases investment in local amenities and social capital and find that
indeed it does, especially because it reduces individual mobility. We discuss this last point in
Section 4.
ii. Group social capital
At the aggregate level, definitions of social capital tend to focus either on the density of
trust, which facilitates collective action and reduces free-riding, or on networks of civic
engagement and of horizontal associations, following Putnam. Although these two aspects
overlap to some extent, so that it is often not easy to distinguish between them, they have
given rise to two strands of the literature.
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Trust
Although at first sight very intuitive, the notion of trust is quite hard to define
theoretically in a clear-cut way. There is a huge literature on this topic, but its subtleties are
probably not so relevant for an aggregate theory of social capital, especially when it comes to
the empirical side. A relevant feature of trusting behavior seems to be that it exposes an
individual to the risk of being worse off, if others behave in a purely selfish way. A key
effect is that trusting others may make them more trustworthy. If this happens, the
advantages of cooperation may be exploited, if it does not, trusting people may be exploited
by non-trustworthy ones.
Paldam and Svendsen (2000) define social capital as ‘the density of trust within a group’
and notice that ‘the group may be extended to the whole society’, consistently with the
definition we gave above. They discuss the link between social capital theories dealing with
goodwill (management), credibility (macroeconomic policy), cooperative solutions (game
theory) and group norms (anthropology and psychology), and point out three possible, non
mutually exclusive approaches to social capital: as a factor in a production function, as a
factor that reduces transaction costs and as determinant of monitoring costs.
Fukuyama (1995a, 1995b) identifies social capital with trust and argues that it determines
the industrial structure of an economy. Germany, Japan and the United States, for instance,
are high trust societies, where trust is not restricted to the family, but rather generalized,
whereas Taiwan, Hong-Kong, Italy and France are examples of low-trust societies. In the
former group of countries it is easy to find giant, professionally managed corporations, because
people are better able to cooperate on an enlarged scale, whereas, in the latter group, smaller,
family-owned and -managed firms dominate the industrial structure. In general, Fukuyama
argues that the strength of family ties may be detrimental to the emergence of large
organizations, and that, where familism is not accompanied by a strong culture of work and
education, it may lead to stagnation, as pointed out, e.g., by Banfield (1958). This does not
automatically imply that high trust, and hence large companies, are per se better performing
or even better for aggregate growth, since what they gain in scale may be lost in flexibility
and rapidity of decision making. The economic success of Northern Italy provides a good
example.
The theoretical relationship between trust and growth is investigated by Zak and Knack
(2001) through a moral hazard model, in which formal and informal institutions determine
the amount of monitoring that a principal needs to exercise over an agent. They argue that
‘informal sanctions depend on, or are facilitated by, social ties’, which can be captured by a
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notion of social distance, and that monitoring costs and risk aversion may make low trust
societies have lower income and lower investments, and thereby lower growth. Moreover,
they add that trust is lower in more heterogeneous societies because a higher social distance
among actors weakens informal controls. As a consequence, in such societies growth may be
lower as well: there may be a ‘low trust poverty trap’.
Indeed, one can observe that their model deals more with informal sanctions than with
trust: once we consider the incentives induced by such sanctions, we can avoid any reference to
trust without conceptually losing anything (in Williamson’s words, ‘calculative trust is a
contradiction in terms’). The point is that trust is the complex product of a structure of social
relations, of the interactions that take place in it, and of how these shape individual
identities and motivations, and finally behaviors. So let us now turn to a more structural point
of view.
 Social norms and networks
As we pointed out above, Putnam defines social capital in terms of networks of civic
engagement and of horizontal associations. Norms and associations are a relatively stable
attribute of a social structure, and can be thought of as a stock. They arise through social
interaction and they shape the way individuals interact with one another, so that social
interaction (a flow) is both a source of social capital and the means through which it
displays its productive services. If a norm of cooperation or of participation is effective, those
behaviors that are in accordance with it will also appear quite stable. This has generated
some confusion in the theoretical definition of social capital, since the term is sometimes
referred to the stock of social norms and networks and sometimes to the specific form of
interaction that arises out of it. This has led some author, for instance Bowles e Gintis (2000),
to abandon the term social capital in favor of something they perceive as more precise. In
particular, Bowles and Gintis prefer to speak of community governance, arguing that it is
often the case in the literature that the term social capital is referred to what groups do
rather than to what they own, and such aspect is better captured by the notion of community
governance – as opposed to the governance mechanisms of the state and of the market – than
by the notion of social capital. Notice, however, that considering just the community of direct
and frequent interactions, expressed by Bowles and Gintis’ idea of community governance, is
restrictive, since it may overlook the strength of weak ties, stressed e.g. by Granovetter (1973)
and by Narayan (1999), and the relevance of generalized trust, as we have discussed above.
Aware of such conceptual problems, Fukuyama (1999) proposes to change his previous
definition of social capital in terms of trust into the following one: ‘social capital is an
instantiated informal norm that promotes cooperation between two or more individuals’. He
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argues that ‘by this definition, trust, networks, civil society, and the like which have been
associated with social capital are all epiphenomenal, arising as a result of social capital but
not constituting social capital itself’. One crucial aspect of such definition is the extent of
validity of the norms considered (also referred to by Fukuyama as the ‘radius of trust, that is,
the circle of people among whom cooperative norms are operative’). This leads to a more
precise specification of the group (or institution) to which one refers the term social capital.
A second crucial aspect is that cooperation within a certain group may have positive as
well as negative external effects on other groups. For instance, the degree of participation to
associational activities does not necessarily increase aggregate (society-level) social capital,
as hypothesized by Putnam: Olson (1982) emphasizes that the purpose of some groups is to
exert a distributive pressure, i.e. to seek rents, and that active participation to such groups
indeed increases the level of distributive struggle in a society and decreases social capital.
Both these aspects – the extension of the group and the kind of external effects – are captured
by Collier (1998). He starts with a definition of social capital in terms of those externality-
generating social interactions which are either themselves durable or whose effects are
durable, and he carefully distinguishes among the various institutional levels at which
social capital may be present: the family, the firm, the government and the civil society.
Social capital at the firm level is the easiest one to study. As already noticed by Coleman,
the internal organization of a firm is intentionally designed to make profits, so that this is
one of the few cases in which social capital is the product of a specific investment and not just
the by-product of other activities. Such aspects are widely studied in management and
business disciplines, although without any reference to the notion of social capital. A proof of
their relevance is the amount of money that firms spend not only to design internal structures,
but also to train managers and workers to work in groups: management consultants and labor
psychologists are often very well paid to provide such training, evidently because it pays off.
Inter-firm linkages, typical, for instance, of industrial districts, constitute a second form of
firm-level social capital. Signorini (2000) presents a very detailed analysis of the Italian
case, which helps to understand how the success of many small Italian firms relies upon
external economies that compensate the scale disadvantage.
Coming to the family, we have noticed above that Fukuyama and Banfield, among others,
emphasize the possible contrast between strong family ties and more aggregate levels of
social capital. Family is indeed the primary source of narrow trust, i.e. trust in peer or
primary groups, but whether or not trust generalizes and extends beyond kinship relations
depends to a high degree both upon the kind of interaction that takes place in the
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intermediate structures of the civil society, and upon the well functioning of the government,
which can provide, for instance, a reliable judicial system.
As we have seen, Putnam emphasizes the first aspect, i.e. participation in associational
networks at the level of the civil society. However, whether trust remains confined within
certain groups or generalizes beyond their scope depends to a high degree on whether groups
form along social cleavages or across them: one needs to look at the specific kind of social
participation and not just at the density of associations, although the latter one may be
sometimes the best empirical proxy available.
As far as the link between social capital and the well functioning of government is
concerned, Narayan (1999) points out it is not univocally of substitution or of
complementarity, since when either of them is poor, the other one may work as a substitute,
but if both of them are rich, they indeed work as complements (he also provides a detailed
discussion of the empirical evidence available). Exactly the fact that formal institution
(market and state) are not working properly may increase reliance on primary groups: what
Rose (1998) claims happened in Russia after the collapse of Soviet Union, but he also points
out that such reliance on primary groups had been previously fostered by the extreme
centralization and had emerged as a way of defending oneself from the invasion of the state.
Another interesting example of how government, family and civil society interplay to shape
trust, norms and connections (social capital) at the level of some groups, but with troublesome
extensions to the whole society, is Gambetta’s (1993) analysis of the Sicilian Mafia.
The problem is that social capital tends to exert positive aggregate effects when trust,
norms and networks that foster cooperation extend beyond primary, ethnic, linguistic or even
income groups and form ‘bridges’ among different groups. This last point is made with
particular strength by Narayan (1999), who observes that the same links that keep together
the members of a group may also exclude the non-members, and who displays an analytical
framework to study ‘bonding’ and ‘bridging’ (i.e. intra-group and inter-group) social capital
at the level of the civil society, together with its connections to the functioning of the state.
b. Empirical evidence on social capital and aggregate performance
There is by now a wide empirical literature on the effects of social capital on aggregate
performance. The World Bank considers a list of eleven broad topics to which social capital
is relevant. Here we analyze only some of them: in particular, we consider empirical evidence
on the effects of social capital on growth, trade and migration, finance, government
performance, education, crime and violence.
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i. Social capital and growth
Knack and Keefer (1997) examine various possible empirical proxies for social capital,
corresponding to the different aspects emphasized by the theoretical literature, and assess
their impact on growth. They discuss three main relationships: between trust and civic norms
and economic growth; between associational activity and growth; and between trust and civic
norms and their determinants, including associational activity and formal institutions. On the
latter aspect we shall come back in the next section. Let us consider here the first two ones.
Knack and Keefer consider data from the World Value Survey for 29 market economies
between 1981 and 1991. As a proxy for trust (TRUST) they take for each nation the percentage
of respondents that most people can be trusted (after deleting the ‘don’t know’ answers) to the
following question: ‘Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or
that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?’. This measure of trust exhibits a high
cross-country variance and high serial autocorrelation within each country. To capture the
strength of norms of civic cooperation, they construct a variable (CIVIC) on the base of the
answers to various questions about how individuals evaluate some anti-civic behaviors. These
two variables are highly positively correlated and both of them are designed to capture
generalized trust and cooperative attitudes, rather than social capital at the level of a
specific group. The first main finding of Knack and Keefer is that ‘trust and civic cooperation
are associated with stronger economic performance’. In particular, they find that one standard
deviation change in TRUST is associated with a change in growth of more than half of a
standard deviation. This result seems to be quite robust. The second question they address
concerns the effects of associational activities, about which, as noticed above, Olson and
Putnam have contrasting hypotheses. As a proxy for the density of horizontal networks in a
society (GROUPS), they consider the average number of groups cited per respondent when
faced with the question of whether they belong to any of a list of groups of ten kinds. The
second main result is that ‘associational activity is not correlated with economic performance
– contrary to Putnam's (1993) findings across Italian regions’. They also split the data to
identify the possibly contrasting effects of ‘Putnamesque’ and ‘Olsonian’ groups, i.e., of groups
that ‘involve interactions that can build trust and cooperative habits’ and of groups with
redistributive goals, respectively. The results are contrary to what the theory predicts, but,
by admission of the authors, they should be regarded as only preliminary. Their relevance,
rather than substantial, is methodological.
Zak and Knack (2001) perform a similar analysis, using the same variable for trust, but
with more data. In particular, while Knack and Keefer’s investigation concerns 29 OECD
countries, Zak and Knack add to the sample 12 additional countries. The effect of the larger
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sample is basically that it reinforces the statistical impact of trust on investments and
growth. Moreover, they investigate the impact of formal institutions and social homogeneity,
finding that they ‘increase growth in part by building trust’.
A related empirical contribution is due to Temple and Johnson (1998), who show that
indexes of ‘social capability’ constructed in the early Sixties, adapted from the work of
Adelman and Morris (1967), are good predictors of long run growth for a wide set of developing
countries. In particular, they find that a mass communication index is robustly correlated with
growth and they argue that this may be due to the fact that ‘it captures the social capital of
developing countries’. Although these results are striking, it is a bit hard to understand
exactly how one should evaluate them, because the social capability index used is quite
composite and not so straightforward to interpret, and because it is not very clear how the
index of mass communication is related to social capital.
Taken together, this evidence consistently shows that social capital, especially in the
form captured by the variable TRUST, has a relevant impact on growth. Glaeser, Laibson,
Sheinkman and Soutter (2000) address the question of what exactly TRUST measures. To this
purpose, they use two experiments and a survey, and assess that standard questions about
trust, such as the one reflected in TRUST, provide a better measure of the level of
trustworthiness in a society rather than of trusting behavior. Nevertheless, they also assess
the possibility to gain robust measures of social capital (trust) as an individual-level
variable. In particular, measures of past trusting behavior predict an individual’s trust better
than abstract questions.
ii. Social capital and government performance
Hall and Jones (1999) explain a relevant part of country productivity as due to institutions
and government policies (what they call social infrastructures). Since these characteristics
are endogenous, they propose a set of instruments. A growing amount of evidence is now
showing that the quality of government is positively influenced by social capital. An in-
depth investigation of the determinants of government quality is due to La Porta et al (1999).
They evaluate empirically the ability of economic, political and cultural theories to explain
the observed quality of governments, according to different measures. Broadly speaking, they
find that economic theories focusing on efficiency are rejected by the data; political theories
focusing on redistribution are highly and robustly supported by the evidence (as instrument for
redistributive tendencies they use ethnolinguistic heterogeneity and legal system); finally,
cultural theories focusing on trust, social norms of tolerance and work ethic cannot be rejected.
In particular, as an instrument for such cultural characteristics they use religion, in the spirit
of Weber (1958), and find essentially that ‘predominantly Protestant countries have better
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government than either predominantly Catholic or predominantly Muslim countries’. Such
results prove to be robust to many alternative specifications and confirm earlier findings of the
same authors.
One of the main functions of governments is to provide public goods. Alesina, Baqir and
Easterly (1999) relate spending in public goods to ethnic division at the level of cities,
metropolitan areas and urban counties in the United States. Their finding that ‘more
ethnically diverse jurisdictions in the United States have higher spending and higher
deficits/debt per capita, and yet devote lower shares of spending to core public goods like
education and roads’ is consistent with the idea that ‘heterogeneous and polarized societies
will value public goods less’.
The relationship between the variables considered in these studies, like ethnolinguistic
heterogeneity and religion, and social capital will be considered in the next section. Here, in
turn, we pass to the analysis of the impact of social capital on education.
iii. Social capital and education
One of the possibly most relevant contributions of social capital is to the formation of
human capital. This was very early recognized by Coleman (1988), who argued that the same
basic individual skills have much better chances of being well cultivated and developed in a
socially rich environment than in a socially poor one. Goldin and Katz (1999), in a study on
the development of secondary education in the United States and in particular in Iowa,
acknowledge that, ‘because educational decisions are made primarily at a local level in the
United States, the production of human capital depends largely on social capital lodged in
small communities’. As a measure of community-level social capital they use ‘the amount of
public resources committed to education as a fraction of the total resources of the community,
given by income’. It is interesting to see that this ‘indicator of educational commitment rises
steeply during the 1910S and for most of the 1920S’ and then rises again in the 150S, but it is
harder to take it as a direct measure of community-level social capital. However, one further
empirical observation supports this interpretation: ‘one good reason for building schools in
rural America was to stop the drift of the population to the cities’, i.e., to save and promote
community cohesion. The almost ubiquitous public provision of schooling is consistent with the
view ‘public funding was part of an intergenerational loan. According to this view,
homogeneous communities, in which people tend to remain and take an active interest in each
other, would be more likely to provide intergenerational loans’. Indeed, such communities
were present in Iowa, one of the leading states in the development of schooling. In particular,
‘smaller towns of Iowa had the highest rates of secondary school attendance’, even though a
more precise assessment of why this was the case turns out to be difficult.
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A relevant problem in empirical analyses of the link between social capital and education
is that there is an issue of reverse causation. Goldin and Katz find a strong correlation
‘between an index of social capital today (combining measures of associational activities,
social trust, and political/civic participation)’ and ‘the high school graduation rate in 1928’.
They conclude that social capital has a double role of condition for accumulation of human
capital and of handmaiden of human capital. The issue of how education determines social
capital is also tackled by Helliwell and Putnam (1999), to whom we will turn in the next
section.
iv. Social capital and crime
It is intuitive that social capital, determining the degree of social cohesion, may have a
relevant influence on the rates of crime and violence. Coleman (1990) already stresses this
point. Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman (1996) explore this issue. In face of several possible
empirical explanations of the high variance of crime across time and space, they take a sharp
interactionist view, assessing that ‘positive covariance across agents’ decisions about crime is
the only explanation for variance in crime rates higher than the variance predicted by
differences in local conditions’. Patterns of local interaction thus seem to drive crime to a
relevant extent, the more so as far as young people and petty crimes are concerned.
v. Social capital and financial development
Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2000) investigate the impact of trust on financial
development. They argue that ‘financing is nothing but an exchange of a sum of money today
for a promise to return more money in the future. Whether such an exchange will take place
depends upon not only the enforceability of contracts, but also the extent the financier trusts
the financee. In fact, financial contracts are trust intensive par excellence. Thus, if trust
matters, it should matter most for the development of financial markets’. Their proxy for trust
is different from standard survey measures, since they consider participation in elections and
blood donation. They use data on Italian regions, which present the advantage of having the
same ‘legal, administrative, judiciary, regulatory and tax system’, but at the same time very
different levels of social capital, and assess that higher trust increases investment in stocks,
access to credit and use of checks, whereas it reduces investment in cash and resorting to
informal credit channels. Moreover, such effects appear to be more relevant where legal
enforcement is weaker and among less-educated people.
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c. Social capital accumulation
The theoretical and empirical literature considered so far shows that social capital,
defined and measured in several ways, matters for a great variety of economic outcomes. This
finding raises the questions of how social capital is accumulated and of whether its
accumulation may be enhanced by policy intervention. We address the first question in this
section and the second in the next one.
i. Theory
There is not much theoretical work discussing the determinants of social capital. According
to Glaeser, Laibson and Sacerdote (2000), as we noticed above, this lack is due to the fact that
most definitions and measures of social capital are aggregate ones, whereas economists are
used to think of capital accumulation as a result of individual investments. They therefore
define social capital in terms of individual social skills, i.e. as the social component of human
capital, and apply a standard model of individual investment. Such model implies that
investment in social capital should increase with patience and with the relevance of positive
externalities in the return to social capital investment (e.g., individuals invest more in social
skills in those occupations where returns to social skills are higher), whereas it decreases
when are higher expected mobility (e.g., homeowners should invest more in social skills), the
opportunity cost of time, the rate of depreciation and the degree of community-specificity of
social capital. Moreover, investment should decrease with age, but, assuming that individual
endowment at birth is sufficiently low, the stock of individual social capital should first
increase and then decrease with age.
This model is theoretically very clear, but it does not solve the problem of aggregation, so
that aggregate determinants of social capital might be quite different from the determinants
of investment in individual social skills. In the authors’ words, ‘understanding the link
between individual and aggregate social capital is important, difficult, and best left to future
research’.
If we consider group-level definitions of social capital, both in terms of trust and of social
networks, the theory of social capital accumulation focuses on the individual problems of
whether to trust or not and of whether to join a group or not.
As far as trust is concerned, Alesina and La Ferrara (2000b) admit that ‘the theory of what
determines trust is sketchy at best’. They consider ‘five broad factors influencing how much
people trust others: 1) individual culture, traditions and religion; 2) how long an individual
has lived in a community with a stable composition; 3) recent personal history of misfortune;
4) the perception of being part of a discriminated group; 5) several characteristics of the
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composition of one’s community, including its racial and income heterogeneity’. However,
they do not display any formal model.
As far as participation in groups and associational activities is concerned, Alesina and La
Ferrara (2000a) focus on population heterogeneity and argue that its link with social
participation is theoretically ambiguous. On one hand, heterogeneity could increase the
number of associations, since each group would like to have its own ones. On the other hand,
heterogeneity may also increase the likelihood of mixed groups being formed. This, in turn,
may reduce participation if individuals prefer to interact with others similar to them (e.g. in
terms of income, ‘race’ or ethnicity).
ii. Evidence
Let us now consider the empirical evidence on the accumulation of the different kinds of
social capital (individual social skills, trust and social participation) and then on the extent
of the decline of social capital assessed by Putnam .
   Individual social capital
Using data from the General Social Survey in the U.S. from 1972 to 1998, Glaeser, Laibson
and Sacerdote’s (2000) find that their theoretical model (discussed above) fits well the data.
In particular, organization membership has an inverted u-shape over the life-cycle; the
prediction that expected mobility reduces individual social capital seems to be consistent
with the data, although they do not find a good instrument for expected mobility; more social
occupations induce higher investment in social skills; the evidence on the impact of
homeownership on group membership varies according to the kind of group (for instance, it is
low for political groups and high for school service): in general, it seems that homeownership
affects social capital more through its effect of reduced mobility than through patrimonial
effects, i.e. through incentives due to expected changes in property value; investment in
individual social skills might be indeed partly due to the opportunity cost of time, but it is
very difficult to find a satisfying empirical assessment of this relationship; physical
distance, unsurprisingly, affects negatively social connections; education and membership in
organizations are positively correlated, as predicted by the theory, since patience increases
both investment in human capital and in social capital; finally, the empirical evidence they
find leaves the authors agnostic as to the relevance of interpersonal complementarities.
As a general point, one might notice that most of the empirical proxies used by Glaeser,
Laibson and Sacerdote are more related with the rest of the literature on social capital than
with their own definition as the social component of human capital. Indeed, they
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acknowledge that standard measures of individual trust and of organization membership do
not capture in an obvious way what they define as ‘social capital’.
As discussed above, DiPasquale and Glaeser (1999) also start with an individual-level
definition of social capital, although they stress more an individual’s social connections with
others. Empirically, they study how homeownership may create incentives to social capital
accumulation and to provision of local amenities. This might work either through the fact
that such investments increase the value of property, or because owing a home reduces
mobility and thus increases the time one expects to enjoy the fruits of such investments. They
use data from the U.S. General Social Survey and from the German Socio-Economic Panel.
Both in the U.S. and in Germany they find a strong correlation between homeownership and
measures of civic engagement in one’s community (e.g. membership in nonprofessional
organizations, knowing the names of local political representatives, voting in local elections,
gardening and church attendance). Such effects are weaker in Germany than in the U.S.;
moreover, in the U.S. a larger fraction of the effect seems to be attributable to increased
community tenure. The authors are very careful about policy conclusions, since unobserved
omitted variables might play a relevant role (homeowners may be different from renters),
and since they do not measure either the positive or the negative externalities linked to
homeownership and decreased mobility.
A general conclusion is that individual incentives matter for social capital accumulation,
but not in a naïve way. Social rewards may provide more effective incentives to social capital
accumulation than material ones, a point that hints at the relevance of social capital for
‘relational production’ besides material production and that should be kept in mind when
thinking of policy intervention.
  Trust
Alesina and La Ferrara (2000b) consider both individual experiences and community
characteristics as possible determinants of individual trust. Using data from the General
Social Survey for the United States from 1974 to 1994, they find that the major causes of low
trust are recent traumatic experiences, belonging to a discriminated group, low income, low
education, living in a society with strong ‘racial’ cleavages or in one with high income
inequality. Religious beliefs and ethnic origins, in contrast, are found not to affect trust
significantly.
Glaeser et al (2000) combine survey and experimental data to separately identify the
determinants of trust and of trustworthiness. Two of their findings are that a smaller social
distance among individuals, for instance due to joint group membership or the same ‘race’ or
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nationality, increases both trust and trustworthiness; moreover, an individual’s higher status
induces others to behave in a more trustworthy manner toward him or her.
Finally, Knack and Keefer (1997) find that ‘trust and norms of civic cooperation are
stronger in countries with formal institutions that effectively protect property and contract
rights, and in countries that are less polarized along lines of class or ethnicity’.
Social participation
Alesina and La Ferrara (2000a) study participation in associational activities like
religious groups, sport groups, hobby clubs, unions, and so on (they consider participation in a
list of 16 different kinds of groups). They analyze data for metropolitan areas in the U.S. from
1974 to 1994, mainly from the General Social Survey. They run a probit regression to explain
the probability of social participation, controlling for individual and community
characteristics. The key results are striking: social participation is higher where income
inequality, ‘racial’ segmentation and ethnic segmentation are lower. This happens in the
North/Northwest of the U.S., the opposite features appearing in the South/Southeast.
Moreover, looking at participation in different kinds of groups, the authors find that
heterogeneity matters less for participation in groups with a relatively high degree of
excludability or a low degree of close interaction among members. Finally, they find that
‘racial’ segmentation matters more for individuals more averse to ‘racial’ mixing.
More in detail, they find that younger cohorts participate less than elder ones, providing
some support to Putnam’s idea of a decline in participation due to the aging of the ‘older civic
generation’. Years of schooling have a positive impact on participation. Women participate
less than men. Black people participate more. Young children reduce parents’ participation.
Family income has a positive effect, ‘suggesting that participation is a normal good’. Coming
to community characteristics, the measures of income inequality and of racial and ethnic
segmentation always have a negative impact on participation, controlling for individual
variables and for year and state dummies. The authors also perform some sensitivity
analysis, which confirms and even strengthen the results: they assess that an increase by one
standard deviation in racial segmentation, income inequality and ethnic segmentation reduces
the probability of participation by respectively eight, six and six percentage points; the
impact of passing from high school dropout to high school graduate or higher is a positive
increase of thirteen percentage points; moving form a full-time to a part-time job increases the
propensity to participate by four percentage points; finally having a child below the age of
five reduces it by 3.5 percentage points. Interestingly, the relation between participation and
income seems to be increasing but not linear: convex for low levels of income and concave for
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high levels. Instrumenting for income inequality leaves its effect on participation highly
negative and significant.
Helliwell and Putnam (1999) consider both trust and social participation at the same time.
They investigate whether and how education determines social capital. They start with the
observation that, although average educational levels have risen sharply in the United
States in the last half century, the same did not happen to political and social participation.
This is somehow puzzling, because individual education is widely acknowledged to be the
best predictor of many forms of political and social engagement. Helliwell and Putnam discuss
the theory trying to solve this puzzle and argue that it does not allow to reach a clear
conclusion. Using data from the US General Social Survey from 1972 to 1996 and from the
DDB-Needham Life Style surveys from 1975 to 1997, they assess that higher average
education increases trust and does not reduce participation.
 Is there a decline in social capital?
One of the main issues in the theory of social capital is the problem of a possible under-
investment. Coleman (1990) raises this issue and Putnam (1995, 2000) documents empirically a
decline in American social capital, identifying the main culprits in television and aging of
the ‘civic generation’ of Americans born between 1910 and 1940. Putnam finds that television is
responsible for up to a quarter of the decline in social capital and the aging of the ‘civic
generation’ up to half of it. However, there is no widespread agreement either on the
empirical relevance of such decline or on its causes.
Costa and Kahn (2001) argue that it has been overestimated by Putnam, although some
forms of social capital indeed declined in the U.S. from 1952 to 1998: whereas group
membership indeed diminished, the probability of volunteering did not; the largest declines
are found in the time devoted to entertainment and visits with friends, relatives and
neighbors. Such results are found using probit regressions with a great variety of data sources.
Costa and Kahn also show that the decline in the social capital produced outside the home is
mainly due to rising community heterogeneity (especially income inequality), whereas the
decline in the social capital produced within the home is mainly explained by women’s
increased labor force participation rate (always controlling for education).
d. Policy
Policy implications are drawn in a sparse and usually very cautious way in the literature
on social capital. The World Bank considers the following list of political issues, strictly
connected with social capital: crime and violence, trade, education, environment, finance,
health, nutrition and population, information technology, poverty and economic
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development, rural development, urban development and water supply and sanitation. Many
of them are more relevant for developing countries than for Europe, but some of them represent
hot issues in the current European political debate. Let us briefly examine some of the
indications arising from the literature.
i. Individual social capital
Those contributions that emphasize individual aspects of social capital make the general
point that its accumulation responds to individual incentives, but not in a naïve way. One of
the difficulties here comes from the fact that intrinsic motivations may be either reinforced
or crowded out by an exogenous introduction of incentive schemes. This is especially the case if
incentives change the way individuals interpret and frame a situation. For instance, suppose
that in a certain situation cooperation is perceived as the appropriate behavior, in
accordance to a social norm, and that we now introduce a fine to sanction defective behavior;
then individuals might abandon the social norm interpretation and embrace a market based
one, according to which defection amounts to purchasing a good (the individual advantage
arising from it) at a given price (the fine), without any remorse for a bad behavior: if the
monetary cost of the fine is lower than the psychological one perceived by breaking a norm,
the incentive will be counterproductive. Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) provide convincing
empirical evidence of this mechanism. A second problem is that, even if incentives to
individual investment in social capital were to work well, it is difficult to evaluate the
aggregate impact, because one should find a way to measure interpersonal externalities.
ii. Trust
Policy indications are somewhat easier to draw if one looks at the correlates of
generalized trust. In particular, policies that increase the well functioning of the state, the
effective protection of property rights, a low degree of inequality in the distribution of income
and a low degree of ‘racial’ heterogeneity create a favorable environment for the
development of trust. Whether or not such policies are desirable (in particular the latter two
ones) involves political issues that we do not tackle here.
The positive correlation found by Helliwell and Putnam (1999) between average education
and social capital provides an additional rationale, besides the traditional ones, to invest in
education even more than we are currently doing. This is especially advisable since, on one
hand, there is a virtuous dynamics between human capital and social capital accumulation,
and, on the other hand, trust-enhancing policies may start a multiplier mechanism. Indeed,
both the theory and the experimental evidence tell us that a key effect of trust is to induce a
higher trustworthiness, which in turn allows people to trust without being exploited. The role
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of policy may then be that of activating such mechanism, especially in low-trust
environments, such as some European regions, which otherwise may remain stuck in a low-
trust poverty trap, where low trust and low trustworthiness justify one another.
As we discussed above, trust-enhancing policies have a special relevance, among other
things, for the purposes of long-run growth and of financial development. What may be added
here is that they can play a special role in the context of the ‘new economy’, in which we are
more and more transacting ideas (e.g. inventions, images, and so on). Unlike physical goods,
whose characteristics are observable before the transaction, ideas cannot be revealed ex ante
(once they are communicated, there is no need to purchase them any more), so that trust comes
to play a prominent role. In a well operating market, reputation mechanisms may probably
substitute for trust to a high degree, but in new, emerging markets such element of stability is
absent, so that the level of trust and trustworthiness may determine whether some
innovative, idea-intensive activities take off at all – and may in any case substantially
reduce their transaction and monitoring costs.
iii. Social participation and networks
Social participation seems to be less an issue for Europe than it is for the United States.
The general problem in designing participation-enhancing policies is that one cannot, by
definition, force voluntary participation. With this caveat in mind, one can think of effective
incentive schemes, which are, however, hard to formulate in general terms. Notice that the
construction of networks of participation may be crucial at least at three levels. First, family-
and community-level participation facilitates human capital accumulation and private
provision of local amenities and of local public goods. Second, social participation at the
level of the civil society generates positive externalities, at least if one focuses attention on
‘Putnamesque’ groups and on ‘bridging’ links. In affluent societies, where material needs have
reached a high degree of satisfaction and relational needs assume a prominent role, these
kinds of participation dynamics may be crucial for individual and social well being. Finally,
cooperation networks among firms may provide at the same time those efficiency and
flexibility characteristics that allow a successful adaptation in rapidly changing economies,
but this is an area in which direct intervention may have positive as well as distortionary
effects, so that it is hard to identify policies recommendable in general.
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